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ABSTRACT
Since the early 1990s, Palestinian organizations have 
drawn from many sources and incrementally refined the 
process of suicide terrorism. By making the modus operandi 
socially acceptable and even fashionable, Palestinian 
organizations have normalized the deployment of suicide­
homicide bombers. These organizations have optimized the 
progress individuals take from reasoning and justifying to 
rationalizing and actually committing suicide terrorism. 
Palestinian organizations have not only developed a 
strategic weapon for their war with Israel, but also 
provided Islamist-terror organizations, such as those 
within the global al-Qaeda network, with the model 21st 
Century terrorist, as well as efficient methods to produce 
such individuals. By mobilizing mass support in the Sunni 
world and empowering the individual through the concepts of 
jihad and istishhad, the shahid, as epitomized by 
Palestinians during al-Aqsa intifada, secured suicide 
terrorism's growing organizational partiality, ensured 
lethality, decreasing targeting discrimination, and 
frequency in the international arena. Thus, the phenomenon 
of the Palestinian shahid has become a driving force behind 
the increasing spread of suicide terrorism worldwide.
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NOTE ON TRANSLATION AND TRANSLITERATION
Translating and transliterating a Semitic language to 
a Germanic one is like trying to replicate a brilliant 
painting using a sculptor's tools. That both Arabic and 
English maintain a richness that increases the amount of 
meanings words have contextually further complicates 
matters. Each Arabic root-word has various forms that lead 
to any number of representations. Regional dialects make 
translation even harder. So for the purposes of this work, 
translations refer to a word's common use within the 
context of the topic at hand. Transliterations simply 
reflect an attempt to minimize confusion. Arabic and other 
foreign words are italicized throughout the text unless the 
word's English equivalent is identical (e.g. Sunni) or 
similar (al-Qaeda versus al-Qa'eda). Silent Arabic letters, 
such as the ta'marbuta and haa', are not written, unless a 
word's English equivalent is the identical; for example, 
instead of shahadah, just shahada is written, but Allah is 
written as it commonly is in English. Oftentimes 
translations denote Arabic letters that have no English 
equivalent with numbers. Avoiding such confusing methods, 
apostrophes signify these unique letters. For example, 
depending on the vowel within the word, either 'a, 'e or ’u 
denotes the Arabic letter ’ayn.
Words are transliterated to English from Fousha
(Modern Standard Arabic); however, proper nouns defer to an 
'Ammiyya (Spoken Arabic) transliteration, in order to 
represent the colloquial form of Arabic that relates to the - 
individual or organization. For example, the Palestine 
Liberation Organization's Arabic name, Munazzmat al-Tahri.r 
al-Filastiniyya, employs the Arabic letter dHaa' to sound 
like a "z"—reflecting the Levantine dialect. Similarly, as 
an Egyptian, Ayman al-Zawahiri uses the Egyptian dialect 
for his name, which turns the dHaa' into a "zh" sound.
Words like Hezballah, which have numerous spellings in 
English, defer to the spelling that has the simplest 
English pronunciation; for example, although Hezballah 
represents two Arabic words, Hezb-Allah (Party of God), and 
the organization itself has at times spelled its name in 
English as Hezbollah and Hizballah, it is written as 
Hezballah throughout the text. Oftentimes one sees al- 
Qa'eda written as al-Qaida; to increase the 
transliterations' consistency, this work reserves the "i" 
for words requiring an "ee" sound. As a result shahid is 
x
written with an "i," although its English pronunciation 
more closely resembles "sha'heed."
For Hebrew proper nouns, all spoken Hebrew letters are 
given an English equivalent in order to maintain the 
integrity of the transliteration. For example, the letter 
khet maintains a "kh" denotation. Oftentimes one sees place 
names such as Mekhola spelled Mehola. As with the Arabic 
transliterations, however, the silent Hebrew heh is not 
identified; so Herzliya is written rather than Herzliyah. 
However, in words with an identical English equivalent the 




'amalyya istishhadiyya: "martyrdom operation"
al- 'ard: "female sexual honor"
da'awa: literally "calling"—meaning "proselytizing"
dar al-harb: literally "dwelling of war"
dar al-Islam: literally "dwelling of submission"
fard ayn: "individual obligation (to jihad)"
fard kafiya: "collective obligation (to jihad)"
fatwa: "(Islamic) edict" or "decree"
feda'i: literally "self-sacrificer"—meaning "one who risks 
his or her life"
fedayin: "self-sacrificers"—meaning "those who risk their 
lives"
hamula: "clan"
houriyyat al-ayn: "virgin maidens"
hudna: "armistice"




istishhad: literally "martyrdom"—meaning "self-sacrifice
for Allah's sake"
xii
istishhadi: literally "martyr"--meaning "one who 
intentionally commits martyrdom"
jannat al-firdaous: "heavenly gardens"
jahiliyya: "ignorance"—meaning "darkness without Allah"
jihad: literally "struggle"--meaning "holy war"
kafir: literally "infidel"—meaning "one who hides the
truth"
Khalifa: literally "successor"—meaning "Islam's highest
living authority"
kufr: literally "blasphemer"—meaning "one who conceals 
revelation"
madrassa: "(Islamic) school"
mufti: "(Islamic law) functionary"
mujahid: literally "struggler"—meaning "one who wages holy
war"
mujahedin: literally "strugglers"--meaning."those who wage
holy war"
al-Naqba: "the Catastrophe"
qadiyya: "a greater cause"
qowmiyya: "(Arab) nationalism"
sahwa: "awakening"
al-salaf al-salihin: literally "pious ancestors"—meaning
"Mohammed's immediate successors"
xiii
salafi: "(one who follows the ways of the) immediate
successors"
Salafiyya: "Salafism"
sammid: "one who practices steadfastness"
sammud: "steadfastness" or "perseverance"
shahada: literally "witness"—meaning "professing one's
submission to Allah" or "death for Allah's sake"
shahid: literally "(male) witness"—meaning "martyr"
shahida: literally "(female) witness"--meaning "martyr"
al-shahid al-hai: "the living martyr"
shari'a: "(Islamic) law"
(through his daughter)"




shuhada: literally "witnesses"—meaning "martyrs"
Sunni: "orthodox"
tawhid: literally "oneness"—meaning "monotheism"
’ulema: "(Islamic) scholars"
um'ma: "(global) Islamic community"
'urf: " (Arab) customary law"
waqf: " (Islamic) endowment"
xiv
Hebrew




AHC: Arab Higher Committee
AMB: Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade
AQI: Al-Qaeda in Iraq (al-Qaeda in the Land of Two Rivers
DFLP: Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
DOP: Declaration of Principles
ICT: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism
IDC: Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya
IDF: Israel Defense Force.
IRGC: Islamic (Iranian) Revolutionary Guard Corps
ISA: Israel Security Agency
LTTE: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MEMRI: Middle East Media Research Institute
PFLP: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
MFA: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs
PA: Palestinian Authority
PI J: Palestinian Islamic Jihad
PKK: Kurdish Workers' Party
PLO: Palestine Liberation Organization
PRC: Popular Resistance Committees
SSNP: Syrian Socialist-National Party




When Israel routed a coalition of Arab- armies in the 
1967 Six-Day War, some in the Arab world realized that they 
could not defeat the Jewish state in a conventional land 
war. Palestinian Arabs, however, sought to lead the way in 
a different type of warfare against Israel. In 1968, 
Palestinian terrorist groups under the structural umbrella 
of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)1 began using 
a myriad of different terror tactics against Israeli and 
Jewish targets in and outside the Middle East.2 These groups 
ushered in the era of modern terrorism by launching 
spectacular attacks (e.g. symbolic airline.hijackings),3 
which were only made possible by assailants' willingness to 
sacrifice their lives. With the success of these shocking 
1 Established in January 1964 at a summit of Arab states, 
Munazzmat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya (the Palestine Liberation 
Organization) or PLO did not find widespread acclaim by 
Palestinians until its cooptation by Yasser Arafat's militant 
group Fatah. Meaning "conquest" in Arabic, Fatah is the inversion 
of the acronym Harakat al-.Tahrir al-Watani al-Filistini (the 
Palestine National Liberation Movement).
2 Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab 
Conflict 1881-2001 (New York: Vintage, 2001), 373-379.
3 Bruce Hoffman, "Modern Terrorism Trends: Reevaluation after 
9/11," in Post-Modern Terrorism: Trends, Scenarios, and Future 
Threats, ed. Boaz Ganor (Herzliya, Israel: Publishing House, 
2005), 40.
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attacks, the PLO learned that operations using fedayin 
(self-sacrificers) had utility well beyond their apparent 
tactical advantages.
The PLO accordingly incorporated self-sacrificing 
operations into its overall political strategy. The new 
approach resulted in such romanticized creations as the 
Black September Organization, which with its horrific 
massacre of 11 Israeli Olympians at the 1972 Munich Games 
brought about the contemporary symbiosis between terrorism 
and the media. Garnering the spotlight of worldwide media 
attention, the PLO succeeded in arousing international 
sympathy and support for the Palestinian movement. These 
early Palestinian groups, however, neither truly harnessed 
nor exploited the strategic potential of suicide terrorism. 
Despite sending their fedayin on high-risk operations, 
which usually projected certain death, Palestinian 
leadership did not begin to promote laying down one's life 
intentionally as an end unto itself until years later.
Between the mid-1970s and early-1990s, a number of 
events affecting the Arab and Islamic worlds drastically 
changed the political atmosphere in the Middle East. A 
Sunni-Muslim sahwa (awakening) swept across Arab countries; 
Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini led an Islamic revolution 
2
in Iran, overthrowing Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi's pro- 
Western government; the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan; 
sectarian strife ravaged Lebanon in a bloody civil war; the 
Cold War's end, the first Palestinian intifada (uprising),4 
and the Gulf War all fostered vast political and social 
change. Accordingly, as identities formed and new 
viewpoints took effect politically and socially, the manner 
in which organizations employed violence also fluctuated.
4 In Arabic intifada literally means "shaking-off." In the case 
of the two Palestinian uprisings, it refers to shaking off the 
"occupiers."
5 Hezb'ollah stands for the "Party of God" in Arabic. Although 
not officially founded until February 16, 1985, Iranian Pasdaran 
operatives set up Hezballah in 1982, and operated it under the 
cover name Islamic Jihad Organization.
6 The Cult of the Suicide Bomber, prod, and dir. David Betty and 
Kevin Toolis, 1 hr. 35 min., Many Rivers Films, 2006; Ronnie 
Scheib, "The Cult of the Suicide Bomber," Daily Variety, 5 June 
2006.
7 Initially, the Shi'a were simply a political faction that 
supported Mohammad's son-in-law and cousin Ali. The battle in 860 
As a by-product of the Iran-Iraq War and Hezballah's5 
guerrilla campaigns in Lebanon against the United States 
(U.S.), France and Israel, the Shi'a-Muslim world 
catapulted the concept of the shahid (martyr) to the 
forefront of militants' imaginations.
By framing the Iran-Iraq War as a "re-enactment"6 of 
the' historic battle of Karbala in 860 between Hussein the 
leader of Shi'at Ali (Faction of Ali)7 and Yazid the Umayyad 
3
Caliph, Iran's Supreme Leader Khomeini directly shaped the 
way Iranian soldiers approached warfare against the . 
advancing Iraqi army. Because the battle in 860 left 
Hussein dead and thus heralded by Shi'a Muslims as a great 
Islamic "martyr," Khomeini's framing invoked many Iranians 
to seek death on the modern battlefield, so they too might 
reap the benefits of martyrdom as articulated in Shi'a 
tradition. Indeed, in 1980, amid a fire fight with Iraqi 
troops, a 13-year old Iranian named Hussein Fahmideh 
gathered explosives, attached them to himself, charged an 
Iraqi tank and detonated the explosives—disabling the tank 
while killing himself. Like that of his namesake, Hussein's 
act of self-sacrifice found widespread praise among Shi'a 
Muslims. Soon after, the Iranian government plastered his 
picture on billboards across Tehran; Hussein's martyrdom, 
like that of the Shi'a patriarch's, inspired countless 
others. By 1982, Khomeini harnessed the power of the Shi'a 
narrative of martyrdom, and began employing "human wave 
attacks," which regularly consisted of thousands of Iranian 
youth simultaneously rushing Iraqi positions, oftentimes 
protected by surrounding minefields; armed usually with
4
helped to "[transform] the Shi'a from a party to a sect." Bernard 
Lewis, The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam (New York: Basic 
Books, 2003), 22.
nothing more than clinched fists and a plastic key around 
their necks, which ensured their post-martyrdom entrance 
through the gates of paradise, Khomeini's "mine jumpers" 
helped turn the tide of the war.8
8 Christoph Reuter, My Life Is a Weapon: A Modern History of 
Suicide Bombing (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
2004), 33-51.
9 Meaning "Guards" in Persian, Pasdaran is short for Sepah-i 
Pasdaran-i Enqelab-i Islami (the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps) or IRGC.
10 Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007), 71.
With significant success on the battlefields of the 
Iran-Iraq War, the Iranian Pasdaran,9 or Revolutionary 
Guard, sought to export Khomeini's martyrdom strategy to 
Lebanon. Engulfed in an overlapping sectarian-divided civil 
war and Israel-PLO war, Lebanon became the testing ground 
for suicide-homicide attacks as a tool of guerrilla 
warfare. In an ultimately successful effort to expel 
Western peacekeeping forces, the Pasdaran's Lebanese 
creation, Hezballah, repeatedly attacked U.S. and French 
targets using suicide-homicide bombers. Hezballah's 
campaign reached its zenith with the 1983 suicide-homicide 
attack on the U.S. Marines barracks, which left 241 
American servicemen dead, and convinced U.S. President 
Ronald Reagan to "redeploy" U.S. forces from Lebanon.10
5
Continuing to advance the tactic in its campaigns against 
the Southern Lebanese Army and Israel Defense Force 
throughout the 1980s, Hezballah inspired numerous pro­
Syrian Lebanese groups to use suicide-homicide bombers.11 
Deeming suicide-homicide attacks "martyrdom operations," 
the Pasdaran and Hezballah effectively convinced many that 
the modus operandi held legitimacy, particularly regarding 
Shi'a tradition.12 Moreover, by concurrently galvanizing the 
Lebanese Shi'a population and expelling foreign militaries 
from Lebanon, Hezballah made the symbolic and strategic 
utility of suicide-homicide attacks clear to its enemies 
and other militant organizations alike.
11 These groups included: Amal, the Syrian Social-Nationalist 
Party, the Syrian Ba'ath (Renaissance) Party, and the Syrian 
Socialist-Nasserite Party.
12 Not only does the Shi'a martyrdom narrative and Ashura holiday 
derive from the story of Hussein and his 72 faithful followers, 
who died with him, but the 12th Century Assassins also contribute 
to the tradition of Shi'a self-sacrifice, as they used daggers in 
suicidal assassination missions.
13 Some refer to al-Jihad al-Islami fi Filastin (The Islamic Jihad 
in Palestine) simply as Jihad Islami (Islamic Jihad). Others call 
it Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami al-Filastini (The Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad Movement), and Palestinian Islamic Jihad or PIJ.
14 Notes from International Institute for Counter-Terrorism 
seminar on "The Global Jihad," given by Reuven Paz, in Herzliya, 
Israel (21 June 2005); Scott Atran, "Genesis of Suicide 
By 1986, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)13 began 
flirting with the idea of employing "exceptional martyrdom 
operations" against civilian Israeli targets.14 In 1989,
6
Hamas15 similarly accepted the idea of using suicide­
homicide attackers16; however, not seeing a strategic 
opportunity to carry out such "martyrdom operations" amid 
the first Palestinian intifada (December 1987 to early 
1993), PIJ and its Islamist-counterpart17 Hamas refrained 
from deploying suicide-homicide attackers. However, as a 
rebuke to the PLO's participation in negotiations with 
Israel,18 Hamas and PIJ carried out eight suicide-homicide 
attacks in 1993 alone.19 By the mid-1990s, some Palestinians 
hoped for the success of the Oslo peace process, but many 
others put their faith in the continuation of violent 
Terrorism," Science 299, issue 5612 (7 March 2003): 1534-1539; 
Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, revised and expanded ed. (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 151.
15 Meaning "zeal" and "courage" in Arabic, the acronym Hamas 
stands for Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (the Islamic 
Resistance Movement).
15 Ami Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism (Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 
2005), 55.
17 "Islamist" refers to an individual or organization that 
subscribes to a political ideology based on the fundamental 
tenets of Islam. Furthermore, just as various interpretations of 
those tenets spawned a variety of Islamic sects, nearly an 
equally number of versions of Islamism or political Islam exist— 
whether, Salafi, revolutionary Shi'a, or otherwise. One could 
understand a "hardline Islamist" as an Islamic supremacist, who 
views politicaltIslam as the only viable and righteous political 
ideology. An "Islamic fanatic" demonstrates a willingness to 
sacrifice his or her self-interest for a collective cause.
18 Rapprochement publicly commenced in October 1991 at the Madrid 
Conference, and began showing progress with the signing of the 
Declaration of Principles in September 1993, in which Israel and 
the PLO recognized one another diplomatically.
19 For a complete list of Palestinian suicide-homicide attacks 
carried out against Israeli targets from April 1993 to April 
2008, see Appendix A.
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resistance, as predominately carried on by Hamas and PIJ's 
shahids. From 1994 to 2000, the two Palestinian Islamist 
organizations carried out 25 suicide-homicide bombings 
against Israeli targets. As a result of political Islam's 
return to the forefront of Palestinian politics and the 
emergence of a complementary culture of martyrdom in 
Palestinian society, the shahid rose as the Palestinian 
movement's new icon--in effect replacing the feda'i (self- 
sacrificer), and making suicide-homicide bombings the 
operational mode of choice. With the failure of the Oslo 
peace process, Fatah sought to maintain popularity by 
joining the Islamist-Palestinian organizations in the 
suicide-terror industry and established al-Aqsa Martyrs' 
Brigade.20 The early 2000s, thus, saw massive waves of 
suicide-homicide bombers targeting Israeli civilians in the 
joint terror effort of al-Aqsa intifada.21 From September 
2000 to December 2005, Palestinian organizations 
20 Fatah created Kataeb Shuhada al-Aqsa (al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade) 
or AMB. However, the majority of its members come from Tanzim 
(meaning "squad" in Arabic), which operates Fatah's grassroots 
following. Furthermore, members of Force 17, Fatah's elite 
Presidential guard, often organize and conduct AMB's attacks.
21 Commentators also commonly refer to al-Aqsa intifada simply as 
the second intifada.
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successfully carried out 155 suicide-homicide bombings and 
launched at least 525.22
22 See Appendix A; and Intelligence and Terrorism Information 
Center, Anti-Israeli Terrorism, 2006: Data, Analysis and. Trends 
(March 2007): 51-55; accessed at <www.terrorism-info.org.il>.
Effectively convincing their own constituencies of the 
Islamic justifications for suicide-homicide attacks, 
Islamist organizations, particularly Hamas, gained 
widespread support within Palestinian society for carrying 
out such operations. Moreover, by targeting civilians en 
masse, Palestinian organizations transitioned suicide­
homicide operations from a guerrilla tactic, as previously 
used on a wide scale first by Hezballah and later by the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, to a weapon of terror. 
Additionally, by demonstrating that participation in a 
"martyrdom operation" marked the fulfillment of a personal 
goal, the Palestinian shahid/suicide-homicide bomber 
captivated mass media and sympathetic populations alike, 
especially in the Arab and Islamic worlds--eventually 
having effects stretching far beyond the pales of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Today, posters glorifying the latest shahid litter the 
walls of Palestinian cities, villages and "refugee camps" 
9
in the disputed territories23 of the West Bank,24 Gaza and 
East Jerusalem. Everyone from corner shop owners and cab 
drivers to the 20-something year olds drinking coffee at 
the local cafe extol past Palestinian terror leaders such 
as Chairman Yasser Arafat, Dr. Fathi Shaqaqi, Sheik Ahmad 
Yassin and Dr. Abdul Aziz al-Rantissi, along with the 
heinous terrorist acts they spent their days sponsoring. In 
Bethlehem, children argue in the street over whose turn it 
is to play the shahid in their casual game of a mock 
suicide-bomb attack. These sentiments expressed on the Arab 
streets of the disputed territories represent a popular 
culture of martyrdom,25 which has gained and continues to 
strengthen a stranglehold on Palestinian society.
23 The term "disputed territories" is used because the listed 
areas do not qualify as "occupied territories," considering there 
has never been a "Palestinian" state. From the years 1967 to 1979 
and 1967 to 1994, it could have been argued that the territories 
in question were "occupied Egypt" and "occupied Jordan," 
respectively, since these were the nation-states that Israel 
captured the territories from during the Six-Day War; however, 
both the Egyptian and Jordanian governments have since 
relinquished all claims to the territories. Thus, they are not 
"occupied," but, indeed, rather "disputed" between Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority--especially since the failure of the Oslo 
peace process has left a final status agreement on the 
territories indefinitely unresolved.
24 A term coined during the British Mandate, "West Bank" 
collectively refers to the areas of Judea and Samaria.
25 First used in explaining Palestinian society's support for 
suicide-homicide bombers sometime after the initiation of the 
second intifada, a number of researchers, scholars and political 
analysts have■since elaborated on the concept "culture of 
10
Identifiable by shahid worship and praise for 
terrorism, Palestinian society, however, no longer 
exclusively exhibits this culture of martyrdom. Cities from 
Jakarta to Baghdad and London have witnessed the fruits of 
this terror-breeding culture. Similarly, the rapid 
diffusion of suicide terrorism, geographically and across 
ideological lines, exemplifies how terror organizations 
have garnered the strategic utility of employing "martyrdom 
operations." Furthermore, Palestinian developments in the 
evolution of suicide-homicide attacks have functioned as 
alerts of these various strategic components. Moreover, by 
setting a precedent among Sunni Muslims, and gaining 
legitimacy for attacking civilians from prominent Islamic 
authorities within the Sunni world, the Palestinian 
shahid/suicide-homicide bomber precipitated its own 
duplication in numerous other conflicts. Thus, to fully 
11
martyrdom" and its variations. See David Brooks, "The Culture of 
Martyrdom: How Suicide Bombing Became not just a Means but an 
End," The Atlantic Monthly 289, no. 6 (June 2002): 18-20; 
Mohammed M. Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of 
Palestinian Suicide Bombers (Washington D.C.: United States 
Institute for Peace Press, 2006); Anne Marie Oliver and Paul 
Steinberg, The Road to Martyrs' Square: A Journey into the World 
of the Suicide Bomber (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); 
Barbara 'Victor, Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian 
Women Suicide Bombers (Emmaus, Penn.: Rodale, 2003); Nat Hentoff, 
"The Poisonous Cult of Martyrdom; Palestinians with Legitimate 
Grievances Are Infected," The Washington Times (8 April 2002); 
and Reuter, 79-114.
appreciate the implications of the Palestinian culture of 
martyrdom and shahid, one needs to understand the former's 
social development, the latter's doctrinal roots, and the 
influence the pair have had on terror campaigns outside the 
context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Since the early 1990s, Palestinian terror 
organizations have drawn from many sources and 
incrementally refined the process of suicide terrorism. By 
making the modus operandi socially acceptable and at times 
even fashionable, Palestinian terror organizations have 
normalized the deployment of suicide-homicide bombers. In 
doing so, the progress individuals take from reasoning and 
justifying to rationalizing and actually committing suicide 
terrorism has been eerily optimized.26 Consequently, 
Palestinian terror organizations have not only developed an 
extremely successful, if not strategic, weapon for their 
war with Israel, but also provided Islamist-terror 
organizations such as those within the global al-Qaeda27 
26 Optimization refers to the fact that one finds no shortage in 
■Palestinian society of individuals willing to carry out suicide­
homicide operations; potential shahids have become a sort of 
Palestinian natural resource, which terror organizations can 
extract from society at any given time.
27 Literally "the Base" in Arabic, al-Qa'eda additionally means 
"the Vanguard." Abdallah Azzam established the organization in 
1988 building off the well-established Mektab al-Khadimat (Office 
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network with the model 21st Century terrorist, as well as 
efficient methods to produce such individuals. By 
mobilizing mass support in the Sunni world and empowering 
the individual through the concepts of jihad and martyrdom, 
the shahid, as epitomized by Palestinians during al-Aqsa 
intifada, secured suicide terrorism's growing 
organizational partiality, ensured lethality, decreasing 
targeting discrimination, and frequency in the 
international arena. Thus, the phenomenon of the 
Palestinian shahid has become a driving force behind the 
increasing spread of suicide terrorism worldwide.
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of Services), which served as a logistics base for mujahedin 
(holy warriors) in Afghanistan.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW: APPROACHING RESEARCH
ON SUICIDE-HOMICIDE ATTACKS
Since the onslaught of the second Palestinian intifada 
and the September 11, 2001 attacks shortly thereafter, 
numerous scholars, analysts, journalists and filmmakers 
have attempted to understand and explain the suicide­
terrorism phenomenon. Studies on suicide terrorism in 
general and in particular contexts, as well as those on 
specific organizations or campaigns, have sprung up in the 
form of books, journal, magazine and newspaper articles, as 
well as documentaries. More often than not, identifying the 
motivations behind suicide terrorism lies at the heart of 
research.1
1 For example, see Diego Gambetta, ed., Making Sense of Suicide 
Missions, expanded and updated ed. (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), vii; and Ami Pedahzur, ed., Root Causes of Suicide 
Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom (New York: Routledge, 
2007).
2 Marc Sageman cited in Ariel Merari, "The Profile of the Modern 
Terrorist," in Post-Modern Terrorism: Trends, Scenarios, and 
Future Threats, ed. Boaz Ganor (Herzliya, Israel: Publishing 
House, 2005), 109-111; Anat Berko and Edna Erez, "'Ordinary 
People' and 'Death Work': Palestinian Suicide Bombers as
Terrorism experts generally agree that most terrorists 
are "ordinary people,"2 without a particular profile or
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common characteristic that links them.* 3 One leading expert
Victimizers and Victims," Violence and Victims 20, no. 6 
(December 2005): 603-623; Ami Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism 
(Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 2005), 122.
3 One study, however, argues that proper "psychological 
autopsies" have not’ been performed on any suicide-homicide 
bombers, so it is premature to suggest that they are not suicidal 
and that a psychological profile does not exist; the study 
concludes: "the absence of such studies should not lead us to 
possible erroneous assertions such as those claiming that the 
suicide bombers are not suicidal or that there are no 
psychological profiles applicable to them." David Lester, Bijou 
-Yang and Mark Lindsey, "Suicide Bombers: Are Psychological 
Profiles Possible?" Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27 (1 July 
2004): 293.
4 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, revised and expanded ed. (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2006), xv.
explains how he is
...always struck by how disturbingly "normal" 
most terrorists, seem when one actually sits down 
and talks to them. Rather than the wild-eyed 
fanatics or crazed killers that we have been 
conditioned to expect, many are in fact highly 
articulate and extremely thoughtful individuals 
for whom terrorism is (or was) an entirely 
rational choice, often reluctantly embraced and 
then only after considerable reflection and 
debate.4
So, what possesses such "ordinary" or "normal" people to
perpetrate acts of terror? Moreover, what motivates suicide
terrorists to take their own lives so that they might
murder others? Within the literary and documentary
collection on suicide terrorism, one finds various schools 
of thought that provide answers to these important 
questions.
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Definitional and Investigative Differences
Disparate findings in the fairly new academic field of 
terrorism studies tend to arise from the varying 
approaches. Most trends in suicide terrorism research 
accordingly divide along lines drawn by definition and 
scope. Failing to distinguish between terror and guerrilla 
campaigns, many notable works lump together all episodes of 
suicide-homicide operations.5 Others sidestep this important 
issue of targeting by refraining from employing the term 
"suicide terrorism," and commonly replacing it with 
"suicide attacks." Both terms represent attacks dependent 
on the perpetrator's death for the operation's success6; 
however, the previous specifies a civilian target, whereas 
the latter maintains ambiguity. Expanding the investigative 
range, some studies focus on "suicide missions," which 
denotes a larger variety of attacks as the term includes
5 For example see Ehud Sprinzak, "Rational Fanatics," Foreign 
Policy 120 (September/October 2000): 66-73; Scott Atran, "Genesis 
of Suicide Terrorism," Science 299, issue 5612 (7 March 2003) : 
1534-1539; Christoph Reuter, My Life Is a Weapon: A Modern 
History of Suicide Bombing (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 2004); Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of 
Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005); Mia Bloom, 
Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2005); and Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism.
5 Boaz Ganor, "Suicide Attacks in Israel," in Countering Suicide 
Terrorism (Herzliya, Israel: International Institute for Counter- 
Terrorism [ICT], 2002), 140-141; and Hoffman, Inside Terrorism,
132 .
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"any operation that is designed in such a way that the 
terrorist does not expect to survive it, even if he or she 
is actually killed by police or other defenders."7 Another 
study views attacks, in which self-inflicted death is not a 
requirement for operational success, as a "high-risk 
mission."8 This collection of works, edited by Oxford 
scholar Diego Gambetta, defines "suicide missions" 
similarly to how other researchers define "suicide 
attacks," wherein self-inflicted death is "strictly 




10 Assaf Moghadam, "Defining Suicide Terrorism," in Root Causes of 
Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom, ed. Ami 
Pedahzur (New York: Routledge, 2007), 16.
Under the terminological umbrella of suicide terrorism 
sits "suicide bombing." Researcher Assaf Moghadam notes, 
"[a]11 suicide bombings are suicide attacks, but not all 
suicide attacks are suicide bombings. Strictly speaking, 
the 9/11 attacks were not suicide bombings, since no 
conventional explosive device was used.,. They were, 
however, suicide attacks."10 Still yet, a myriad of similar 
terms exist, including "homicide bombing" and "martyrdom 
operation." Mostly meaning the same thing, such terms 
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express opposing viewpoints relating to the legitimacy of 
the acts they represent. To avoid using "highly charged, 
normative terms that do not aid in the effort to analyze 
and explain this deadly phenomenon," scholar Mohammed M. 
Hafez promotes the terms "suicide bomber" and "human bomb," 
both of which he defines as "an individual who willingly 
uses his or her body to carry or deliver explosive 
materials to attack, kill, or maim others."11 His 
terminology is a direct response to the dialogue often spun 
in the media. Hafez notes:
11 Mohammed M. Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of 
Palestinian Suicide Bombers (Washington D.C.: United States 
[U.S.] Institute for Peace Press, 2006), 4.
12 Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs, 4.
Those who support these acts of violence prefer 
to call them "martyrdom operations," and their 
perpetrators "heroes" and "freedom fighters." 
Those who oppose them prefer to call them 
"homicide bombers," "suicide terrorists," or 
"suicidal murderers."12
Within the same controversy, as Hafez recognizes above, 
some have replaced "suicide bomber," with the term 
"homicide bomber," placing emphasis on the target rather 
than the perpetrator, but still leaving the term somewhat 
incomplete; Moghadam contends, "the term fails to describe 
the particularity of this type of bombing—namely the death 
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of the perpetrator as an integral part of the attack."13 
Still, others who emphasize the martyrdom component of 
suicide-homicide attacks, such as scholar Rafael Israeli 
argue, "it [is] a fallacy to dub these people 'suicide 
bombers', because their primary concern [is] to kill their 
enemies... though they [are] ready to sacrifice themselves 
in the process."14 Within the literature, nomenclature 
stands as far as it could from universal consistency. Thus, 
in any study on terrorism, clearly it has become imperative 
to illustrate definitions, rather than simply articulate a 
term.
13 Moghadam, "Defining Suicide Terrorism," 16.
14 Rafael Israeli, "A Manual of Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism," 
Terrorism and Political Violence 14, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 23.
Levels of Analysis
Usually due to the disciplinary backgrounds of the . 
researchers conducting them, studies on suicide terrorism 
tend to focus on a single level of analysis: usually either 
the individual, organizational or environmental level. 
While at times studies traverse multiple levels of 
analysis, most rely heavily on one. In recent years, the 
most common trend has placed emphasis on the organizational 
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level--leaving many scholars to view it as the sole level 
of importance.
At the organizational level, a significant amount of 
research has found strategies to sit at the forefront of 
suicide terrorism's growing employment. The late scholar 
Ehud Sprinzak noted that strategic utility of suicide­
homicide attacks has driven its use since Hezballah first 
began carrying out attacks as the central component of its 
coercive campaigns against foreign militaries.15 While most 
scholars agree that organizational strategy marks the most 
influential component in propelling suicide terrorism, a 
heated debate exists over the most important audience of 
that strategy. Some argue the defined enemy marks the 
primary audience, others the domestic population or rival 
organizations.
15 Sprinzak, "Rational Fanatics."
16 Pape, 4.
Spearheading one of these trends, University of 
Chicago professor Robert Pape contends, "what nearly all 
suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific 
secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to 
withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists 
consider to be their homeland."16 This represents the
20
"suicide terrorism is a secular response to occupation"
argument, which disregards the employment of cultural and
religious narratives in the mobilization of suicide­
homicide attackers outright. University of Georgia
professor Mia Bloom, offers a rebuttal to this notion that 
the defined enemy always represents the primary reason for 
organizations employing suicide terrorism. Bloom states:
Although Pape's explanation is useful for 
understanding how suicide bombing is directed 
against the external enemy, it glosses over the 
domestic political dynamics and organizational 
motivations for outbidding. Pape's model...does 
not fully explain why religious groups (with 
goals beyond territorial demands) might use 
[suicide terrorism].17
17 Bloom, Dying to Kill, 84.
18 Mia M. Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, 
Market Share, and Outbidding," Political Science Quarterly 119, 
no. 1 (2004).
Concerning the Palestinian context, Bloom asserts that
competition between rivals lies at the core of suicide 
terrorism's increase in frequency.18 Similarly, the director 
of RAND Corporation in Washington D.C. Bruce Hoffman 
recognizes that organizations such as the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam and Hamas began employing suicide-homicide 
attacks as a way to distinguish themselves from rival 
groups, in order to gain notoriety/increase popularity 
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within their domestic populations.19 Pape, Bloom and 
Hoffman, while not always in agreement on why organizations 
employ suicide terrorists, indeed agree that organizational 
strategies dictate when, where and why suicide terrorism 
erupts.
19 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 137-168.
20 For example, see Eyad El Sarraj, "Wounds and Madness: Why We've 
Become Suicide Bombers," Peacework (May 2002); John Rosenberger, 
"Discerning the Behavior of the Suicide Bomber: The Role of 
Vengeance," Journal of Religion and Health 42, no. 1 (Spring 
2003); and Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 135-151.
21 Berko and Erez, 603-623; Barbara Victor, Army of Roses: Inside 
the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers (Emmaus, Penn.: 
Rodale, 2003); and Yoram Schweitzer ed., "Female Suicide Bombers: 
Dying for Equality?" Memorandum No. 84 (Tel Aviv: Jaffe Center 
for Strategic Studies, 2006) .
22 Mohammed M. Hafez, "Dying to Be Martyrs: The Symbolic Dimension 
of Suicide Terrorism," in Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The 
Globalization of Martyrdom, ed. Ami Pedahzur (New York: 
Routledge, 2005), 76; Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 134-145.
Considering the motivations of individuals, 
researchers have overwhelmingly posited that suicide 
terrorists often .carry out attacks for purposes of 
revenge.20 Scholars have also found that individuals pursue 
"martyrdom," as commonly connected with suicide-terror 
attacks, for personal reasons, whether religious,, cultural 
or otherwise.21 Hafez notes: "at the individual level, 
religious and nationalist appeals that equate self­
sacrifice with martyrdom and national salvation are 
instrumental in producing volunteers for suicide attacks."22 
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In this sense, desire for revenge and self-sacrifice 
converge to motivate individuals. Scholar Ami Pedahzur 
argues that either "commitment" or "crisis" motivate 
suicide terrorists.23 In Pedahzur's first type, suicide 
terrorists seek "to fulfill their duty as devout members of 
their organizations."24 His second type of suicide terrorist 
acts in response to "the intensification of both personal 
and community crisis situations."25 In researching 
individuals' impetuses for self-sacrifice, many scholars 
have applied sociologist Emile Durkheim's typologies of 
suicide. Commonly, scholars have arranged his model of 
"altruistic suicide"26 as a basis- for furthering research on 
suicide terrorism.27
At the social level, researchers have recognized the 
importance that death cultures play in promoting and 

















See Ivan Strenski, "Sacrifice, Gift and the Social Logic of
Muslim 'Human Bombers,'" Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 
3 (Autumn 2003); Pape; Berko and Erez; and Ami Pedahzur and Arie 
Perliger, "The Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks: A Social 
Network Perspective," Social Forces 84, no. 4 (June 2006): 1987- 
2008 .
27 Chapter Six further explores this idea.
28 Reuter, 79-114; Strenski; David Brooks, "The Culture of 
Martyrdom: How Suicide Bombing Became not just a Means but an 
End," The Atlantic Monthly 289, no. 6 (June 2002): 18-20. 
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phenomenon that is not only present in most conflicts where 
suicide attacks are widely used, but that also appears to 
be the distinguishing characteristic between suicide 
terrorism and ordinary terrorism is what is known as the 
culture of martyrdom."29 Pedahzur adds:
29 Assaf Moghadam, "The Roots of Suicide Terrorism: A Multi-Causal 
Approach," in Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization 
of Martyrdom, ed. Ami Pedahzur (New York: Routledge, 2005), 98.
30 Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 159.
31 Mohammed M. Hafez, "Rationality, Culture, and Structure in 'the 
Making of Suicide Bombers: A Preliminary Theoretical Synthesis 
and Illustrative Case Study," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29 
(2006) : 166.
In certain societies that perceive themselves as 
weak and who feel hopeless and oppressed by a ■ 
powerful enemy, suicide terrorism, with its 
potential to cause considerable pain, damage and 
confusion to the aggressor, can empower that 
society. It may even offer hope that things will 
eventually change; it may at least ensure that 
the aggressor suffers... [P]erception of the 
enemy as evil and dehumanized makes it easier for 
people to support acts in which not only soldiers 
and politicians but also innocent civilians and 
children are killed.30
Hafez identifies the "[convergence of] three conditions"
that makes suicide terrorism possible:
(1) prevailing cultural norms encompass belief 
systems, symbolic narratives, and historical 
traditions that justify and celebrate martyrdom;
(2) legitimate authorities promote or acquiesce 
to extreme violence; and (3) communities feel 
victimized and threatened by external enemies in 
the course of political conflict.31
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In a groundbreaking 2002 article, researcher David Brooks 
noted, "the best resource [Palestinian] terrorists have is 
the culture of martyrdom."32 Accordingly, scores of studies 
have acknowledged the important roles social conditions 
play in propelling suicide terrorism.33
32 Brooks, 20.
33 See Anne Marie Oliver and Paul Steinberg, The Road to Martyrs' 
Square: A Journey into the World of the Suicide Bomber (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005); The Cult of the Suicide Bomber, 
prod, and dir. David Betty and Kevin Toolis, 1 hr..35 min., Many 
Rivers Films, 2006, DVD; Female Suicide Bombers: Dying to Kill, 
prod. Neil Barrett, Scott Bronstein and Clare Nolan, dir. Cara 
Biega, 52 min., National Geographic Explorer, 2004. M4V.
34 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Ami Pedahzur and Arie 
Perliger, "The Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks: A Social 
Network Perspective." Social Forces 84, no. 4 (June 2006): 1987- 
2008.
35 Berko and Erez, 607.
Superceding or at least tangling together the 
organizational and social levels, some researchers view 
social networks as central to the suicide terrorism 
phenomenon.34 Similarly, scholars Anat Berko and Edna Erez 
contend that "individual motivation (internally or 
externally induced) to self-sacrifice combined with access 
to or support of an organization are necessary conditions 
in suicide bombing."35 Oftentimes scholars make links 
between various levels of analysis in passing and without 
clear articulation.
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Recognizing the disparate but important findings that 
these approaches produce, Moghadam designed a "multi-causal 
approach to the study of suicide terrorism." In it he 
acknowledges the respective utility of "individual/ 
psychological," "organizational/strategic" and 
"environmental/structural" approaches.36 Accordingly, 
Moghadam's framework seeks to show how the three levels 
"interact with each other, and at times are thoroughly 
intertwined, resulting in synergetic effects."37 Similarly, 
in 2006, Hafez published a study on Palestinian suicide­
homicide bombers, which used a combination of analyses at a 
similar three levels: "organizational strategies, 
individual motivations, and societal conflicts."38 Hafez 
asserts that
36 Assaf Moghadam, "The Roots of Suicide Terrorism: A Multi-Causal 
Approach," Unpublished paper presented for the Harrington 
Workshop on the Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism, University of 
Texas at Austin (12-13 May 2005): 7.
37 Moghadam, "The Roots of Suicide Terrorism," in Root Causes of 
Suicide Terrorism, 88.
38 Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs, 15.
Social movement approaches have a distinct 
advantage over purely political, psychological, 
or cultural approaches because they are 
interdisciplinary and multipronged. They analyze 
relationships among political environments, 
organizational dynamics, and cultural frameworks. 
Above all, they seek to explain collective action 
at three levels of analysis: individual 
26
involvement, organizational strategies, and, , q gsociopolitical facilitators of activism. 
Importantly, Moghadam and Hafez have seemingly slowed the 
debate over approaches to suicide terrorism for the time 
being. They show that integrating the three approaches 
works to provide a comprehensive analytical method. 
Context, however, still dictates the importance one level 
might take over another at a given time and/or place.39 40
39 Mohammed M. Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and 
Ideology of Martyrdom (Washington D.C.: U.S. Institute for Peace 
Press, 2007), 16-17.
40 Note the differences in Hafez's own findings on his independent 
studies of suicide terrorism on the Palestinians and in Iraq. See 
Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs; and Hafez, Suicide Bombers in 
Iraq.
The Palestinian Context
Generally in studies on suicide terrorism, one notices 
an analysis of the "root causes." Within this discussion 
relating to the Palestinian context, academic literature 
provides a spectrum ranging from studies that solely blame 
the aggressor to those which only find culpability with the 
targeted. Numerous studies pinning the blame of Palestinian 
suicide terrorism on its Israeli victims suggest that the 
phenomenon epitomizes the desperation of a people. 
Palestinian Psychiatrist Eyad El Sarraj promotes this type 
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of reasoning, as he suggests, "[t]he hopelessness that 
comes from a situation that keeps getting worse, a despair 
where living becomes no different from dying...It propels 
people to actions or solutions that previously would have 
been unthinkable."41 Also commonly found within the general 
suicide terrorism literature, El Sarraj's statement 
summarizes the "they made me do it" explanation that seeks 
to the credit harsh conditions imposed by an opposing 
nation or group for the desperate realities a people might 
face, in which an act of suicide-vengeance offers the 
optimal escape. Along similar lines, some scholars also 
view "humiliation" as a primary impetus for Palestinian 
suicide terrorism.42
41 Eyad El Sarraj, interview by Linda Butler, "Suicide Bombers: 
Dignity, Despair, and the Need for Hope," Journal of Palestine 
Studies 31, no. 4 (Summer 2002): 72.
42 Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious 
Militants Kill (New York: Harper Collins, 2003); Jon Elster, 
"Motivations and Beliefs in Suicide Missions," in Making Sense of 
Suicide Missions, expanded and updated ed., ed. Diego Gambetta 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 245-246 and 251; 
Lester, Yang and Lindsey, "Suicide Bombers," 286.
Unsurprisingly, Israeli academics and analysts offer 
the most thorough research on Palestinian suicide-homicide 
bombers. Particularly, the International Institute for 
Counter-Terrorism (ICT) sits at the top of this expertise. 
Headed by scholar Boaz Ganor, ICT offers a profusion of 
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quality studies on varying aspects of Palestinian suicide 
terrorism.43 ICT scholars Shaul Shay44 and Ely Karmon,45 Tel 
Aviv University professor Ariel Merari,46 Project for the 
Research of Islamist Movements (PRISM) director Reuven 
Paz,47 University of Texas-Austin professor Ami Pedahzur,48 
Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies researcher Yoram 
Schweitzer,49 Hebrew University professor Raphael Israeli,50 
Palestinian Media Watch director Itamar Marcus,51 and Global 
Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center director 
Barry Rubin,52 to name a few, additionally provide in-depth 
43 See Boaz Ganor ed., Countering Suicide Terrorism, updated ed. 
(Herzliya, Israel: ICT, 2007); Boaz Ganor ed., Post-Modern 
Terrorism: Trends, Scenarios, and Future Threats (Herzliya, 
Israel: Publishing House, 2005); Boaz Ganor, The Counter- 
Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers (Piscataway, N.J.: 
Transaction, 2005); also see ICT's collection of articles at 
<www.instituteforcounterterrorism.org>.
44 See Shaul Shay, The Shahids: Islam and Suicide Attacks (London: 
Transaction Publishers, 2004).
45 See collection of articles at <www.instituteforcounter 
terrorism.org>.
46 See Ariel Merari ed., On Terrorism and Combating Terrorism 
(Fredrick, Maryland: University Publications of America, 1985); 
and Ariel Merari and Shlomi Elad, The International Dimension of 
Palestinian Terrorism (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post Press, 1986) .
47 See a collection of Paz's work at <www.e-prism.org>.
48 See Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism.
49 See Yoram Schweitzer ed., "Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for 
Equality?" Memorandum No. 84 (Tel Aviv: Jaffe Center for 
Strategic Studies, 2006).
50 Rafael Israeli, Islamikaze (London: Frank Cass, 2003).
51 See a comprehensive documentation of the Palestinian culture of 
martyrdom, overseen by Marcus at <www.pmw.org.il>.
52 See a collection of Rubin's articles at <www.gloriacenter.org>.
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research and analysis that displays expertise derived from 
years of frontline research.
Many Israeli scholars draw from and build on the work 
of the late Dean of the Lauder School of Diplomacy and 
Strategy53 at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC)54 in 
Herzliya, Ehud Sprinzak, who initially brought attention to 
suicide-homicide attacks' rational/strategic component. 
This tradition implies that Palestinian suicide terrorism 
represents a tactical by-product of organizations matching 
means to an end—in this case, the destruction of the state 
of Israel. However, a new trend in Israeli scholarship on 
Palestinian suicide terrorism has recently made findings 
contrasting the strictly organization-centric model 
summarized by Ganor's contention that Palestinian suicide 
terrorists do not volunteer but are recruited.55 The newer 
trend identifies more closely the social forces that work 
as a corollary to organizational models. Indeed, Pedahzur 
and Arie Perliger have worked to shed light on suicide­
terror attacks launched at the intra-organizational and 
53 Formerly the Lauder School of Government
54 IDC also houses ICT, as well as Rubin's GLORIA and Paz's PRISM.
55 Sprinzak, "Rational Fanatics."
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inter-organizational levels.56 ICT research fellow Jonathan 
Fine argues for the necessity "to assess culture, ideology, 
and motivation," on a case-by-case basis.57 ICT scholar Anat 
Berko additionally highlights the importance of individual 
motivations,58 playing off another tradition in Israeli 
scholarship pioneered by Sprinzak: "to maintain contact 
with terrorists, and talk to them, in order to understand 
them"59; or as another scholar summarized: "[Sprinzak] had 
this elegantly simple notion, that the best way to find out 
what leads people...to be willing to kill in the name of 
their cause, is--to ask them!"60 Holding true to all levels 
of analysis, Sprinzak's simple, yet "elegant" notion can 
help elucidate why not only individuals but also 
organizations and large portions of a society might support 
56 See Ami Pedahzur, Arie Perliger and Leonard Weinberg, "Altruism 
and Fatalism: The Characteristics of Palestinian Suicide 
Terrorists," Deviant Behavior: An Interdisciplinary Journal 24 
(2003): 405-423; and Pedahzur and Perliger, "The Changing Nature 
of Suicide Attacks."
57 Jonathan Fine, "Contrasting Secular and Religious Terrorism," 
Middle East Quarterly 15, no. 1 (Winter 2008): accessed at 
<www.meforum.org/article/1826>.
58 Anat Berko, The Path to Paradise: The Inner World of Suicide 
Bombers and Their Dispatchers, trans. Elizabeth Yuval (Westport, 
Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2007).
59 Merari, "The Profile of the Modern Terrorist," 107.
60 Remarks from a memorial service printed in Jerrold M. Post, 
Ehud Sprinzak and Laurita M. Denny, "The Terrorists in Their Own 
Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern 
Terrorists," Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 1 (March 
2003): 171.
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suicide terrorism. Taken together, the scholarly literature 
concludes that in most contexts, including the Palestinian 
one, society, organizations and individuals work as one in 
launching and sustaining suicide-terror campaigns. So, it 
makes sense to look at the words and deeds of those 
individuals, organizations and social forces perpetrating 
Palestinian suicide terrorism to determine why it has 




AND THE RELATION BETWEEN IDENTITY
AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE1
1 Here the use of "political violence," a somewhat controversial 
term, refers to any form of violent conflict designed for 
political purposes. In this sense, political violence functions 
as an umbrella term for war, asymmetrical warfare, guerrilla 
warfare and terrorism.
2 See Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, trans. Steven Lattimore 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998); Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (New 
York: Everyman's Library, 1993); Donald Kagan, On the Origins of 
War and. the Preservation of Peace (New York: Anchor Books,' 1995); 
Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1965); and Joseph S. Nye 
Jr., Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to 
Theory and History, 4th ed. (New York: Longman, 2004) .
3 While there have been many excellent contributions to the study 
on suicide terrorism that look at a specific cause or use a 
single level of analysis, many of these studies miss the "big 
picture." See Moghadam, "The Roots of Suicide Terrorism,"
Purpose of Study
From Thucydides to Carl Von Clausewitz to Donald
Kagan, Kenneth Waltz and Joseph Nye, insightful observers 
of warfare have recognized that war erupts from multiple 
causes and at a number of levels, whether international, 
state, individual or a combination.2 Likewise, as recent 
scholarship determines, gaining a comprehensive 
understanding of terrorism and more specifically suicide 
terrorism requires a multilayered approach.3 In the
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Palestinian context, suicide terrorism revolves around the 
phenomenon of the shahid, which acts on behalf of a popular 
culture of martyrdom that represents decades of influence 
on society from a variety of terrorist and other militant 
political organizations. Accordingly, the following 
research seeks to uncover the relationship between the 
political objectives of the primary Palestinian political 
entities, the methods used by those entities to pursue 
their goals, and the socio-cultural fluctuation vis-a-vis 
the acceptability of, and participation in, suicide 
terrorism that has occurred as a result. Clausewitz 
recognizes that war is a product of a "trinity" made up of 
the people, their government and its army. Similarly, one 
can view contemporary terror campaigns through the lens of 
a people who identify with one another and have a set of 
common goals (i.e. a collective), their representative 
organizations, and the armed fighters of those 
organizations or affiliated social networks.* 4 As a 
Unpublished paper presented for the Harrington Workshop on the 
Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism.
4 For an understanding of the contemporary importance of 
Clausewitz's theory on war, see Mark T. Clark, "The Continuing 
Relevance of Clausewitz," Strategic Review 26, no. 1 (Winter 
1998): 54-61; also Mark T. Clark, "Does Clausewitz Apply to 
Criminal-States and Gangs?" Global Crime 7, issue 3 & 4 (August 
2006): 407-427.
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supplement to the multi-layered approach, the following 
study analyzes the development and evolution of Palestinian 
suicide terrorism using the "trinity" model as a socio­
political gauge for shifts in the Palestinian collective 
identity—viewed here as the primary source behind 
Palestinians' employment of suicide terrorism.
Any lasting solutions to suicide terrorism lie within 
the exposure of its ideological, as well as tactical and 
operational, sources. Furthermore, detecting the 
motivations that propel suicide terrorism's continued use 
can create a starting point for establishing a suitable 
counter-terrorism policy. This is not, however, a study on 
counter-terrorism methods, but rather an analysis of the 
motivations of individuals, entities and a society that 
participate in a particular terror modus operandi, so as to 
open the door for a better understanding of how one might 
best deter, preempt or prevent participation in such acts 
in the future. Surely, the rational allures to committing 
acts of suicide terrorism provide inherent rational 
deterrents.5 And there is no better context to review 
suicide-homicide attacks than the Palestinian one, wherein 
5 The "rational" actor is defined here as one who operates with 
reason.
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the modus operandi has had significant comparative success 
politically and in turn inspired numerous other campaigns 
internationally. Indeed, the Palestinian organizations that 
have used suicide terrorism represent the host to the 
spread of the larger suicide-terror epidemic. Often 
identifying and understanding the host to a disease marks 
the first advancement toward finding a cure for it. The 
same logic applies here.
Thus, the following study has three purposes: first, 
to determine how certain Palestinian terror organizations 
developed an efficient process to deploy suicide-homicide 
bombers; second, to display how a specific-terror 
supporting culture has influenced international terror 
campaigns; or, to decode the effects that the Palestinian 
shahid phenomenon has had outside its own context in order 
to provide insight into the learning process that allows 
the global-terror community to evolve various modi operandi 
and strategies; last, and most importantly, to provide a 
thorough understanding of the motivations behind the 
shahid/suicide-homicide bomber phenomenon. Two methods 
central to this last part include: eradicating "mirror 
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imaging"6 from analysis by understanding the specifics of 
the socio-cultural environment from which the phenomenon 
under study arises, and, as stated above, by using various 
levels of analysis, which can elucidate the connections 
between the three components within the trinity model. 
Accordingly, the four following questions warrant further 
research than that which is readily available: 'first, what 
effect has Palestinian organizations' accommodating da'awa 
infrastructures and/or supportive political/governmental 
institutions had on the process of creating suicide­
homicide bombers? Second, what effect has the Palestinian 
culture of martyrdom had on suicide terrorism in the 
disputed territories as well as in the international arena? 
Three, what political victories have Palestinian terror 
organizations gained by employing suicide-homicide bombers, 
and how have these lessons-learned affected international 
terror campaigns? Four, how do rationality and culture play 
into Palestinian suicide-homicide operations for the 
perpetrating individual, deploying terror organization, 
sanctioning society, and nation-state that seeks to deter 
s Oftentimes, deterrence policies suffer a problem of "mirror­
imaging, " in which the deterring nation-state assumes that a foe 
maintains a similar worldview that arrives them to identical 
cost/benefit analyses.
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such actions? This work contends that the answers to the 
questions above also answer questions posed by scholars 
pondering the general suicide-terror phenomenon. Bloom 
articulates:
The almost daily occurrences of suicide attacks 
in Iraq, the July 25 attack in Sharm el Sheikh in 
Egypt... coupled with the July 7 and 21 attacks 
against the London Tube and buses, the first such 
instance of suicide terror from homegrown cells 
in the West, raise the question of why a once 
occasional mode of attack increasingly appears to 
be the terrorists' weapon of choice. The increase 
in the number of attacks throughout the 
world...and the increasing lethality of the 
improvised explosive devices themselves require 
further investigation and understanding.7
7 Mia Bloom, "Dying to Kill: Motivations for Suicide Terrorism," 
in Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of 
Martyrdom, ed. Ami Pedahzur (New York: Routledge, 2005), 25.
Terrorism trends spiral, from an inner core to the outer
peripihery--from local conflicts to global campaigns;
fashionable tactics adapt and evolve to new environments
and accordingly embed themselves into varying strategies.
Like a product of the fashion industry, a terror modus 
operandi such as suicide-homicide bombing snags onto a wave 
of popularity. That which is new, shocking and often 
brilliantly devised captures the attention of youthful 
masses. The following study seeks to decipher the shahid 
fashion, by identifying its chief designers, producers and 
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their methods, in order to help prevent further imitation 
and adaptation.
Definitions
Clausewitz states "war is not merely an act of policy 
but a true political instrument, a continuation of 
political intercourse, carried on with other means'."8 War in 
perhaps its most rugged and callous incarnation takes on 
the form of terrorism. Often today, so brutal are the 
tactics and vile the choice of targets that acts of 
terrorism lose their ability to provoke an understanding of 
the political pursuits, which drive the employment of such 
acts. One can easily forget that behind an act of terror 
lays a political goal, driven by an organizational ideology 
that a collective identity empowers. It is far easier to 
understand terrorists as "crazy," "insane," "deranged," 
"mentally ill," or possessing other pathological states of 
mind that explain their actions with a simple psychotic 
diagnosis. For some, suicide terrorism exacerbates this 
issue of comprehension. But despite the intuition to write 
off acts of terrorism and specifically suicide-homicide 
attacks as crazy, such acts stand far from anything of the 
8 Clausewitz, 99.
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sort. Terrorism and suicide-homicide attacks have found 
their place as strategy and tactic in the pursuit of 
political goals; they are just as much "the extension of 
politics by other means," as are other forms and acts of 
warfare. Whether they are legitimate or not is another 
question—one that definitions can only answer.
In any discussion on warfare of any kind and 
particularly on terrorism, maintaining clarity requires a 
brief explanation of general terms and their intended 
usage. First and foremost, it is necessary to define 
"terrorism." Terrorism is the use of violence by a non­
state actor against civilians and/or non-combatants for the 
purpose of political gain. Three parts, all equally 
important, make up the definition. First, by removing "non­
state actor," the wording simply defines war in its modern 
sense as between nation-states. Second, if one replaces 
"civilians and/or non-combatants" with soldiers and/or 
their commanding-civilian officials, then the wording 
defines guerrilla warfare and not terrorism; if a specific 
attack targets a mixture of the two types of victims, then 
the definition reverts to the aggressor: that is, if a 
state actor perpetrates the attack then it is an act of 
war, whereas if a non-state actor perpetrates the attack 
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then it is an act of terrorism. The distinction might- seem 
esoteric to some. Nevertheless it is important to recognize 
that governments of nation-states are the only legitimate 
facilitators of coercive force, as they represent the only 
entities responsible for citizenry and'to the potential 
negative responses of foreign entities, which could be 
detrimental to the nation as a whole.9 Third, by taking out 
"political gain," the wording defines violent crime. 
Furthermore, when executed without some type of attached 
political purpose, emotional acts or "revenge" acts 
constitute crimes and not terrorism--although in many 
instances a specific political act might have instigated a 
perpetrator's desire for vengeance.
9 A guerrilla war carried on after the fall of the particular 
nation-state's government maintains legitimacy to the effort's 
end; a nation-state after all is deemed "successful" or not by 
its ability to own a monopoly on the use of coercive force, as a 
state's monopoly allows for its nation's stability and security, 
as well as maximizes the potential for securing against external 
threats.
10 "Suicide" is defined here simply as one committing the 
premeditated, or intentional, killing of oneself.
"Suicide10 terrorism" for all intents and purposes 
refers to an act of terrorism, in which the perpetrator 
kills oneself while initiating the attack. Furthermore, 
operational success, whether tactically, symbolically or 
both, requires the perpetrator to take his or her own 
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life.11 "Suicide-homicide bomber" represents an individual 
that detonates explosives either strapped to his or her 
person, directly carried, or contained within a vehicle for 
the purpose of carrying out a suicide-homicide attack. 
Importantly, suicide-homicide bomber, rather than "suicide 
bomber" or "homicide bomber," explicitly expresses the two 
separate, albeit simultaneous, acts that such an attacker 
intends to commit while carrying out his or her operation-- 
i.e. suicide and murder.
11 Boaz Ganor, "The Rationality of the Islamic - Radical Suicide 
Attack Phenomenon," in Countering Suicide Terrorism, updated ed.
(Herzliya, Israel: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism 
[ICT], 2007); also Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, revised and 
expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 132.
"Political Islam," or "Islamism," simply refers to a 
political ideology based on the fundamental tenets of 
Islam. Furthermore, just as various interpretations of 
those tenets have spawned a variety of Islamic sects, 
nearly an equal number of versions of Islamism exist--such 
as Sunni, Shi'a and others, including a variety of sub-sect 
offshoots and juxtapositions like Salafi and revolutionary 
Shi'a. One could understand "hardline Islamism" simply as 
Islamic supremacism, or the viewpoint that political Islam 
offers the only viable and righteous political ideology. 
"Islamic- fanaticism" represents those ideas and individuals 
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within Islamist movements that promote a willingness to 
sacrifice individual self-interest for the collective 
cause.12
For an explanation of the term "fanatic," see Lee Harris, The 
Suicide of Reason: Radical's Islam's Threat to the West (New 
York: Basic Books, 2007), xx.
13 Farhad Khosrokhavar, Suicide Bombers: Allah's New Martyrs, 
trans. David Macey (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Pluto Press, 2005), 13.
Literally "struggle," but meaning "holy war," jihad 
has functioned differently throughout Islamic history. The 
primary Islamic texts, Qur'an and Hadith, complement jihad 
with the notions of dar al-Islam (dwelling of submission) 
and dar al-harb (dwelling of war); when infidels, i.e. non­
Muslims, invade dar al-Islam, Muslims have a fard ayn 
(individual obligation) to physically defend their sacred 
territory. Dar al-harb denotes territory that still 
requires Islamic conquest; accordingly, during such Islamic 
expansions, Muslims have a fard kifaya (collective 
obligation) to jihad, meaning able-bodied individuals may 
opt to participate through means other than physical 
combat. The additional notion of dar al-sulh (dwelling of 
armistice) represents those territories where non-Muslims 
have signed an armistice with Muslims and agreed to pay a 
tribute.13 The Shaffi school of Islam14 adds the category of 
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dar al-ahd (dwelling of agreement) , in which a territory­
receives a neutral designation.14 5 Furthermore, Sufi or 
mystic Muslims promote the idea of breaking jihad down into 
general two forms: jihad al-nafs (spiritual holy war) 
refers to a Muslim's spiritual struggle within oneself, 
whereas jihad bil-saif (holy war of the sword) stands for a 
physical struggle against the enemies of Islam.16 Unless 
otherwise noted, the traditional definition is how the work 
uses the term throughout, as "Islamic thinkers [on the 
whole] reject the quietist and mystical version."17
14 Sunni Islam has four schools, including Hanafi, Maliki, Shaffi 
and Hanbali.
15 Khosrokhavar, 13.
16 See Assaf Moghadam, "Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the 
Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects," Studies 
in Conflict & Terrorism 26, no. 2 (March 2003): 70; Walter 
Laqueur, New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass 
Destruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 130; and 
Khosrokhavar, 14.
17 Khosrokhavar, 15. '
The next two definitions, in their verb, gerund and 
noun forms, often cause some confusion for non-Arabic 
speakers, as they hold similar connotations, yet with 
.subtle differences, and are commonly used interchangeably 
in colloquial discourse. Shahada literally stands for 
"witness"—however, depending on context, it either means 
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the "affirmation of one's submission to Allah,"18 or "death 
for Allah's sake." Istishhad literally stands for 
"martyrdom"--although, meaning "self-sacrifice for Allah's 
sake." Shahada refers to incidental death during jihad, 
whereas istishhad indicates deliberate death during jihad. 
Regarding where each relates to suicide terrorism, the 
former connotes a "willingness to die" and the latter an 
explicit "eagerness to die"—thus leaving only istishhad in 
the realm of suicide terrorism.19
18 In this sense, shahada also refers to the first pillar of 
Islam--confirming one's affirmation as a Muslim by declaring 
loyalty to Allah.
19 One scholar explores the importance of making distinctions 
between these two types of self-sacrificial acts. See Jon Elster, 
"Motivations and Beliefs in Suicide Missions," in Making Sense of 
Suicide Missions, expanded and updated ed., ed. Diego Gambetta 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 237-238.
Concepts
Similarly to definitions and the key distinctions they 
make, concepts and their explanations work to increase the 
level of lucidity. The following research contains 
discussions on four concepts in particular. Each has a 
distinct function in the Palestinian suicide terror 
phenomenon.
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"Palestinian shahid" refersFirst and foremost,
primarily to the Palestinian perpetrators of suicide­
homicide attacks beginning in 1993; the concept secondarily 
.represents those deemed "shahids" in Palestinian society, 
whether participants in suicide-homicide bombings or 
otherwise. Palestinian society views both the shahid and 
the istishhadi as martyrs who deserve the rewards of 
paradise.20 Indeed, colloquially, as noted above, 
Palestinians speak about both the istishhadi (one who 
intentionally commits martyrdom during jihad} and the 
shahid (one who incidentally attains martyrdom during 
jihad} as shahids.21 To confuse matters further, when 
discussing a suicide-homicide attacker and/or a suicide­
homicide attack, Palestinians (as other Arab Muslims) 
usually use shahid in referring to the suicide-homicide 
attacker and istishhad in describing the act. However, as 
one researcher points out, Palestinians frequently say 
things like: "Before the istish'hadi, there were shuhada
20 Yasser Mahmoud Ali Abu Bakar cited in Intelligence and 
Terrorism Information Center, Suicide bombing terrorism during 
the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict: September 2000-December 
2005 (1 January 2006), 7-8; accessed at <www.terrorism-info.org. 
il/>.
21 Additionally, one should not confuse the shahid/istishhadi with 
the feda'i or mujahid, both of whom display a willingness to 
sacrifice their lives for Islam, but usually seek to fight as 
long as circumstances permit.
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. [martyrs]"22-—such a statement refers to the specific 
tactical change, from dying while throwing rocks at 
soldiers to blowing oneself up on a civilian bus, that 
occurred between the first intifada and al-Aqsa intifada. 
The social blurring of these terms oftentimes creates 
analytical difficulties. Simply put, one could think of it 
as all istishhadis are shahids, but not vice versa, and 
therefore the more encompassing term usually wins out in 
the layman's everyday usage. Thus, for purposes of this 
work, although istishhadi, or one who "intentionally 
commits martyrdom," might represent a more precise 
denotation of a suicide terrorist, shahid is used 
throughout as Palestinians more commonly use the term 
colloquially to define one who has participated in an 
'amalyya istishhadiyya (martyrdom operation)—i.e. suicide­
terror attack.
22 See Nichole Argo, "The Role of Social Context in Terrorist 
Attacks," The Chronicle of Higher Education, 13 January 2006.
Second, "culture of martyrdom" represents the forces 
in Palestinian society that accommodate participation in 
terrorism; moreover, it is the socio-cultural fabric that 
often instigates participation in suicide-homicide bombings 
and other such "martyrdom operations." Furthermore, the 
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culture of martyrdom stands for the components of the 
shahid/suicide-homicide bomber phenomenon not necessarily 
affiliated with a particular organization, as it 
collectively signifies the elements in Palestinian society, 
such as music videos, popular poems, educational texts 
books, mass rallies, memorabilia, etc. that support ideas 
of, and sanction beliefs in, jihad, shahada and istishhad 
or commemorate a past shahid. Additionally, it represents 
less tangible components that accommodate suicide 
terrorism, such as popular acceptance and praise of 
shahids, as well as scarce condemnation by authority 
figures and other forms of tacit consent.
Third, "terror machine" signifies the established 
social apparatuses as well as the political institutions 
that support, from time to time, one or more organizations, 
including Hamas's al-Qassam Brigades, Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad's al-Quds Brigades, Fatah's•al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade, 
and others. An organization's "terror machine" refers to 
the actual components of an infrastructure behind the 
process of deploying suicide-homicide bombers, such as the 
bombmakers and dispatchers, inspirational sermons, videos 
of previous shahids, etc.
48
Fourth, the Palestinian notion of sammud 
(steadfastness) or national perseverance refers to "staying 
on the land despite immense Israeli pressure to leave."23 
Sammud. symbolizes a daily "form of resistance activism."24 
Moreover, sammud represents Palestinian Arabs' conceptual 
response to the narrative of al-Naqba (the Catastrophe), 
which signifies the establishment of a Jewish state on 
sacred Islamic land. Containing deep a "religious 
sensibility,"25 which shapes the national consciousness in 
the form of Islamic concepts and promotes maximalist goals, 
sammud accordingly encourages Palestinians to reject any 
proposal compromising the prospects of establishing an 
Arab/Islamic state over the old territory of Mandatory 
Palestine. Furthermore, sammud has played a central role in 
the "development of Palestinian society," and the shahid's 
popularization.26
23 See Mark Levine, "Chaos, Globalization, and the Public Sphere: 
Political Struggle in Iraq and Palestine," The Middle East 
Journal 60, no. 3 (Summer 2006): 473.
24 Iris Jean-Klein, "Palestinian Martyrdom Revisited: Critical 
Reflections on Topical Cultures," Cornell Law School East Asian 
Law and Culture Conference Series 5 (2002): 3.
25 Levine, 473.
26 Notes from discussion with Palestinian Academic Society for the 
Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) Director Mahdi Abdul 
Hadi, in Jerusalem, Israel (19 December 2005).
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Key to understanding all four concepts is gathering 
how they developed overtime through the interplay and 
fluctuation between a Palestinian collective identity, its 
related political goals, organizational strategies on 
obtaining those goals, the corresponding tactics employed, 
and the mobilization of individuals to carry out tactical 
operations. Particular identities, for purposes of this 
study, are extremely important as their attached narratives 
lend varying levels of support and legitimacy to any number 
of types of violence, including suicide terrorism.
Identity Construction and Fluctuation 
in Pursuit of a Nation-State
Two central parts compose the modern nation-state: the 
nation, which reflects a collective identity, and the 
state, which governs the people who embody the collective. 
The legitimacy of a specific nation-state, as understood in 
.international relations, derives from the fulfillment of 
three areas: (1) building a nation--or group of people in 
agreement with one another on a common identity and civic 
culture or social contract (i.e. the establishment of non­
violent means for the resolution of civil necessities); (2)
erecting a state--or governmental monopoly on the use of 
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physical coercion; and, (3) recognition by a world power of 
the previous two27—that is, the nation/collective and the 
state/government. Accordingly, realizing a nation marks an 
imperative first step, not only to legitimizing a state but 
also making one function at an acceptable level to the 
population that it governs. For decades, various 
Palestinian movements have sought to simultaneously 
construct a national identity, establish a state and garner 
international support for recognizing the fulfillment of 
the previous two.
27 While debatably an imperative to a nation-state's legitimacy, 
the importance of a nascent revolutionary nation-state seeking 
and securing support from world powers goes back to the efforts 
of the emerging United States, which dispatched Benjamin 
Franklin, John Adams, and John Jay across Europe to secure 
recognition of America's legitimate establishment of self- 
determination .
A group's realization that it comprises a separate and 
distinguishable nation, whether contrived after the 
formation of a state, sought after the dismemberment of an 
empire or otherwise, acts as the source of the "nation's" 
staying power. A historical narrative operates as one of 
the pillars that holds up the social and political cohesion 
of a nation. Narratives tell a historical story, describe 
the present, and imagine a future. Narratives help define a 
collective identity and accentuate it politically and 
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culturally.28 The "imagined future" accordingly lends itself 
to those articulating common goals for the collective. 
Supplemented with cultural values and beliefs, and personal 
attitudes, common goals pave the way for collective 
behavior.
28 Michael Barnett, "The Israeli Identity and the Peace Process: 
Re/creating the Un/thinkable," in Identity and Foreign Policy in 
the Middle East, ed. Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett (Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002), 66.
29 The "hierarchy of identities" notion is also referred to as a 
"menu of choices." See Michael Barnett and Shibley Telhami, 
It comes as no surprise then that the manner in which 
Palestinian Arabs have viewed themselves since the Ottoman 
Empire has shaped their political behavior--including how 
they have employed violence. Palestinian Arabs, like most 
people across the globe and throughout time, have ascribed 
and subscribed to multiple identities simultaneously. 
Whether religious, ethnic, national, tribal, clan, family, 
occupational, gender, age, etc., individuals find 
themselves in a continuous negotiation of a "hierarchy of 
identities"; scholars Michael Barnett and Shibley Telhami 
explain, within such a hierarchy "one [identity] 
constitutes the core and others...are 'activated' during 
certain social situations and do not undermine the 
pillar."29 Nations find themselves in a similar negotiation 
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that is occasionally swayed by a charismatic leader, 
religious resurgence, social reformation, en vogue 
political ideology or other collective-identity altering 
phenomena. Scholar Samuel P. Huntington explains,
Identity is an individual's or a group's sense of 
self. It is a product of self-consciousness, that 
I or we possess distinct qualities as an entity 
that differentiates me from you and us from them... 
Identities are important because they shape the 
behavior of people.30
"Introduction," in Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle 
East, ed. Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 2002), 13-16.
30 Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America's 
National Identity (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 21-22.
31 An identity's strength is usually determined by the amount of 
people, influential elites and/or community leaders who ascribe 
or subscribe to it as an important signifier of their overall 
hierarchy of identities. Newly established political boundaries, 
however, oftentimes function as a political tabula rasa.
32 Don Peretz, "The Historical Background of Arab Nationalism in 
Palestine," in The Palestine State: A Rational Approach, ed. 
Richard J. Ward, Don Peretz, and Evan M. Wilson (London: National 
University Publications, 1977), 3-23; see also Tom Segev, One 
Maintaining a collective (e.g. national) identity can 
at times be taxing on a populace and/or governing body. 
This is particularly the case when a group finds itself 
geo-politically dislocated from others with whom it has a 
common identity.31 Palestinian Arabs after World War I (WWI) 
exemplify such a case; during this period, they found 
themselves, most of whom self-identified as "Southern 
Syrians,"32 under British rule in Mandatory Palestine, and 
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separated from the newly carved-out protectorates of Syria 
and Transjordan. Many Palestinian Arabs had viewed Islam as- 
their most important identity prior to WWI, but with the 
Ottoman Empire and Caliphate dissolved, Arab ethno- 
linguistic identity arose as the natural and pragmatic 
alternative.33 The Arab world, however, found itself 
superficially divided by British and French imperial 
design. Accordingly new, constructed, national identities 
crept to the forefront of many Middle Eastern peoples' 
hierarchy of identities.
Palestine Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate (New 
York: Owl Books, 2001) .
33 The Young Turks' loosening of the Ottoman imperial grip 
precipitated national awareness among Levantine Arabs, including 
those in Palestine. However, Arabism did not fully flourish until 
after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.
34 The Yishuv stands for the pre-state Jewish establishment in 
Ottoman and British Palestine.
Often collective identity is just as much about the 
"them" as the "us." In the decades preceding WWI, the 
arrival of waves of Zionists in Ottoman Palestine 
heightened the sensitivities of Arab nationalism. Thus, a 
key catalyst to Arab nationalism in the Levant and 
Palestine proved to be the "us"-versus-"them" scenarios 
that played themselves out in confrontations between the 
Yishuv (Jewish settlement)34 and the local Arab population, 
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first during Ottoman rule, followed later by the British 
and U.N. Mandates and lastly after the state of Israel's 
establishment in 1948. The fluctuation of the Palestinian 
Arab population's collective identity often resulted in a 
reshaping of how leading political bodies viewed and 
approached the political situation. Throughout the Zionist- 
Arab, Israeli-Arab, and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts,35 
these changes have significantly affected how Palestinian 
Arab organizations have utilized political violence.
35 The varying "conflicts" do not refer to those between different 
groups per se, but rather signify different time periods of the 
century-long conflict between Jews and Arabs over the territory 
of Ottoman Palestine, British Mandatory Palestine, and lastly the 
State of Israel.
35 When asked why he did not agree to a final status in 2000 with 
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak's offer of 90 percent of the
disputed territories on the table, Arafat remarked: "[the rest] 
is not mine to give."
By no coincidence, Palestinian political violence 
strategies and tactics have progressively obtained higher 
levels of brutality as the primary objectives of the 
Palestinian populace have remained untenable over the 
decades. At times organizations have attempted to negotiate 
away various objectives, only to be met with popular 
rejection.36 A combination of the apparent permanence of the 
state of Israel, coupled with a Palestinian collective 
identity that increasingly attaches identifiable components 
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(e.g. victimhood, glorification of martyrdom, hatred of 
Israel37) that distinguish it as the pure antithesis to 
Israel, has exacerbated the "us" versus "them" mentality. 
Therefore, while identity has served as a primary device to 
maintain social cohesion amid the Palestinian nation absent 
a state, it has also functioned as the narrating source to 
the virulent ideologies that have waged a continuous and 
escalating war first against the Yishuv and later against 
Israel.
37 Notes from ICT seminar on "The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle," given 
by Boaz Ganor, in Herzliya, Israel (19 June 2005).
38 The riots are also known as the "disturbances," which was a 
term preferred by the British in order to deceptively insinuate 
minimal severity to its own population.
Whether during 1929 riots,38 the Arab revolt from 1936 
to 1939, the Jewish-Arab Civil War from late 1947 to May 
1948, the PLO's decades-long terror campaign, the first 
intifada from December 1987 to early 1993, or the more 
recent al-Aqsa intifada from September 2000 to late 2005, 
Palestinian Arabs have demonstrated that organized 
political violence serves at the request of a supportive . 
constituency. By identifying some kind of common ground and 
goals as a collective foundation, groups sustain cohesion. 
While constituencies might disagree from time to time over 
the means, the broader collective identity remains unified
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■on the ends. For nearly 80 years, whether through the death 
squads of the Arab Higher Committee,39 PLO fedayin or Hamas 
shuhada, Palestinian Arabs have demonstrated how a society, 
an organization and empowered individuals can operate as 
one in pursuit of a state, all while attempting to 
construct and maintain a nation, and fight the ever­
important "other."
39 Yehoshua Porath, The Palestinian Arab National Movement 1929- 
1939: From Riots to Rebellion (London: Frank Cass, 1977), 295- 
303; see also Chuck Morse, The Nazi Connection to Islamic 
Terrorism: Adolf Hitler and Haj Amin al-Husseini (New York: 
Universe, 2003) .
Producing the Contemporary Shahid
Various rationales and attractions draw individuals 
into the world of terrorism. More often than not, however, 
personal and collective identity and ideology-infused 
organizations play key roles in highlighting the allures 
and duties of participating in political violence. Identity 
shapes one's desires at varying levels of human 
interaction--political, social and so forth. Moreover, 
one's hierarchy of identities, as dominated by the 
negotiated spearhead, often directs or indirectly arrives 
the individual during his or her lifetime to a 
corresponding ideology, which focuses his or her 
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"[political] view of the present and vision of the 
future,"40 and simultaneously buttresses his or her 
identity. Thus, whether consciously or subconsciously, the 
symbiotic relationship between identity and ideology mark 
the starting line of an individual's race to political 
action.41 Terrorists are by definition political actors. For 
religion, revolution, rebellion or otherwise, terrorists 
act in pursuit of political change. The actions terrorists 
take represent the pursuit of an end goal, which a specific 
ideology usually defines. But, ideological attractions do 
not seduce individuals in the sense of hypnotization-- 
lacking coercion, they must play directly into the one's 
natural sense of a cost/benefit analysis, as constituted by 
his or her cultural mindset, in order to result in the 
individual taking action.
40 Leon P. Baradat, Political Ideologies: Their Origins and 
Impact, 9th ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson Prentice Hall, 
2006), 8.
41 Central characteristics of terrorism, and terror organizations, 
have drastically changed over the last 30 years. Whereas the 
terrorism of the late 1960s and 1970s reflected more elitist 
ideological campaigns (i.e. generally Marxist-Leninist), today's 
terror organizations predominately pursue identity-based goals 
(i.e. usually religious or ethno-nationalist). Nevertheless, both 
identity and ideology play key roles in the overwhelming majority 
of modern terror campaigns. For extensive studies on the 
evolution of modern terrorism, see Laqueur, New Terrorism; and 
Hoffman, Inside Terrorism.
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4 2 Values, beliefs and attitudes produce behavior.
Culture,, unlike anything else, has the ability to develop, 
condition and refine one's mindset, as it shapes how 
knowledge, or in the case of terrorism, how one receives 
and understands a doctrine. Culture, ultimately, acts as a 
filter for behavior's three primary instigating factors. 
Scholar Ernest Gellner explains culture as "a system of 
ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and 
communication."42 3 Huntington adds, "[culture] refers to a 
people's language, religious beliefs, social and political 
values, assumptions as towhat is right and wrong, 
appropriate and inappropriate, and to the objective 
institutions and behavioral patterns that reflect these 
subjective elements."44 Culture thus enables rationales, 
which sanction specific behavior--leaving individuals with 
an understanding of the world around them, as well as with 
direction for the choices that lay before them. Philosopher 
Lee Harris notes:
42 Notes from lecture on "Government and Politics of Japan," given 
by Ray Geigle, in Bakersfield, California (January 2003) .
43 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1983), 7.
44 Huntington, Who Are We?, 30.
Our culture trains us. It teaches us what to be 
ashamed of, what is permissible to do in front of 
other people and what is not. It teaches us how 
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to show respect and deference, how to indicate 
that we have a peaceful intent, how to assert 
ourselves without offending others, and in 
general how to behave 'properly' with others in 
our interactions with them.45
45 Lee Harris, Civilization and Its Enemies (New York: Free Press, 
2004), 162.
Culture, nonetheless, works as the individual's gauge for 
socially acceptable behavior, as well as an organization's 
guidelines for that which a given collective deems 
permissible.
Today, when an individual Palestinian volunteers, 
prepares and lastly becomes a suicide-homicide bomber, he 
or she does not merely fulfill some shadowy cult's 
religious ritual or an-honorary duty. Rather, he or she 
acts on an individual finding of a cost/benefit analysis, 
as weighed through social norms, expectations, bonds and 
personal interests. This "weighing procedure" marks the 
final step in a larger process, wherein the individual 
initially receives exposure to a framing of a problem, 
secondly gets introduced to potential solutions to the 
problem, subsequently finds justifications and legitimacy 
for the proposed solutions, and lastly considers the 
prospects of acting in pursuit of the solutions. Thus, the 
act of killing oneself to murder others, while certainly 
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considered a religious duty or maintenance of ethno­
cultural honor for some, ultimately marks the final product 
of a lengthy process that incorporates the functions of 
identity, ideology and culture, the institutions of 
socialization, and the psychology of a sane individual. 
Therefore, a pair of cooperative relationships, one between 
the individual's identity and subscribed ideology, and 
another between one's reasoning and specific cognitive 
boundaries placed on it by his or her socio-cultural 
milieu, determine one's participation in political 
activism, including acts of terrorism.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RAISING THE SHAHID WITH IDENTITY AND IDEOLOGY':
PALESTINIAN SOCIETY, ORGANIZATIONS AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF A CULTURE OF MARTYRDOM
Palestine, with the boundaries it had 
during the British Mandate, is an 
indivisible territorial unit.1 
-Palestinian National Charter, 1968
1 An excerpt of the amended Palestinian National Charter of the
Palestinian National Council, representative body of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization. See Yonah Alexander and Joshua 
Sinai, Terrorism: The PLO Connection (New York: Taylor & Francis, 
1989), 198.
2 Hamas charter in Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian 
Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2000), 183.
3 Remarks made by a young Palestinian girl on PA television. See 
Palestinian Media Watch, "Topic III: Children as Combatants in PA 
Ideology," TV Archives/Video Library (2002): accessed at 
<www.pmw.org.il> on 28 October 2007.
4 See Yehoshua Porath, The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab 
National Movement 1918-1929 (London: Frank Cass, 1974); Benny 
Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict 
There is no solution to the Palestinian 
problem except by Jihad.2 
-Hamas Charter, 1988
We will murder them all; 
we won't leave a single Jew.3 
-Palestinian girl on PA Television, 
October 22, 2000
During the initial-era of "Palestinian" nationalism, 
from the early 1920s to the establishment of Israel in 
1948,4 the Arabs of Palestine looked predominantly to 
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religion for guidance in the political arena. With the 
Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini5 in place as 
the Palestinian-Arab population's undisputed leader, 
religious overtones saturated the Zionist-Arab conflict 
over these years.6 The 1949 armistice between Israel and 
Arab states brought about a relatively dormant period in 
Palestinian nationalism, as Arabs in the West Bank formed 
part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Gazan Arabs 
1881-2001 (New York: First Vintage Books, 2001), 99; Tom Segev, 
One Palestine Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate 
(New York: Owl Books, 2001) .
5 Hajj Amin al-Husseini arrived to the national stage, when he 
helped lead the 1920 riots and was subsequently convicted of his 
involvement in absentia by the Mandatory government-. See Morris, 
Righteous Victims, 95 and 98; Chuck Morse, The Nazi Connection to 
Islamic Terrorism: Adolf Hitler and Haj Amin al-Husseini (New 
York: IUniverse, 2003), 17. A year later in 1921, Arabs again 
resorted to "pogrom"-like violence against Jews; yet, this time 
rather than sentence him to another ten years in prison for his 
role in inciting the violent episodes, the British decided to 
install Amin al-Husseini as the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, which 
made him the highest Islamic authority in Palestine. Amin al- 
Husseini' s grandfather, father, and elder brother had previously 
held the position of Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, and his 
appointment displayed the political and religious clout his clan, 
the Husseinis, continued to enjoy among the Palestinian Arab 
population. Segev, One Palestine, Complete, 159-160; also Morris, 
Righteous Victims, 100. Aside from being the "preeminent 
Palestinian nationalist leader," Amin al-Husseini was also a 
local leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. See Ziad Abu-Amar, 
"Hamas: A Historical and Political Background," The Journal of 
Palestine Studies 22, no. 4 (Summer 1993): 6.
6 Yehoshua Porath, The Palestinian Arab National Movement 1929- 
1939: From Riots to Rebellion (London: Frank Cass, 1977); Morris, 
Righteous Victims, 106-204; and Morse, 12-84.
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came under Egyptian rule.7 This era saw Palestinian 
nationalism lapse into inertia, as Jordan and Egypt's 
leaders promoted the status quo—keeping the notion of 
Palestinian self-determination frozen.8 Palestinian 
nationalism however found a new source of life with the 
creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 
and its subsequent cooptation by Yasser Arafat and his 
outfit of Fatah fedayin.9 The defeat of Egypt, Syria and 
Jordan in the 1967 Six-Day War not only initiated the 
sounding of pan-Arabism's death knell, but also left a 
majority of the Palestinian population under Israeli rule, 
disconnected from an Arab state, and once again left to 
reformulate a collective identity.
7 Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (New York: 
Penguin Books, 2000); Morris, Righteous Victims; Samih K. 
Farsoun, "Whither Palestine and the Palestinians?" The 
Contemporary Middle East (Cambridge, Mass.: Westview Press, 
2006); and William B. Quandt, Fuad Jabber and Ann Moseley Lesch, 
The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism (Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 1973) .
8 Eric Rozenman, "Au Revoir, Palestine," The Journal of 
International Security Affairs no. 13 (Fall 2007): 78.
9 The PLO was created in January 1964 during a summit of Arab 
states at the behest of Egypt's President Gemal Abd'ul Nasser. 
Its first leader, Ahmad Shuqari, was a known Nasserite and pan­
Arabist. After Arafat's takeover, the PLO readjusted its 
affiliation with the Arab League, Nasser and pan-Arabism in 
general. See Alexander and Sinai, Terrorism: The PLO Connection.
From the mid-1960s until the first intifada in
December 1987, the PLO, an umbrella for numerous 
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nationalist-terrorist groups, held a virtual monopoly on 
the Palestinian movement for self-determination. As Arafat 
and the PLO sought to maintain a staunch "secular­
nationalist" timbre that fit well against the backdrop of 
the Cold War,10 political Islam remained largely in the 
Palestinian underground. But, by the mid-1980s, a 
collection of Palestinian organizations affiliated with the 
Muslim Brotherhood11 began to mechanize participation in 
"resistance."12 With the PLO's leadership, including Arafat, 
mostly exiled in Tunisia the organization lacked a dominant 
command and control over the first Palestinian intifada— 
10 As a primary backer of the PLO, the Soviet Union expected 
maintenance of some ideological solidarity with the entities it 
supported. See Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander, Terrorism: The 
Soviet Connection (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1984).
11 Established by Hassan al-Banna in 1928, as an Islamist rebuke 
of Egyptian King Farouk al-Awwal, Jamiat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin 
(the Muslim Brotherhood) became a mainstay in Arab and Islamic 
political circles when one of its members, Sayyid Qutb called for 
an active jihad against secular-Arab governments and the West. 
See Seyyid Qutb, Milestones (Damascus, Syria: Dar al-Ilm, [no 
date] obtained in 2005). As the Muslim Brotherhood spread 
throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds, it established a 
Palestinian branch in 1945, but respective Jordanian and Egyptian 
politics dominated most of the organization's operations. For an 
extensive study on the formative decades of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, see Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of Muslim 
Brothers (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).
12 A popular euphemism used in Palestinian society, as well as 
throughout the Arab and Islamic worlds, "resistance" refers to 
political activism, including terror and guerrilla acts, against 
an "occupying" force. Accordingly, the terms resistance and 
occupation go hand in hand in the popular Palestinian lexicon.
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allowing for the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza13 to gain a 
share of the political benefits afforded by the uprising.14 
As the influence of Islamic organizations spread, 
competition with the PLO for popular support soared. The 
intense rivalry between these two main Palestinian 
political factions, one doctrinally Islamic and the other 
nationalistic, precipitated a vast mobilization of 
political participation within Palestinian society. As 
Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) rose to 
prominence, political Islam reaffirmed its role in 
Palestinian politics—ultimately emerging as the primary 
alternative to the PLO.
13 In the 1970s the different groupings of the Muslim Brotherhood 
in the West Bank, Gaza and Jordan united as "The Muslim 
Brotherhood in Jordan and Palestine"; however, the Gaza component 
of the organization held the most power as it oversaw al-Mujamma 
and the Islamic University in Gaza.
14 There is some debate over which organization, if any, 
"controlled" the first intifada. Some argue the PLO did under the 
Fatah-led al-Qaeda al-Wataniyya al-Muwahhada li-Intifada (Unified 
National Leadership of the Uprising) or UNLU; see Mohammed M. 
Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian 
Suicide Bombers (Washington D.C.: United States Institute for 
Peace Press, 2006). Others argue Hamas had more of an edge; see 
Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas.
Eventually, in the 1990s, competition between the two 
sides over which best represented the Palestinian political 
movement led to a social synthesis of the two political 
movements' ideologies, qowmiyya (Arab nationalism) and
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Islamiyya (political Islam). The notion of regaining the 
Islamic waqf (endowment) of "Palestine" matched the 
nationalist cry against "colonial occupation." Political 
Islam's reappearance alongside the traditional PLO line, as 
instituted in the Palestinian Authority (PA), forced the 
Fatah-led body to look for ways to reacquire popular 
support. Thus the grassroots elements within the Muslim 
Brotherhood's Gaza branch that initially provoked 
sustained-resistance at the beginning of the intifada in 
1987, had by the end of al-Aqsa intifada in 2005, spawned a 
highly efficient terror apparatus, which operates to date 
at the behest of Hamas. The return of political Islam to 
prominence in the Palestinian political arena precipitated 
competition over political leadership, social direction 
and, most importantly, violent resistance. Consequently, a 
popular culture of martyrdom based on Islamic concepts 
developed in Palestinian society and directly led to the 
shahid/suicide-homicide bomber phenomenon.
Terror Organizations as the Voice of
the Palestinians
In the Palestinian context, collective identity is 
inextricably linked to political violence strategies and 
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tactics employed by representative organizations. The 
phenomenon of the suicide-homicide bomber demonstrates this 
interrelation in full-force, as it mandates connectivity 
between a motivated political organization and willing 
individuals and an accommodating society, which provides an 
impetus for both.* 15 Distinguished terrorism expert Bruce 
Hoffman notes, "[t]he resilience of [terrorist] groups is 
doubtless a product of the relative ease with which they 
are able to draw sustenance and support from an existing 
constituency."16 Organizations rely on their constituencies 
for accommodation and momentum, and in return 
constituencies expect organizations to provide political 
representation. Ultimately they form a symbiosis.
15 See Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs.
15 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, revised and expanded ed. (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 242.
More often than not, two factors primarily determine 
if and how political entities use violence against an 
enemy—or in this case, when and how Palestinian 
organizations target the state of Israel and its interests. 
First, whether the destruction of Israel and in its stead 
the establishment of a Palestinian state, the creation of a 
Palestinian state alongside Israel, or the establishment of 
an Islamic empire constituting all the lands of dar al-
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Islam, organizations' political goals guide their 
strategies. Various means usually exist for a given 
setting. Strategy, thus, additionally determines the timing 
of violence, as well as whether restraint or negotiation 
might offer better options. Second, the population 
represented must sanction the type of violence used in 
order for the organization to maintain support over the 
long-run.17 18Just as the population at hand oftentimes reaps 
the benefits of an organization's success, the population,
17 Ami Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism (Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 
2005), 25-26 and 29.
18 Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2005).
1 8 along with the organization, also pays the consequences. 
Both factors underline the necessary relationship between 
organizations and the population they attempt or claim to 
represent.
The evolution of the PLO exemplifies the importance of 
an organization's interaction with its constituency. 
Effectively representing the Palestinian population during 
the 1960s and 1970s, the PLO maintained political stances 
that offered little compromise—thus reflecting the views 
of the Palestinian populace. By following a "strategy of 
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protracted struggle,"19 i.e. a variant of the Maoist three- 
stage guerrilla model, the PLO had to constantly keep media 
attention focused on itself. As a result, the PLO's 
fedayin20 attained utmost importance within the 
organization's strategy. Fedayin provided a romanticized 
icon for the Palestinian struggle, and as their 
international terror attacks brought the Palestinian issue 
to the world stage, the PLO's ability to use a mixture of 
violence and diplomacy to further the Palestinian cause 
increased.21 The PLO, its fedayin, and the Palestinian 
population worked together, like Clausewitz's "trinity" of 
war model suggests, furthering their collective goals 
19 Aharon Yariv, "A Strategy to Counter Palestinian Terrorism," in 
On Terrorism and Combating Terrorism, ed. Ariel Merari (Fredrick, 
Mary.: University Publications of America, 1985), 2. In 1974, 
Arafat officially adopted the phase strategy at the Palestinian 
National Congress. See Ely Karmon, "Arafat's Strategy: 
Lebanonization and Entanglement," International Institute for 
Counter-Terrorism [ICT]: Articles (No Date): accessed at 
<www.instituteforcounterterrorism.org> on 10 October 2007.
20 The feda'i traces it roots far before the creation of the PLO, 
Fatah and Arafat. The foundation of the feda'i is Islamic but its 
expression owes more to Arab-tribal culture. For decades, the PLO 
employed fedayin as its most trusted operatives. The Palestinian 
National Charter of the PLO declares: "[Fedayin] action 
constitutes the nucleus of the Palestinian popular liberation 
war." See in Yonah Alexander and Joshua Sinai, Terrorism: The PLO 
Connection (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1989), 6-7 and 
198.
21 By the late 1970s, more nation-states had recognized the PLO 
than the state of Israel. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 70.
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against their defined enemy.22 Accordingly, when the PLO 
became more responsive to international calls for peace and 
therefore less representative of the Palestinian population 
in the disputed territories, the patience of those same 
Palestinians wore thin.23 Arafat and his fedayin eventually 
found themselves outflanked during the intifada on the 
domestic-resistance front by kids armed with nothing more 
than stones and slingshots. The will of Palestinian youth 
to throw rocks at Israeli tanks captured the media 
attention that for so long the PLO had solely enjoyed. The 
PLO lost connection with the population it claimed to 
represent, and as a result other organizations filled the 
gap and made the moves the Palestinian population 
demanded--chiefly, the continuation of violent resistance. 
But, more importantly, the shift of the PLO's strategy away 
from its icon, the feda'i, and onto sources that brought
22 For an example of how the model works, see Mark T. Clark, "The 
Continuing Relevance of Clausewitz," Strategic Review 26, no. 1 
(Winter 1998): 54-61; also Mark T. Clark, "Does Clausewitz Apply 
to Criminal-States and Gangs?" Global Crime 7, issue 3 & 4 
(August 2006): 407-427.
23 The PLO's long-time official number two in charge, Salah 
Khalaf, aka Abu Iyad, as early as 1981, admitted: "What we feared 
most of all...has happened. Our movement has become bureaucratized. 
What it gained in respectability it lost in militancy. We have 
acquired a taste for dealing with governments and men of power." 
Quoted in Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 80.
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■ 2 4the organization and Arafat international legitimacy, 
signaled to the Palestinian populace that it needed a new 
representative.
By seizing parts of the PLO's following, Islamist- 
Palestinian organizations significantly expanded their own 
constituencies. Accordingly, as Hamas and PIJ consolidated 
power within Palestinian society, they sought to capitalize 
on it politically. The first intifada provided them with a 
prime opportunity to flex their political muscles. The re­
elevation of political Islam within the Palestinian 
collective identity opened the door to changes in the 
population's views on legitimate political violence tactics 
and targeting, and consequently led to the employment of 
new modi operandi.
Suicide-homicide bombings made their mark in the 1990s 
as one such modus operandi. Islamist-Palestinian 
organizations, and particularly Hamas, utilized suicide 
terrorism to distinguish themselves from the PLO/PA,24 5
24 In 1988, Arafat banned PLO terror operations outside of Israel. 
Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 80.
25 Reuven Paz, "The Islamic Legitimacy of Palestinian Suicide 
Terrorism," in Countering Suicide Terrorism, updated ed., ed.
Boaz Ganor (Herzliya, Israel: ICT, 2007), 61; and Hoffman, Inside 
Terrorism, 146-154.
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disrupt the Israeli-PA peace process,26 and reshape the 
national consciousness.27 Hamas learned that suicide 
terrorism provided new moves in an extremely lethal yet 
stagnant political bout. Once discovering its signature 
mode of operation, Hamas realized just how to spend the 
social capital it had accumulated over nearly two decades.
26 Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, "Sabotaging the Peace: The 
Politics of Extremist Violence," International Organization 56, 
no.' 2 (Spring 2002) : 263-296; Shay, 52-64.
27 Matthew Levitt, Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the 
Service of Jihad (Nev; Haven, Conn. : Yale University Press, 2006) , 
107 .
The Hamas Terror Machine: Organizing Da'awa
and Mechanizing Jihad
Hamas's version of resistance, which relies heavily on 
the Islamic concepts of jihad (struggle) and istishhad 
(martyrdom), resonates quite differently with Palestinians 
than the PLO's campaign for self-determination. This has as 
much to do with Hamas's use of violence as it does with the 
terror organization's intimate relationship with the 
Palestinian populace in the disputed territories and 
particularly in Gaza. Although the jihad operations of 
Hamas and its cousin organization PIJ brought notoriety to 
political Islam, the Gaza Muslim Brotherhood's da'awa 
(Islamic calling) or proselytizing institutions, set up in 
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the years preceding the intifada, deserve more of the 
credit 'for political Islam's revival in Palestinian 
society.28 In the 1970s and 1980s, with Arafat in one exile 
after another, Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated organizations 
seized the opportunity to set up social services, such 
health clinics, education facilities, Islamic centers, as 
well as to provide a wide range of other social services 
that were sure to win the loyalties of local populations.
28 During the 1970s, as the political shortcomings of pan-Arabism, 
secular-Arab nationalism, and Nasserism became evident, an 
Islamic sahwa (awakening) spread across the Sunni-Arab world. See 
Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs, 34-35, etc. Iranian leader 
Ayatollah Khomeini led a similar Shi'a revival at the end of the 
decade. See Shaul Shay, Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and the 
Palestinian Terror (London: Transaction Publishers, 2004).
29 Al-Mujamma's full name, Al-Mujamm'a al-Islami, means "the 
Islamic Gathering" in Arabic.
30 In 1978, al-Mujamma registered as a non-profit organization 
with the Israeli authorities, marking the initial cordial 
relations between the Jewish state and Muslim Brotherhood- 
affiliated organizations in the disputed territories and Jordan. 
After seeing its popularity stagnate due to a refusal to 
participate in armed resistance, the Muslim Brotherhood slowly 
began a change of course, culminating with its overt 
participation in the intifada and the establishment of Hamas. See 
Ziad Abu-Amr, "Hamas"; and Diego Baliani, "The Internecine 
Struggle among Palestinian Factions after Hamas' takeover of the 
Gaza Strip," ICT: Articles (23 October 2007): accessed at
<www.instituteforcounterterrorism.org> on 28 October 2007.
Founded in 1973-, al-Mujamma29 operated as a da'awa and 
administrative base for the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza 
Strip.30 Its leaders would eventually lead the intifada in 
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198731; they included most notably, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, who 
had been the most prominent Muslim Brotherhood member in 
Gaza since 1968, and "systematically" spread da'awa 
operations throughout Gaza.32 Over two decades, Yassin 
successfully established an Islamic organization, which 
provided vast social services to the Arab Gazan population, 
and an underground infrastructure that leaders could 
instantaneously activate to do the organization's bidding. 
Historian Benny Morris explains, "[t]he growth of the 
[Muslim] Brotherhood—and Islamic fundamentalism in 
general—among Palestinians owed much to the organizational 
skills of Sheikh [Yassin]."33 He accomplished this while 
arousing little attention from- the PLO and minimal concern 
by Israeli security services. In 1986, Yassin established 
Majd,34 which acted as al-Mujamma's internal security 
force--i.e. it protected the Muslim Brotherhood's interests 
from rival organizations, primarily the PLO's Fatah, and
31 Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, 16-19.
32 Yassin accomplished this by dividing Gaza into five areas, 
which were filled with operational cells made-up of three men 
each. See Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, 19.
33 Morris, Righteous Victims, 563.
34 Meaning "glory" in Arabic, Majd represents the acronym of 
Munazzamat al-Jihad wal-Da'awa (the Organization of Jihad and 
Da'awa).
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or o zrviolently punished "collaborators." When PIJ began
drawing members from al-Mujamma's ranks due to an appealing, 
activist-jihadi approach,35 67 Yassin, recognizing the need to 
match PIJ's actions in order to maintain membership levels, 
increased Majd's operations.38 In January 1988, as the 
intifada had swept across the disputed territories, the 
Gaza Muslim Brotherhood/al-Mujamma established Hamas as its 
official armed-wing in the disputed territories.39
35 Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, 34-35.
36 Although founded in the late 1970s by Dr. Fathi Shaqaqi, 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad mostly lagged behind Yassin's al- 
Mujamma and later Hamas in terms of social and political 
influence. See Levitt, 25-28.
37 PIJ's ideology intertwines the teachings of Qutb and Khomeini 
making the organization politically right of Hamas.
38 Boaz Ganor, The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide For Decision 
Makers (Piscataway, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 33;
also, Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, 33-34.
39 On December 14, 1987, the Muslim Brotherhood released its first 
leaflet calling for resistance against Israel; this leaflet is 
often attributed as Hamas's first communique. The name Hamas was 
not announced however until January 1988. This suggests the 
Muslim Brotherhood played it safe first before taking overt 
credit for its role in the intifada. See Abu-Amr, "Hamas," 10. 
Released in August 1988, Hamas's Covenant states in Chapter One, 
Article Two: "The Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the wings 
of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine." See Mishal and Sela, The 
Palestinian Hamas, 36 and 177.
With the opportunity the intifada provided, 
Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood elements turned accumulated 
social capital into political action. Initially, al-Mujamma 
pressured young men in Gaza to participate in the intifada 
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by reminding them of their Islamic duty to do so.40 However, 
over the course of the first intifada, Hamas transformed 
its social apparatus into a political action machine--that 
is, it learned how to maximize political participation, 
including acts' of violence, among its growing constituency. 
By the second intifada, Hamas would daily turn away scores 
of individuals seeking to participate in a "martyrdom 
operation." Or, as one Hamas official put it, "Our biggest 
problem is the hordes of young men who beat on our doors, 
clamoring to be sent... It is difficult to select only a few. 
Those whom we turn away return again and again pestering 
us, pleading to be accepted."41
40 Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious 
Militants Kill Consciousness (New York: Harper Collins, 2003), 
47 .
41 Quoted in Nasra Hassan, "Letter from Gaza: An Arsenal of 
Believers," The New Yorker, 19 November 2001.
Breeding Efficiency: The Effects of 
Competition over Resistance
Distinguished historians of the Zionist-Arab conflict 
have suggested, "the intifada accomplished more in its 
first few months than decades of PLO terrorism had
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achieved."42 The intifada brought perspective back to the 
Palestinian populace- regarding their political 
representation. Scholars Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela 
explain, "[t]he perception that the PLO was militarily and 
politically bankrupt apparently induced the Mujamma' 
leadership to contemplate the possibility that it could 
become a political alternative."43 Similarly, most Gazans 
viewed al-Mujamma and eventually many West Bank Arabs saw 
Hamas as a potential bulwark against the PLO's 
totalitarianism and Arafat and Fatah's vast corruption. 
Ultimately, the PLO's ability to dictate Palestinian 
politics ended with the intifada,44 as Hamas, and to a 
lesser extent PIJ, "began to challenge the legitimacy and 
leadership of the PLO and 'Arafat."45 As a result, 
competition, rivalry, and timely cooperation between the 
PLO/PA and the explicitly Islamist-Palestinian terror 
42 Yehoshua Porath paraphrased in, and agreed with by, Avi Shlaim, 
The Iron Wall: Israel and. the Arab World (London: Penguin Books, 
2000), 454. See also Morris, Righteous Victims, 562.
43 Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, 33.
44 William Cleveland, "Israeli-Palestinian Relations Since the 
Gulf War," in The Contemporary Middle East, ed. Karl Yambert 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Westview Press, 2006), 79.
45 Samih K. Farsoun, "Whither Palestine and the Palestinians?" in 
The Contemporary Middle East, ed. Karl Yambert (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Westview Press, 2006), 109.
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organizations manifested themselves in the political and 
social arenas and in approaching the conflict with Israel. 
Political■Culture and Irrevocable Beliefs
The competition that developed between terror 
organizations during and directly after the first intifada 
led to a significant increase in the brutality and 
frequency of political violence over the following decade. 
Hamas's ability to tap into the social networks established 
by al-Mujamma for the purposes of launching terror 
operations or other political actions, as well as PIJ's 
ability to use Islamic revolutionary allures among its 
support base,46 restructured the make-up of socio-political 
relations in the disputed territories. Most importantly, 
however, the advent of the suicide-homicide bomber onto the 
scene, as well as the refinement of the selection and 
deployment process of suicide-homicide bombers, triggered a 
number of latent components in Palestinian Arab political 
culture.
46 Unlike Hamas in the 1990s, which had a vast array of social 
services to attract adherents, PIJ relied more on its ideological 
attractions, which Fathi Shaqaqi linked to the aura of 
revolutionary Iran.
Palestinian collective identity, while fluid over the 
decades, interacts with a political culture47 that has 
remained mostly consistent as it is entrenched in the 
concept of sammud (steadfastness).48 Representing the 
Palestinian Arabs' conceptual response to the narrative of 
al-Naqba (the Catastrophe), which refers to the 
establishment of a Jewish state on sacred Islamic land, 
sammud accordingly promotes maximalist goals relating to 
the establishment of an Arab/Islamic state on the former 
territory of Mandatory Palestine. Over the years such 
unwavering aims have spawned and led to the refinement of a 
number of practices in the Palestinian political arena, 
including: no compromise, violence as the choice means for 
pursuing political goals, and intra-group intimidation and 
conflict. All of the practices find their modern roots in 
the British Mandate period, wherein Hajj Amin al-Husseini 
47 A specialist on political culture in the Arab world, Basheer 
Meibar contends, "political culture is defined by the types of 
belief prevalent among its members and the patterns by which 
beliefs are constrained in integral belief systems. The members 
of a political culture are classified into, groups 
(constituencies) delineated by these two determinants." Basheer 
Meibar, Political Culture, Foreign Policy and Conflict: The 
Palestine Area Conflict System (London: Greenwood Press, 1982), 
23 .
48 Also translated as "perseverance," Palestinian sammud refers to 
the concept of "staying on the land despite immense Israeli 
pressure to leave." See Mark Levine, "Chaos, Globalization, and 
the Public Sphere," The Middle East Journal 60, no. 3 (Summer 
2006): 473.
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socially codified them into Palestinian political culture.49
49 During the 1920s, the Husseini clan, spearheaded by Haj Amin, 
used Islam and incitement against Jews to out-maneuver their 
political/tribal rivals, the Nashashibis--ultimately gaining 
control of the leadership of the Arabs of Palestine as a result. 
See Morris, Righteous Victims, 100-110. During the revolt from 
1936 to 1939, along with propelling a tradition of violence as 
the choice means to an end, the Arabs of Palestine, set a 
precedent among their popular political culture—that being, 
accepting the violent domination of a specific leader who 
systematically targeted his dissenters. Hajj Amin al-Husseini, 
even while in exile for the majority of the revolt (similarly to 
Yasser Arafat decades later), used terror, not only against his 
enemies, but also against Palestinian Arabs. Amin al-Husseini 
biographer, Chuck Morse notes: "Arabs assassinated by al-Husseini 
inspired death squads during the riots of 1936-1939 would include 
Palestinian Arab leaders Sheikh Daoud Ansari, Imam of the Al Aqsa 
Mosque, Sheikh Ali Nur el-Khattib, Sheikh Nusbi Abdal Rahim, 
Council of Muslim Religious Court, Sheikh Abdul el-Badoui from 
Acre, Sheikh el-Namouri from Hebron, Nasr el-Din Nassr, Mayor of 
Hebron, and eleven Mukhtars, or community leaders who were 
murdered along with their entire families by al-Husseini's roving 
killers." Morse, 43-44,. This deadly pattern, which finds its 
historical roots in Arab-tribal/hamula (clan) warring, continues 
to present day to serve as an instrumental component of 
Palestinians' political culture, as demonstrated by recent Hamas- 
Fatah fighting, as well as PLO in-fighting during the 1970s and 
1980s.
50 One scholar notes: "Studies on factionalism in the early days 
of the Palestinian national movement have indicated clearly that 
the organization of national politics around factional loyalties 
in patriarchal structures has been a major factor in the national 
movement's inability to achieve its goals. The competition 
between the Husseinis and the Nashashibis, as well as those 
groups' elitism and detachment from the needs of the common 
Palestinian, has prevented them from mobilizing the Palestinian 
public under one common and agreed upon strategy. The patterns of 
the pre-1948 period seem to have remained consistent, although 
they have taken on new forms. The familial politics of the pre- 
Diluted by two decades of PLO dominance, the dormant 
traditions in Palestinian political culture, systemically 
reliant on competing tribal forces,50 returned to full 
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effect once Arafat had a formidable rival in the Hamas/PIJ 
confederation and its rapidly developing constituency.51 52For 
the most part, Palestinian Arabs' beliefs about the world 
around them have stayed stagnant since before Israel's 
establishment, as have, until recent decades, the varying 
Palestinian constituencies.
1948 period has changed into factional politics in the last 
several decades." See Amal Jamal, The Palestinian National 
Movement: Politics of Contention, 1967-2005 (Bloomington, Indi.: 
Indiana University Press, 2005), xiii-xiv.
51 In 1993, as a response to the Oslo peace process, Hamas and PIJ 
"joined" the Alliance of Palestinian Forces (APF), which worked 
out of Damascus. "Regular" collaboration however did not occur 
until the second intifada. See Levitt, Hamas, 14 and 26.
52 The Palestinian population has remained consistently opposed to 
accepting a Jewish state. In 1937, the Arabs of Mandatory 
Palestine rejected the British Peel Commission's suggestion of a 
two-state solution, as they did again in 1948 with the U.N.'s 
Partition Plan. As recent as the Annapolis meeting in December 
2007, the PA maintains its refusal to accept Israel's 
"Jewishness."
53 Indeed, when Arafat’arrived to the disputed territories after 
the failed Camp David II talks, "he was hailed as a victor." Luca 
Ricolfi, "Palestinians, 1981-2003," in Making Sense of Suicide 
Missions, expanded and updated ed., ed. Diego Gambetta (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 93.
Consistent refusals by the Palestinian populace to
E paccept Israel's permanence or its Jewish identity 
represent core tenets of a political culture that views 
compromise on this issue as unacceptable.53 This forms the 
basis of the Palestinian conflict with Israel. Also, most 
Palestinians do not entertain proposed compromises over 
Jerusalem or the right of "refugees" to return (to Israel 
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proper), as well as other territorial issues based on the 
ideas of waqf and dar al-Islam (dwelling of submission). 
Moreover, when a representative body has made a movement 
toward compromise on these issues, a rival organization/ 
faction has initiated intra-group conflict as a response.54 
Additionally, violence as the choice means of political 
pursuits, rather than negotiation, is engraved in 
Palestinian Arab political culture.55 When the PLO 
recognized Israel's right to exist with the signing of the 
Declaration of Principles (DOP) on September 13, 1993, it 
sent the Palestinian collective identity into a "momentous 
political crisis."56 The fairly cohesive Palestinian 
populace fragmented into three constituencies; some 
Palestinians were "enthusiastic," many gave "conditional 
approval," and others viewed the process as "potentially 
fatal for Palestinian national aspirations and survival as 
a people."57 The initial period of the Israel-PA peace 
54 Such a case occurred in 1939, when a group attempted to go 
against the AHC and accept British compromises. Opposition 
leaders were either assassinated or intimidated, so as to change 
their minds. See Morse, 43-44.
55 See Morris, Righteous Victims; Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 148- 
149.
56 Samih K. Farsoun and Naseer H. Aruri, Palestine and the 
Palestinians: A Social and Political History, 2nd ed. (Boulder, 
Colo.: Westeview Press, 2006), 379.
57 'Farsoun and Aruri, 37 9.
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process, better known as the Oslo years, ultimately served 
as a testament to a consistent Palestinian political 
culture that expressed itself through a fluid collective 
identity. Indeed, Palestinians have not vacillated over 
their goals as a people—rather, only their representative 
political organizations have from time to time.58
58 One should note that a majority of Palestinians view diplomatic 
processes as a potential tool of warfare; accordingly, "support 
for the peace process" or for a peace conference does not equal 
"support for peace." For analysis, see Ricolfi, 108-110.
59 Abdallah Azzam Brigades took its name from the founder of al- 
Qaeda, who hailed from a small village outside Jenin in Samaria.
60 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades takes its name from the 
Palestinian national hero and jihadi leader whose death/martyrdom 
"helped spark the 1936 [Arab Revolt]See Levine, 472.
61 Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs, 36; Although already the 
official "armed wing" of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine, 
Hamas for political reasons established al-Qassam Brigades as its 
own "military wing." See Levitt, Hamas, 1-35.
Political Islam Carries on as the Palestine
Liberation Organization Acquiesces
The PLO's political disconnect from sections of the 
Palestinian population, along with an inability to own a 
monopoly on the use of coercive force, allowed for the rise 
of Hamas and its Islamist counterparts. In January 1992, 
Hamas merged its West Bank militia, Abdallah Azzam 
Brigades,59 with its Gaza militia, 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam 
Brigades,60 and established the latter as the official 
"military wing" of Hamas.61 For the duration of the 
intifada, the reputation of "al-Qassam Brigades" as a 
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formidable militant force only grew. As Hamas's appeal 
swelled within the Palestinian population, the PLO's 
expanded in the international community, and some in Israel 
began viewing Arafat's terror organization as the lesser of 
two evils.
In 1993, just as the PLO's political power seemed on 
the verge of collapse, an unimaginable peace process, 
announced to the world by Israel, the PLO and the United 
States (U.S.), revived and empowered Arafat's terror 
organization as the "legitimate" political representative 
of the Palestinians. After the intifada, the PLO's only 
move rested on relinquishing the long-held goal of 
liquidating the state of Israel.62 After losing further 
influence over the Palestinian population,63 Arafat realized 
the necessity to reposition the PLO vis-a-vis the 
population it claimed to represent in order to maintain 
minimal functional control. Israel's signing of the OOP in 
1993 not only legitimized the PLO as the PA and welcomed 
Arafat back to the disputed territories but also 
demonstrated that Israel, if pressed hard and long enough, 
62 See the PLO's Palestinian National Covenant in its original 
form from 1964 and its amended version from 1968.
63 The reduction in influence resulted from a loss of legitimacy 
in the sense of credibility on the Arab street.
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would give in to terrorism.64 Furthermore, the PLO's 
international legitimacy as advanced by the Oslo Accords 
and peace process in the following years provided other 
Palestinian terror organizations with a precedent for 
justifying and legitimizing their own continued use of 
terrorism against Israel. The intifada, signing of the DOP, 
and peace process served to restructure the "official" 
goals of Palestinian society, and as a result intensified 
competition between the PLO (and later the PA) and Islamist 
organizations, which carried on the Palestinian Arab 
tradition of no compromise. Moreover, the peace process 
provided Hamas and PIJ with a renewed raison d'etre: 
continued violent resistance in pursuit of "all Palestine" 
and pointedly in spite of the PLO's official acquiescence.65
64 Chapter Five discusses at length the strategic threat this has 
posed to Israel's national security.
65 Hamas states in its 1988 charter that "Neither a single Arab 
state nor all the Arab states, neither a king nor president, not 
all the kings or presidents, not any organization or all of 
them... [may give up any part of Palestine] because the land of 
Palestine is an Islamic Waqf." See Hamas charter in Mishal and 
Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, 181.
The Palestinian Suicide-Homicide .Bomber
The inevitable post-intifada political maneuvering 
between the PLO/Fatah-controlled PA and the Hamas-PIJ 
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collective,66 marked a new era in Palestinian politics, 
wherein PA leadership straddled the fence between 
negotiation and continuance of the "struggle." Accordingly, 
the popular Islamist organizations consistently worked to 
keep the PLO off balance. The peace process posed a major 
threat to Hamas and its fellow Palestinian-Islamist terror 
organizations, and thus the mid-1990s saw sabotage make its 
mark as a useful strategy.
66 PIJ did not seek a direct conflict with the PLO or non-Islamist 
groups. See Abu-Amar, "Hamas"; nonetheless, PIJ participated 
greatly in the overall scheme of things relating to an 
ideological rivalry between Islamism and Arab nationalism within 
Palestinian society.
67 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 150; Hafez, Manufacturing Human 
Bombs, 79.
68 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Terrorism (2007): accessed 
at <www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism> on 21 May 2007.
On April 6, 1994, Hamas carried out its first 
successful suicide-homicide attack inside Israel proper in 
the Northern city of Afula, killing eight people and 
wounding 34.67 68A week later on April 13, a Hamas suicide­
homicide bomber blew himself up on a bus in Hadera, 
Israeli--leaving five dead and scores wounded. The 
entrance of suicide-homicide bombers into the center stage 
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict virtually gave Hamas 
and PIJ veto power over the peace process. To disrupt 
negotiations or the implementation of agreements, Hamas or 
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PIJ would attack Israel, and simply wait for the Israel 
Defense Force (IDF) to respond.
The 1990s saw the alteration of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict's surficial make-up, and suicide 
terrorism played a major role in displaying the effects. 
Palestinian society became further infused with Islamic 
concepts that fuel conflict. Calls for jihad and istishhad 
drowned out voices for peace. No longer could one deny the 
underlying religious causes of the conflict (e.g. holy 
sites in Jerusalem, the notion of dar al-Islam, etc.). As 
Islamic justifications provided a basis for such attacks, 
incidents of suicide terrorism magnified religious issues 
within the conflict. Moreover, the mid-1990s saw the early 
development of a popular Palestinian culture that praised 
shahada, or "death for Allah's sake." Hamas bombmakers such 
as Yahya Ayyash and Mohammed Deif rose to superstar status. 
Suicide-homicide bombers and other shuhada (martyrs) 
received glorification as heroes.69 As the Palestinian youth 
who threw stones during the intifada grew up and looked for 
new avenues to express themselves religiously/politically, 
Islamic organizations obliged them by illuminating the path 
69 Indeed, Palestinians often refer to a martyr as a shahid batal, 
or "martyr hero." See Hassan.
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to martyrdom.70 Ultimately, Hamas and PIJ recognized that 
the suicide-homicide bomber provided a prime method for 
implementing their respective strategies vis-a-vis Israel 
and the Palestinian population, as well as the PLO/PA.71
70 Palestinian psychiatrist Iyad El Sarraj states: "The children 
who threw stones and Molotov cocktails and confronted Israeli 
soldiers in 1987 are the young men [and women] who are the 
martyrs of today." Quoted in Barbara Victor, Army of Roses: 
Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers (Emmaus, 
Penn.: Rodale, 2003), 40.
71 Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 58-61.
72 In 2004 Mia M. Bloom identified two "audiences." In 2005, she 
included the international community as a third audience. See Mia 
M. Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market 
Share, and Outbidding," Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 1 
(2004): 64; and Bloom, Dying to Kill. Another scholar separates 
the internal population from rival organizations within it. See 
Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 44.
Generally, a terrorist organization designs attacks to 
further serve the achievement of its political goals. Three 
primary groups make up the intended audience: the 
population and government of the foreign enemy, the 
international community, and the domestic population as 
well as rival organizations.72 Accordingly, terrorist 
organizations use different tactics for any number of 
reasons. The employed tactic, like the choice of target, 
represents part of the calculation an organization makes. 
Both tactic and targeting reflect a political statement. 
Hoffman notes, "[suicide terrorism] is seen by its 
adherents as a particularly effective way to communicate a 
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violent message... [and such] attacks are thus conducted for 
the purpose of demonstrating the terrorist organization's 
ability and determination to use violence to achieve its 
political objectives."73 In addition to terrorizing Israeli 
society, Hamas has utilized suicide-homicide bombers to 
distinguish itself within the greater Palestinian 
movement,74 so as to achieve its political objectives on the 
"domestic" front.
73 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 136-137.
74 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 137.
75 Directly after the initiation of the Oslo peace process, Arafat 
"arrested over 2,000 [Hamas and PIJ] operatives, and killed 
twenty of their leaders." Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing," 
66.
75 Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs, 18.
As Arafat used the PA's newly acquired power to 
repress rival-militant groups in the mid-1990s,75 Hamas and 
PIJ had to look for ways to dodge PA-imposed "political 
limitations."76 Suicide-homicide attacks against Israelis 
worked as the perfect instrument not only to maintain 
resistance against Israel, but also to undermine the PA's 
legitimacy. When an Islamist organization launched a 
suicide-homicide attack against Israel, the Palestinian 
population's subsequent praise circumvented Arafat's 
political ability to reign in Hamas or PIJ leaders and 
other culprits who designed or participated in specific 
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suicide-terror attacks. Hoffman explains, "Hamas decided to 
challenge simultaneously the entire DOP framework, Arafat's 
leadership, and the PLO's authority."77 Without the 
Palestinian population's support specifically for acts of 
suicide terrorism, Hamas could not have survived a 
simultaneous confrontation with the Fatah-led PA and 
Israel.
77 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 149; see also Abu-Amr, "Hamas," 13.
Terrorism is a learning process for organizations. So 
when a tactic works in the manner that the suicide-homicide 
attack worked for Hamas and PIJ, it has a tendency to take 
on a life of its own within the particular organization; 
hence the old film noir detective notion: 'Its their MO, so 
they must have done it.' The importance that certain modi 
operand! play in an organization's overall strategy 
encourages the organization to seek ways to ensure 
continued availability of individuals willing to 
participate in the specific types of operations. For Hamas, 
other Islamist-Palestinian organizations, and eventually 
some of the "secular" Palestinian groups represented in the 
PLO/PA, the ability to deploy suicide-homicide bombers 
reached the top of their respective priority lists. In the 
Palestinian context, Hamas's initial success of the modus 
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operandi spawned widespread organizational realization of 
suicide-homicide bombers' strategic value. One of PIJ's 
founders, Fathi Shaqaqi, indeed articulated the idea of 
using "'exceptional' martyrdom operations" as a potential 
Palestinian strategy sometime in the mid-1980s.78 79And in 
1986, Israel's domestic security agency, the Shin Bet, 
foiled a PIJ plot to send a 19-year old girl from Bethlehem 
on a suicide-homicide bombing attack into Israel. Hamas 
however succeeded first on April 16, 1993 in using the 
modus operandi against Israeli interests.80 Due to the 
success suicide-homicide attacks brought the organization 
on a variety of levels, particularly after the signing of 
the DOP, Hamas sought to do everything within its power to 
accentuate various elements in the Palestinian environment 
and collective identity so that they conditioned
Some researchers put Shaqaqi's statement circa 1988, but an 
attack plotted two years earlier by PIJ suggests the organization 
had thought about using suicide terrorism sometime well before 
its leader articulated it publicly. See Scott Atran, "Genesis of 
Suicide Terrorism," Science 299, issue 5612 (7 March 2003): 1534- 
1539; Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs, 17; and Hassan.
79 Notes- from ICT seminar on "The Global Jihad," given by Reuven 
Paz, in Herzliya, Israel (21 June 2005).
80 In 1993, Hamas and PIJ launched a combined eight suicide­
homicide bomber attacks. This debunks a popular notion in the 
scholarship that suggests that Palestinian organizations' 
initiation of suicide-homicide attacks was in response to Dr. 
Baruch Goldstein's small-arms attack at the Machpela Cave in 
Hebron on February 25, 1994, which left 29 Palestinians dead. See 
Shaul Shay, The Shahids: Islam and Suicide Attacks (London: 
Transaction Publishers, 2004), 52-53.
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individuals not only to accept and support suicide 
terrorism but also seek to participate in launching an 
attack in one way or another.
The Culture of Martyrdom and Its 
Socio-Political Development
"This is not suicide; it is war," so goes one
Palestinian's explanation of why he tried to attain 
"martyrdom" through an act of suicide terrorism. While 
complicated at the individual level,81 2 the statement holds 
true for Palestinian organizations. Far from organizational 
suicide, the deployment of suicide-homicide bombers simply 
marks an organization's calculus of its position in 
relation to its end-goals.83 Functioning as a conduit 
between individuals and organizations, "the support of the 
community" sustains a suicide terror campaign.84
81 Interviewed in The Cult of the Suicide Bomber, prod, and dir. 
David Betty and Kevin Toolis, 1 hr. 35 min., Many Rivers Films, 
2006, DVD.
82 Chapter Six explores at length individual Palestinians' 
rationality in participating in suicide terrorism, particularly 
concerning most suicide-homicide bombers' conditioned 
understanding of suicide as "martyrdom."
83 Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 25.
84 Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 163.
Since the first intifada and culminating during the 
second, Palestinian terror machines, such as the one headed 
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by Hamas, have polished the processes of launching suicide­
homicide attacks. Palestinian terror organizations advanced 
the recruitment/selection process by helping construct and 
in turn feed off of a culture of martyrdom that operates as 
a link between the .various steps in the individual's path 
to "martyrdom"—the steps of reasoning, justifying, 
rationalizing and participating. The culture of martyrdom 
funnels individuals through the various steps, mentally 
preparing and convincing them of the legitimacy of their 
actions. Scholars Anat Berko and Edna Erez explain,
Easy access to suicide-facilitating 
organizations, beliefs in impending rewards of 
martyrs, together with ever-present communal 
exaltation of shahids, creates an environment 
that produces a steady supply of candidates, [and 
ultimately] emboldens... individuals to join the 
suicide industry.85
85 Anat Berko and Edna Erez, "'Ordinary People' and 'Death Work': 
Palestinian Suicide Bombers as Victimizers and Victims," Violence 
and Victims 20, no. 6 (December 2005) : 616.
The Palestinian culture of martyrdom thus performs the 
sanctioning component that many terrorists rely on to 
legitimate their actions. Suicide-terrorism expert, 
Mohammed M. Hafez notes that Palestinian terror 
organizations have "promote[d] a culture of martyrdom based 
on religious appeals and innovative rituals to convince the 
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broader public of the value of suicide bombings."86 87
86 Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs, 32. Other explanations of the 
same phenomenon in Palestinian society refer to it as a "culture 
of suicide terrorists"; see Shaul Kimhi and Shmuel Even quoted in 
Levitt, Hamas, 108; and the "cult of the suicide bomber," see The 
Cult of the Suicide Bomber, prod, and dir.. David Betty and Kevin 
Toolis, 1 hr. 35 min., Many Rivers Films, 2006, DVD.
87 See Israel Shahak, "Hamas and Arafat: The Balance of Power," 
Middle East International no. 486 (February 4, 1996): 17; see- 
also Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 152.
88 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 152.
89 From 1996 to September 2000, there were ten suicide-homicide 
bomber attacks. Refer to Appendix A.
Organizations have increasingly understood that the 
sustained use of suicide-homicide bombers requires a daily 
interaction between its terror apparatus and the community 
at large. Hamas with its da'awa infrastructure had a jump 
on its rivals regarding an intimate social connection with 
its constituents and potential operatives.
The Social Synthesis of Competing Political
Ideologies: Palestinian Identity Solidified?
By 1996 the IDF viewed Hamas as the strongest
• Q 7Palestinian "military" force in the disputed territories. 
Its "tenuous modus vivendi with the governing Palestinian 
Authority," during the mid to late 1990s, facilitated 
political Islam's advance further into the mainstream of 
Palestinian society.88 While putting a temporary halt on the 
deployment of suicide-homicide bombers,89 the lull in open 
aggression between Hamas and the PA, allowed for the 
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previous to refocus its attention on its da'awa operations, 
which had previously suffered from the PA's post-Oslo 
crackdown. The rejuvenated operations also revived the Gaza 
Muslim Brotherhood/Hamas's long-held goal of displaying the 
PLO/PA's ineptitude to the Palestinian population.
Thus philanthropy explains a secondary motivation for 
the refocusing on da'awa. Hamas expert Matthew Levitt 
notes, "[t]he Hamas dawa serves several distinct functions 
in support of the group's objectives and through which it 
facilitates Hamas attacks."90 In addition to personal 
motivations derived from politics, religion, and/or other 
identity-induced values and beliefs, individual suicide­
homicide bombers usually require affirmation that the 
defined enemy threatens these same values and beliefs. 
Accordingly, the individual's surrounding environment plays 
an instrumental role.91 In the late 1990s, Hamas refocused 
on providing this necessity92; Levitt explains,
90 Levitt, Hamas, 6.
91 Levitt, Hamas, 108.
92 A central ideological component of the Muslim Brotherhood, one 
that often distinguishes it from its break-off organizations, 
remains the idea of establishing the "Other Society," i.e. an 
Islamic one, before jihad is launched against its defined 
enemies.
...the battery of mosques, schools, orphanages, 
summer camps, and sports leagues sponsored by 
Hamas are integral parts of an overarching 
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apparatus of terror... [all which] engage in 
incitement and radicalize society, and undertake 
recruitment efforts to socialize even the 
youngest children to aspire to die as martyrs.' 
They provide logistical and operational support 
for weapons smuggling, reconnaissance, and 
suicide bombing...
And, as with any success story in a competitive 
environment, organizational imitation followed.
In late September 2000, as the peace process seemed 
indefinitely deadlocked, Palestinians unleashed a new 
intifada,9^ which, like the first, drastically changed the 
landscape of Palestinian politics. As al-Mujamma, through 
its establishment of Hamas, gained the ability to offer a 
serious alternative to the PLO during the first intifada, 
the second or al-Aqsa intifada demonstrated a push for the 
'new frontiersmen,' led by Hamas and PIJ, to begin 
replacing the 'old guard,' as symbolized by Fatah, which 
not only controlled the PA but also had demonstrated an 
inability, or unwillingness on Arafat's part, to reach a 
final status agreement with Israel.93 45 The failure of the 
93 Levitt, Hamas, 5.
94 One should note, however, al-Aqsa intifada began "with 
guerrilla operations directed by al-Fatah and al-Fatah linked 
militias." See Ricolfi, 96.
95 Bloom, Dying to Kill, 26. A variety of books authored by 
involved leaders and officials provide useful insight into this 
historical event. For example, see Bill Clinton, My Life (New 
York: Knopf, 2004); Dennis Ross, Missing Peace: The Inside Story 
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peace process left many Palestinians dissatisfied and a 
gave them another reason to shift support to Hamas or other 
Islamist organizations,96 which made no pretensions about 
pursuing peace yet offered a sense of righteousness in 
continuing violent resistance.
of the Fight for Middle East Peace (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 2004) .
96 The unpopularity of Arafat and the PA started well before the 
second intifada. From 1996 to 2000, Arafat's approval rating 
among Palestinians hovered around 27 percent. See Bloom, 
"Palestinian Suicide Bombing," 69.
97 Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs, 36-91.
With more Palestinians joining the ranks of the Hamas 
loyal throughout the 1990s and early 2000s the Palestinian 
collective identity shifted its hierarchal components. The 
constant barrage of political bombshells Hamas dropped on 
the PA's doorstep, and the popular support for such 
actions, forced Arafat to match moves on the resistance 
front in order for the PA to maintain functional legitimacy 
with the Palestinian populace. Fatah members and 
supporters, as well as those of other PLO groups began 
massive political mobilization97—culminating with al-Aqsa 
intifada, which served not only to revive the rivalry 
between Hamas and the Fatah-led PA, but also worked to 
amalgamate the opposing sides' methods of political 
expression. For the contemporary battlefield, Hamas and PIJ 
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provided the contextual testing of suicide-homicide 
attacks. Additionally, with Islam finding an even greater 
role in the Palestinian political arena, secular groups 
found it imperative to relate their ideologies to some form 
of Islamic message.98
98 Bloom, Dying to Kill, 29-34; Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 64; 
and Levitt, Hamas, 13-14.
99 See "Leaflet No. 1" in Shaul Mishal and Reuben Aharoni, 
Speaking Stones: Communiques from the Intifada Underground, 
(Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1994), 201-203. See 
also excerpt of "Introductory Memorandum" in Steven Simon and 
Jonathan Stevenson, "Confronting Hamas," The National Interest 74 
(Winter 2004/2004): 60.
Hamas had, as early as 1987, ideologically outflanked 
all other Palestinian political organizations by adopting 
nationalist rhetoric without compromising a core Islamic 
message.99 Hamas successfully fused the Palestinian national 
movement's tone with the Muslim Brotherhood's Islamist 
worldview, and in doing so assembled together the two most 
encompassing components of Palestinian identity. Hamas 
reconciled these centrifugal forces by articulating, as its 
primary objective, the destruction of Israel, which 
fulfills the Islamist goal of removing a kafir (infidel) 
nation-state from the lands of dar al-Islam, while also 
satisfying Palestinian nationalists' desire to eradicate 
the Jewish state rather than negotiate with it due to a
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perceived "colonial/imperial" foundation that lacks any 
legitimacy.100 Thus, Hamas made holy war the cornerstone of 
its national struggle. As this approach appealed to more 
and more Palestinians, Arafat found it harder to ignore the 
Islamic identity and corresponding Islamist ideology that 
slowly crept toward the top of the Palestinian collective's 
hierarchy of identities. By covering its ideological bases, 
and literally sticking to its guns, Hamas proved its 
religious sincerity and credentials in relation to 
Palestinian sammud, not only to the general Palestinian 
populace, but also to rival organizations.
100 The Hamas charter, Chapter Three, Article 11 proclaims, 
"[Hamas] believes that the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf 
[endowment] to all Muslim generations until the day of 
resurrection. It is not right to give it up or any part of it." 
Chapter Three, Article 13 goes on to declare: "peaceful 
solutions, and the international conferences to resolve the 
Palestinian problem, are all contradictory to the beliefs of the 
Islamic Resistance Movement. Indeed, giving up any part of 
Palestine is tantamount to betraying Islam. The nationalism of 
the Islamic Resistance Movement is part of its religion, the 
movement instructs its members to adhere to its principles and to 
raise the banner of Allah over their homeland as they fight their 
Jihad...There is no solution to the Palestinian problem except by 
Jihad." See Hamas charter in Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian 
Hamas, 181 and 183.
The inability of Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister 
Ehud Barak to agree on a final-status solution at the Camp 
David II talks, despite U.S. President Bill Clinton's 
tenacious mediating efforts, marked the completion of a 
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long-failing peace process. With Israel and the PA's 
arrival at a diplomatic dead end, Arafat understood the 
international protection of the PA's power laid at stake. 
The Fatah-controlled PA saw a single option: to attempt to 
regain' widespread popular support within the Palestinian 
population as a means for maintaining power. Arafat, 
accordingly, ordered the adjustment of Fatah's image vis-a- 
vis Palestinians. He understood the only way to play ball 
was to resuscitate Fatah's participation in violent 
resistance.101 102As a result, the PLO/Fatah-controlled PA 
joined its rivals in the suicide-homicide bomber
101 Indeed, many Palestinians seemingly offered Arafat a second 
chance by welcoming him home from the failed Camp David II talks 
as a "victor." See Ricolfi, 93.
102 One scholar notes: "in the first weeks of the [second] 
intifada, it seemed that the heads of Fatah could not decide what 
steps they should take. Confusion in the organization's ranks was 
demonstrated in the first period of these events, when veteran 
activists restricted themselves to shooting incidents aimed at 
Israeli civilian and military targets and younger members took 
part in heavy riots and lynching of Israeli citizens. However, 
these 'small noises' of the Fatah actions got lost in the mayhem 
of the multitude of suicide attacks perpetrated by Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad." See Peda’hzur, Suicide Terrorism, 63.
103 Meaning "glorification of Allah," al-Quds stands for Jerusalem 
in Arabic.
1 0?business.
In an effort to' compete with the Islamist suicide­
homicide brigades, Hamas's al-Qassam Brigades and PIJ's al- 
Quds103 Brigades, Fatah established al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade 
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(AMB).104 On November 29, 2001, marking a symbolic 
completion of the Palestinian collective identity's 
alteration, Fatah's newly formed AMB attacked Israel using 
a suicide-homicide bomber.105 A month earlier on October 17, 
2001, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP), a long-standing Marxist/Arab-nationalist group, 
deployed its first suicide-homicide bomber.106 Soon after, a 
similar organization, the Democratic Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine, claimed responsibility for a 
number of suicide-homicide bombers.107 By January 2002, 
Arafat openly urged children to aspire to martyrdom on PA 
television.108 Over the following year, as scholar Ami 
Pedahzur notes, "[t]he new Fatah suicide squads, endorsed 
by the highest echelons of Fatah and the Palestinian 
Authority, performed their duty to the full... [and] became 
the most active group in the initiation of suicide
104 Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 64.
105 Coordinated with PIJ, this attack killed three people and 
wounded nine. Assaf Moghadam, "Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in 
the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects," 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 26, no. 2 (March 2003): 82.
106 Prior to its initial suicide-terror attack, al-Jahba al- 
Shabiyya li-Tahrir Falastin (the Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine) or PFLP established its own Islamist suicide-terror 
unit: Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades.
107 Bloom, Dying to Kill, 29.
108 Palestinian Media Watch "Topic V: PA Indoctrination of 
Children to Seek Heroic Death for Allah - Shahada," TV 
Archives/Video Library (2002): accessed at <www.pmw.org.il> on 28 
October 2007 .
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actions."109 Ultimately, al-Aqsa intifada marked an era 
wherein popular support for the leading Palestinian 
political organizations, including the PA, rose and fell 
according to their ability to launch successful suicide­
homicide attacks.110
109 Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 64.
110 Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing," 66.
111 See Appendix A.
112 Itamar Marcus, "The Indoctrination of Palestinian Children to 
Kill the Jews and Seek Death," in The Jerusalem Alternative, ed. 
Dmitry Radyshevsky (Greenforest, Ark.: Balfour Books, 2005), 217- 
219.
With the major Palestinian political organizations all 
now playing to the same tune, suicide-homicide bombings 
attacks increased significantly.111 By 2002, a culture of 
martyrdom had consumed most Palestinian institutions of 
socialization,112 ensuring future support for suicide 
terrorism. Thus, by building on established religious, 
ethnic and national narratives, drawing from the Islamic 
texts of the Qur'an and Hadith, and seeking to 
institutionalize an aura of victimhood, Palestinian terror 
organizations reinvigorated the violent Palestinian 
movement for self-determination. Yet, this time arming it 
with a staunch Islamic fervor, supportive popular culture 
that condoned the most abhorrent violence against 
innocents, and, most importantly, a strategic weapon, which 
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would provide a number of verifiable victories' in the years 
to come.
Palestinian Political Culture and Identity:
Same Song, Different Genre
Initially, culture and society worked as a middleman 
for terror organizations seeking business with individuals, 
but by al~Aqsa intifada, the roles had reversed and terror 
organizations became the middleman for Palestinian 
society's handiwork on individuals. A widespread culture of 
martyrdom confirmed the ideological doctrines distributed 
by terror organizations, and individuals were no longer ■ 
sought by organizations to commit suicide terrorism, but 
rather vice versa. The initial relationship between terror 
organizations and suicide-homicide bombers changed from one 
of recruitment to selection. Berko and Erez explain, 
"[s]ocial structures, value systems, and the collective 
memory of a group combine[d] to produce a steady supply of 
motivated [suicide-homicide bomber] candidates."113 Pedahzur 
adds:
113 Anat Berko and Edna Erez, "'Ordinary People' and 'Death Work': 
Palestinian Suicide Bombers as Victimizers and Victims," Violence 
and Victims 20, no. 6 (December 2005): 617.
Changing patterns of recruitment and especially 
the transition from a careful culling of 
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candidates by trained recruiters to a mass 
mobilization of volunteers emphasizes the success 
of the organization in planting the roots of a 
'culture of death' in a society which in return 
provided endless numbers of prospective bombers 
in time of need.114
114 Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 17 0.
115 Nominally "secular" Palestinian terrorist organizations have 
also contributed to the culture of martyrdom. But this is not to 
say that the culture is not Islamic in nature by any means. The 
leadership of Fatah, the PFLP and others might often declare 
organizations secular, yet their members are rarely secular or 
non-Muslims. Similarly, to provide a Western example, the U.S. 
House of Representatives is technically secular, but in reality 
it is made up of Protestant, Catholic, other Christians, Jews, 
and a variety of Americans who hold some kind of religious 
beliefs. And, it is without a doubt that the overwhelming 
majority of U.S. House members seek to uphold an institution 
founded on Judeo-Christian principles, while simultaneously 
maintaining a secular state.
116 One leading counter-terrorism analyst has suggested that 
organizations cynically use suicide-homicide bombers. See Boaz 
Ganor interview in Suicide Killers: Paradise Is Hell, prod, and 
dir. Pierre Rehov, 1 hr. 20 min., City Lights Pictures, 2006, 
DVD. .
Hamas's role in manipulating these forces led other
organizations including the Fatah-led PA to adopt similar
mobilization techniques and resistance methods--leaving
Palestinian society as a reflection of the same indignant
ideologies115 that have maintained a death grip on it.
The culture of martyrdom and mechanized terror that
one finds so properly identifiable with contemporary
Palestinian society is not, however, the result of a few 
cynical organizations116 that play off of the desperation of 
a confused populace. The shahid phenomenon, and the 
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mechanized terror and culture of martyrdom that facilitate 
the production of suicide-homicide bombers, all represent 
products of nearly a century of the fluctuation of a 
distinct national identity whose members have negotiated 
components within it, while pursuing "Palestinian" 
political goals. Certainly, precedents set by Palestinian 
Arab organizations in pursuit of these same goals, as well 
as Israeli responses to methods employed by organizations, 
have aided in the establishment of the phenomena listed 
above, but nothing accounts for them more than the process 
of matching ends with effective means, which have some type 
of justifiable employment as filtered through religion, 
culture and other forms of behavior-legitimizing elements 
of identity.
Today, the Palestinian movement stands as neither 
entirely ethno-natio.nalistic nor fully Islamist. It is 
both.117 The political mobilization of the Palestinian 
population through political Islam's establishment as a 
117 Many assume that the Islamicization of the Palestinian 
movement for self-determination over the last two decades is 
simply a result of the PLO/PA's failure to obtain a Palestinian 
state; this notion fails to recognize Palestinian Arabs history 
dating back to the early 1920s and before when Islamic 
authorities and political leaders were one and the same. Islam 
has always played an important role in the national consciousness 
of Palestinian Arabs; it just at times has not played the 
dominant one.
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counter to the PLO opened the Palestinian national 
consciousness to renewed introspection. Moreover, the 
development of a culture of martyrdom in Palestinian 
society and the anointment of the shahid as the national 
Palestinian icon demonstrate the lengths a society can take 
to ensure its values are maintained and goals are met. 
Furthermore, the Palestinian population has shown that it 
tenaciously holds on to its revered notion of sammud. 
Generation after generation, Palestinians have remained 
true to their collective standard of an appropriate final 
status over the old territory of Mandatory Palestine. When 
the PLO/PA failed to uphold these standards, it opened the 
door for a new Palestinian representative. Candidates 
emerged and precipitated an unparalleled competition with 
the PLO. Like all good competitions, efficiency marked the 
end result. Efficient representation, mobilization, and 
most apparently efficient uses of violence emerged at the 
forefront of the Palestinian movement for self- 
determination .
Purely erratic behavior rarely governs the pursuit of 
political goals. Often specific socio-cultural concepts of 
how to engage an enemy drives the means through which an 
entity, whether a nation-state, political party or terror 
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organization, seeks its end-goals. State and non-state 
actors alike usually seek to match a capability with their 
motivation—i.e. their political pursuits, yet culture 
plays a key role in filtering tactics and therefore 
strategy as well. As of 2007, jihad, and istishhad, the main 
ideological forces behind suicide-homicide bombers in the 
Palestinian context, rested at the core of organizations 
including Hamas, PIJ, AMB, the Popular Resistance 
Committees, the al-Qaeda-linked Army of Islam, the recently 
formed Kataeb Abu-Amar (Abu Amar Brigades), and other 
Islamist-Palestinian organizations of the like. The shahid, 
in the form of a suicide-homicide bomber, has accordingly 
found a central role in these organizations. Moreover, the 
Palestinian use of suicide-homicide bombers demonstrates 
how terrorism can be just as much about internal political 
posturing as it is about waging an external war. 
Additionally, it shows, in a time of war, when an 
organization strays from its army in favor of unpopular 
diplomatic pursuits, it signals to the represented populace 
that its interests have been replaced by those of the 
organization. Ultimately, the shahid/suicide-homicide 
bomber phenomenon confirms the necessity of the 
Clausewitzian people-government-army model in waging an 
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effective military campaign--or in this case, a terror 
campaign waged by a people, representative organizations, 
and their armies of death and murder-craving bombers.
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CHAPTER FIVE
A STRATEGIC TERROR WEAPON (THE SUICIDE-HOMICIDE
BOMBER) AS THE PARAMOUNT TERRORIST (THE SHAHID):
MATCHING CAPABILITY TO MOTIVATION
[Hamas] advanced the Intifada from the
stone age to suicide attacks1 2
1 Yaakov Amidor quoted in Matthew Levitt, Hamas: Politics, 
Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad (New Haven, Conn.: 
Yale University Press, 2006), 48.
2 Quoted in Nasra Hassan, "Letter from Gaza: An Arsenal of 
Believers," The New Yorker, 19 November 2001.
-IDF Brigadier General Yaakov Amidor, 1995
We do not have tanks or rockets, 
but we have something superior-- 
our exploding Islamic human bombs.
In place of a nuclear arsenal, we p are a proud arsenal of believers.
-Hamas Member, 2001
On October 4, 2003, Hanadi Taysir Jaradat entered the
Maxim restaurant in the Northern Israeli city of Haifa, 
ordered a chicken kebab, sat down, ate her meal, and then 
walked to the middle room, stood between the tables of two 
families dining, smiled and detonated the 22-pound bomb 
strapped to her stomach. Along with taking her own life, 
the 27-year old lawyer/Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) 
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operative from a village outside Jenin3 murdered 21 people 
and wounded 60.4 The two Israeli families closest to the 
blast lost loved-ones spanning three generations. The Almog 
family alone lost: Zeev, age 71 and his wife Ruth, age 70, 
their son Moshe, age 43, his son Tomer, age 9, and another 
Almog-grandson Asaf Shtayer, age 11; the family also had 
four wounded.5 This describes only one of hundreds of 
suicide-homicide attacks perpetrated by Palestinian terror 
organizations against Israeli civilians. It is, however, 
representative of an attack that Palestinian terror 
organizations deem "successful," and the type that 
Palestinian society reacts to with praise; indeed, 
Palestinian media heralded Jaradat as the "Bride of Haifa."6 
Additionally, the attack on the Maxim restaurant represents 
the kind of horror that caused great anxiety in Israeli 
society, and eventually led the Sharon government to begin 
3 Hanadi Jaradat hailed from Silat al-Hartiya, which is the same 
village where Abdallah Azzam, the founder of al-Qaeda was raised; 
see Yoni Fighel, "Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Female Suicide 
Bombers, " International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT): 
Articles (6 October 2003): accessed at 
<www.instituteforcounterterrorism.org> on 10 October 2007.
4 Kevin Toolis, "Suicide Bomber Caught in the Act; why these 
girls want to be Martyrs." Herald Sun, 16 September 2006.
5 John Ward Anderson and Molly Moore, "For 2 Families in Haifa, 3 
Generations of Victims," The Washington Post, 6 October 2003.
6 See Chapter Six for an explanation of this term.
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erecting a security/separation barrier between Israel 
proper and the disputed territories.
In sum, the Palestinian's al-Aqsa intifada, from 
September 29, 2000 to November 2005, took the lives of 
1,074 Israelis and seriously wounded another 7,520; 
Israelis spent a combined 11, 724 days in hospitals due- to 
injuries sustained from Palestinian terror attacks.7 The 
psychological damage, remains incalculable. Palestinian 
terrorism and more acutely suicide-homicide bombers own the 
responsibility of the tragedy reflected in these harrowing 
statistics. Furthermore, suicide-homicide bombers delivered 
Palestinian political and territorial gains that resulted 
from concessions made by the Sharon and Olmert governments.
7 Terror Medicine International Center, Since the Beginning of 
the Last Terror Wave in Israel (November 2005) : accessed at 
<www.terrormedicine.org/data.htm>.
8 Notes from ICT seminar on "Modern and Post-Modern Terrorism 
Strategies," given by Boaz Ganor, in Herzliya,■Israel (8 June 
2005).
9 See Chapter Six for a full explanation of this notion.
The Palestinian shahid thus emerged from al-Aqsa 
intifada, marking the epitome of modern terrorism.8 
Beginning in the Oslo years, the shahid, who personally 
views the "martyrdom operation" as an end unto itself,9 
demonstrated a new capability—to strike Israel anywhere 
and at anytime—all while leaving security forces with 
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minimal counter-terrorism opportunities. As an increasingly 
valuable weapon for their war with Israel, Palestinian 
terror organizations brought together decades worth of 
incitement methods to ensure continued availability of 
potential shahids. Consequently, by the end of the 1990s, a 
widespread culture of martyrdom had come to fruition.10 
Palestinian terror organizations accordingly utilized this 
culture of martyrdom in optimizing the production of 
suicide-homicide bombers. Employing the culture of 
martyrdom resulted in the normalization of Palestinian 
"martyrdom operations," as displayed by the unremitting 
flow of suicide-homicide bombers during al-Aqsa intifada.
10 By 2002, "vast segments of Palestinian culture ha[d] been given 
over to the creation and nurturing of suicide bombers." David 
Brooks, "The Culture of Martyrdom: How Suicide Bombing Became not 
just a Means but an End," The Atlantic Monthly 289, no. 6 (June 
2002): 19.
By effectively symbolizing Palestinian sammud 
(steadfastness), or the refusal to abandon maximalist aims 
based on religious, ethnic, and nationalist components of 
collective identity, the shahid, coupled with defeatist 
responses by Israel, enabled a strategic capability within 
suicide-homicide attacks. Overall, the shahid phenomenon 
demonstrates a tenacity on the part of Palestinian society 
that reverberates far beyond the political ultimatums of 
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traditional modern terrorism, which usually provoke little 
more than a military response or police action by the 
targeted government and is likewise met with a rebellious 
resolve on the part of the victimized society; Palestinian 
suicide-homicide bombers effectively wore Israel down past 
this point. Additionally, the Palestinian use of suicide­
homicide operations surpasses the simplicity of a guerrilla 
tactic that exacts a victory by continuously attacking 
until the targeted nation-state concedes its interests, 
which are rarely, if ever, strategic in nature. Israel's 
very existence lays at stake, yet Palestinian suicide­
homicide bombers still proved successful in extorting 
concessions from the Jewish state. The Palestinian shahid 
represents a society willing to do anything to destroy its 
enemy, even if it means destroying itself. Unlike anything 
else in the history of the Israeli-Arab conflict, the 
Palestinian suicide-homicide bomber has precipitated the 
Jewish state's reckless reaction,11 somber reclusion12 and, 
11 Careless responses to terrorism have at times worked in favor 
of Palestinian organizations regarding the international media 
war.
12 Israel's economy suffered greatly as production slowed in 
Israeli society due to widespread anxiety caused by the suicide­
homicide bomber threat.
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most costly, its territorial retreat.13 The fruitless 
conclusion of the Oslo peace process, the construction of a 
security/separation barrier roughly along the 1967 
greenline,14 the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, and the 
fragmentation of the Likud party collectively demonstrate 
that the second-intifada's shahid, successfully delivered 
the message of Palestinian sammud to Israel. By targeting 
civilians en masse, and demonstrating that participation in 
"martyrdom operations" represent personal end-goals, 
Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers evolved their modus 
operandi from a guerrilla tactic to a strategic terror 
weapon. Ultimately, the employment of suicide-homicide 
bombers provided Palestinian terror organizations and 
society with a catalog of unmatched strategic victories.
13 Territorial gains proved beyond a doubt the shahid's political 
success.
14 If completed, Israel's security barrier will mostly follow 
along the "greenline," or pre-1967 Six-Day War border, with 
exceptions made for some Jewish settlements in Ariel, Efrat, and 
in the greater Jerusalem area; see Israel Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, "The Anti-Terrorist Fence," Israel in Maps (20 February 
2005): accessed at <www.mfa.gov.il/ MFA/Facts> on 8 February 
2008 .
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Strategy Adopted and Adapted: 
Fitting Goals with Means
Many think of strategic weapons as nuclear devices or 
weapons of mass destruction attached to inter-continental 
ballistic missiles that allow warheads to travel across 
continents, and kill- large portions of a targeted populace. 
Such a definition derives from the Cold War-era when the 
use of force came predominantly from superpowers or their 
controllable proxies. In today's post-9/11 era paradigm, 
where nation-states increasingly find themselves engaged in 
conflict with non-state actors, warfare often develops, not 
from the remaining allowances of deterrence policies, but 
rather from the summation of warring entities' respective 
motivations and capabilities, or political will and 
military prowess.
Consequently, suicide-homicide attacks have become the 
weapon of choice by entities, which are significantly 
outgunned, yet highly motivated to attack their enemies. As 
"strategy provides the bridge between military means and 
political goals,"15 strategists therefore seek to match 
capability with motivation. Weapons are not strategic, yet 
some are capable, insofar as the needed motivation exists, 
15 John Baylis et -al., Strategy in the Contemporary World. (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 3.
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of strategic employment. The suicide-homicide bomber 
represents one such weapon, which at the predetermined cost 
of one's life, tends, to guarantee an exponential return for 
the producing organization and/or sanctioning body. Indeed, 
at times, the Palestinian shahid/suicide-homicide bomber 
has seamlessly fused optimal motivation with optimum 
capability—effectively functioning simultaneously as the 
paramount terrorist and perfect weapon.
Suicide-homicide attacks exemplify, and regularly 
maximize, the political and socio-psychological components 
of terrorism. The political pressure created by suicide­
terror attacks often provides those who utilize such 
operations with the capability to extort concessions from a 
particular nation-state that otherwise would have been 
unlikely. Given the right circumstances, suicide-homicide 
bombers, who are basically mobile-thinking bombs, have the 
ability to change geopolitical circumstances, which in turn 
can alter a targeted nation-state's strategic environment.16
16 To date, suicide-homicide operations have significantly altered 
the strategic environments of at least three Middle Eastern 
nation-states: Lebanon in the 1980s, Israel during the second- 
Palestinian intifada, and currently in Iraq. Additionally, the 
9/11 attacks forced the U.S. government to rethink its entire 
collection of foreign and security policies.
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Guerilla groups’, terrorist organizations and rogue 
states alike find suicide-homicide attacks attractive for a 
number of reasons.17 First, that the perpetrators die during 
the attack precludes an interrogation by security services, 
and therefore provides those who deploy suicide-homicide 
bombers plausible deniability and anonymity if desired (as 
is usually the case with state-sponsored terrorism). 
Second, suicide-homicide operations allow for significant 
attack fluidity, as the perpetrators can penetrate enemy 
territory often undetected and with subsequent freedom of 
movement. Israeli terrorism analyst Shaul Shay explains:
17 While this chapter and more specifically this section addresses 
organizations and their use of suicide terrorism, it should be 
noted that levels of subgroups' autonomy on the ability to launch 
suicide-homicide attacks varies with organization and subgroup. 
With a variety of research pointing to the strategic use of 
suicide terrorism by Palestinian organizations, analysts have 
somewhat ignored intra-organization posturing similarly as they 
have inter-organization rivalries. While only a few scholars such 
as Mia Bloom and Bruce Hoffman have studied extensively the 
effects of inter-organizational rivalries on the suicide-terror 
phenomenon, even less research has been carried out on the 
effects of intra-organizational maneuvering on suicide-homicide 
attacks. Scholars Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger have discovered 
that suicide-homicide bombers are not always the result of a 
rational pursuit at the organization level, but rather at the 
hamula (clan) or "network" level. This provides some insight to 
why organizations might seem more or less cohesive and effective 
from time to time. See Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, "The 
Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks: A Social Network 
Perspective," Social Forces 84, no. 4 (June 2006) : 1987-2008.
[The suicide-homicide bomber's] control over' 
timing and venue enables its direction so that it 
will cause maximum damage... The suicide attacker
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is a kind of sophisticated guided missile that 
knows how to launch the explosive charge at the • 1Atarget [and] at the optimal timing.
Third, because the suicide-homicide bomber has 
accessibility that likens him or her to a multi-million 
dollar missile, yet is fairly inexpensive to deploy and 
possibly an even more precise killing tool than a precision 
bomb, makes him or her an exceptionally efficient weapon.
RAND Corporation calculates that "suicide terrorist attacks 
cause four times more casualties than other types of 
terror," and in Israel that number jumps to six times as 
many.18 9 During al-Aqsa intifada, suicide-homicide bombers 
initiated just one percent of all the terrorist attacks, 
but accounted for 50 percent of the entire murders.20 A 
highly efficient and cost-effective weapon, the suicide­
homicide bomber adds a priceless component to the arsenal 
of terror organizations. Indeed, a suicide-homicide attack 
represents a bottom-dollar operation that oftentimes 
18 Shaul Shay, The Shahids: Islam and Suicide Attacks (London: 
Transaction Publishers, 2004), 7.
19 Bruce Hoffman, "Modern Terrorism Trends: Reevaluation after 
9/11," in Post-Modern Terrorism: Trends, Scenarios, and Future 
Threats, ed. Boaz Ganor (Herzliya, Israel: Publishing House, 
2005), 41.
20 Boaz Ganor, "The Rationality of the Islamic Radical Suicide 
Attack Phenomenon," in Countering Suicide Terrorism, updated ed. 
(Herzliya, Israel: ICT, 2007).
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provides top-dollar results.21 Fourth, some terrorist 
organizations have learned how to use suicide-homicide 
attacks as a recruiting tool, by fusing the modus operandi 
with religiously and culturally sanctioned martyrdom. As a 
result, these organizations have increased motivation and 
in doing so extended their capability. Fifth, highlighting 
its latent strategic nature, the suicide-homicide bomber 
usually functions as the single weapon in an organization's 
arsenal that allows it to attack an enemy at a desired 
level. Last and perhaps most importantly, suicide-homicide 
attacks assure media- coverage—thus aiding in the central 
component of terrorism and guerrilla warfare theory: 
winning politically, but -not necessarily through a decisive 
military victory against enemy armies.
21 See Bruce Hoffman, "The Logic of Suicide Bombers: Lessons from 
Israel that America Must Learn," The Atlantic Monthly 291, no. 5 
(June 2003): 42.
While suicide-homicide attacks have many advantages, 
they do not serve as a magic bullet for each and every 
organization wishing to extort political concessions. In 
other words, all suicide-homicide bombers are not created 
equal. Context determines a suicide-homicide attack's 
strategic potential, or lack thereof. Terrorism expert 
Bruce Hoffman states, "[sjuicide terror attacks are 
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rational acts undertaken as part of a deliberately 
calculated and orchestrated campaign to undermine 
confidence in government and leadership, crush popular 
morale, and spread fear and intimidation."22 Thus the 
reception of the targeted government plays a vital role in 
granting strategic capability to a suicide-terror campaign. 
Over the decades, Palestinian terror organizations have 
manipulated social and political variables in their favor-- 
ending with a weapon that best suited environmental 
circumstances, as it proved to induce desired results in 
the political arena. Responses from various Israeli 
governments, however, have played an equally important role 
in the suicide-homicide bomber's rise as a strategic 
weapon.
“ Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, revised and expanded ed. (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 168. See also Ganor, "The 
Rationality of the Islamic Radical Suicide Attack Phenomenon."
The Pioneer and the Refiners: Hezballah
and the Palestinians
Suicide-homicide attacks, despite frequent usage in 
recent years, do not constitute a new phenomenon. The 
modern use of perpetrators' suicides in modi operandi has 
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developed mostly over the last 40 years,23 beginning with 
the "suicide missions"24 of the Palestinian fedayin of the 
late 1960s leading to Iran's "mine jumpers"25 during the 
1980's Iran-Iraq War and culminating with the Palestinian 
shahid's suicide-terror attacks. The pioneering of modern 
suicide-homicide attacks, however, lies with Hezballah.
23 There are examples that predate 1968, such as the Imperial 
Japanese use of Kamikaze pilots against the U.S. Navy during 
World War II.
24 A common definition explains "suicide missions" as those in 
which "the terrorist does not expect to survive," but does not 
intentionally seek death; "suicide attacks" or suicide-homicide 
attacks, are those "in which the attacker kills himself 
or...herself" during the operation. See Robert Pape, Dying to Win: 
The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 
2005), 10-11.
25 See Christoph Reuter, My Life Is a Weapon (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2002), 44-47.
26 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), xviii.
Suicide-homicide bombers often possess a vital 
characteristic that falls within traditional definitions of 
strategic weapons. In explaining the genesis of the term 
"strategic," Lawrence Freedman notes,
...fledgling air forces, after World War I, were 
anxious to demonstrate that they possessed a 
means for getting right to the heart of the 
enemy's power and destroying it with some well- 
chosen blows, they described this as a 
'strategic' capability [emphasis added],26
Such "well-chosen blows," in the form of suicide-homicide 
attacks, have been dealt to the United States (U.S.),
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Israel, Iraq, the United Kingdom (UK) and a number other 
nation-states in attempts by organizations to directly 
target an enemy's power, whether symbolic, military, 
economic, political or otherwise. Over the last few 
decades, a targeted nation-state's political will rather 
than its sheer military might has frequently characterized 
the "heart of the enemy's power." The example of U.S. 
involvement in Lebanon in the early 1980s validates this 
point.
In 1982, the Reagan administration dispatched U.S.
Marines to Lebanon to act as the chief contingent of an 
international peacekeeping force, charged with the mission 
of curtailing the ongoing civil war, and overlapping 
Israel-PLO war. While Lebanon remained a fragile 
environment, U.S. and French forces made headway in 
marginalizing Iran and Syria--the state sponsors of the 
various aggressors in the conflicts. However, the 
Pasdaran's Frankenstein creation, Hezballah, along with a 
federation of other Muslim groups,27 operating under the 
name Islamic Jihad Organization, set out on a suicide­
27 While most of the groups were Shi'a, Palestinian Fatah, which 
is Sunni, did play an important role. See Robert Baer, See No 
Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on 
Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2002).
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homicide attack campaign with the goal of driving out U.S. 
and French forces, in order to establish Iranian-Syrian-PLO 
dominance in Lebanon and to battle Israel on favorable turf 
without an American presence.
On April 18, 1983, a suicide-homicide bomber drove a 
van into the U.S. embassy in Beirut and detonated 400 
kilograms of explosives,28 killing 63 people, including 
numerous CIA employees, and wounding 120 others.29 On 
October 23, 1983, suicide-homicide truck bombers attacked 
the U.S. Marines (killing 246)30 and French paratroopers 
barracks (killing 58)31 in Beirut. After these and a few 
other devastating suicide-homicide attacks on its 
interests, the U.S. pulled the Marines out of Lebanon on 
February 26, 1984. For the first time in modern history, a 
superpower pulled out of an engagement due to the actions 
of an enemy, which investigators could not even identify.
28 Shay, The Shahids, 91.
29 The Cult of the Suicide Bomber, prod, and dir. David Betty and 
Kevin Toolis, 1 hr. 35 min., Many Rivers Films, 2006, DVD; Shay, 
The Shahids, 91.
30 The deaths included 220 U.S. marines, 18 sailors, three 
soldiers, and five Lebanese. Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: 
A Short History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
2007), 71.
31 French paratroopers account for all 58 killed in this attack. 
Norton, 71.
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Thus a few "well-chosen blows" against U.S. targets 
convinced the Reagan administration to end America's 
presence in Lebanon, rather than stay and "run the risk of 
another suicide attack on the Marines," to put it in 
President Ronald Reagan's words.32 One should note that it 
is highly unlikely that the attacks could have succeeded 
with the level that the did had the attackers, instead of 
taking their own lives, opted to try and plant the 
explosives close enough to the embassy and barracks to 
inflict an equal amount of casualties and damage. The 
attack on the U.S. Marine barracks marked the largest 
conventional explosion at the time since the end of World 
War II (WWII) .33 Therefore, reason suggests that a few 
suicide attackers, armed with automobiles and enough 
explosives to destroy a score of buildings, altered the 
security environment of a state, as well as drove out a 
superpower, both of which proved to have severe 
repercussions for the decades to come.
32 U.S. President Ronald Reagan quoted in Pape, 65.
33 See The Cult of the Suicide Bomber.
Accordingly, many accredit the suicide-homicide 
bomber's advent to its successful usage in Lebanon. Since 
its campaign against the U.S. in Lebanon, Hezballah has 
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influenced and inspired Amal,34 the Syrian Socialist- 
National Party (SSNP), Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Hamas, al-Qaeda, 
and others in their uses of suicide-homicide attacks. 
Hezballah's influence on other Muslim (both Shi'a and 
Sunni) organizations, however, surpasses the importance of 
the impression it left on militant groups spanning the 
ideological spectrum; militarily, Hezballah directed 
various Islamic organizations' attention away from suicide 
missions and onto suicide-homicide attacks. In religious 
and cultural terms, Hezballah shifted the focus from the 
feda'i to the shahid. Middle East Historian, Rafael Israeli 
explains the subtle but important difference between the 
two notions:
34 Meaning "hope" in Arabic, the acronym Amal stands for Afwaj al- 
Muqawamat al-Lubnaniyye (Lebanese Resistance Detachments).
35 Rafael Israeli, Islamikaze (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 75.
...both shahid and fida'I are motivated by a 
profound and numbing religious fanaticism which 
pushes them to commit acts of self-sacrifice, 
which we usually refer to as 'suicide■attacks'... 
However, while the shahid is a martyr in the 
sense that he is serving a cause, the fida'I 
connotes more of a devotion to a leader.35
Thus the focus of Islamic martyrdom shifted from the 
specific to the universal. It moved away from the 
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established organization member to any individual who 
aspired ad hoc to answer the call of jihad.36
36 This difference has played an important role concerning the 
development of Palestinian suicide terrorism, considering most■ 
Palestinian shahids are not long-time members of an organization 
at the time of launching their suicide-homicide attacks. Rather 
Palestinian suicide terrorists are oftentimes periphery members 
of a social network affiliated with an organization, and 
capriciously decide to carry out an attack; see Ami Pedahzur and 
Arie Perliger, "The Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks: A Social 
Network Perspective." Social Forces 84, no. 4 (June 2006): 1987- 
2008 .
37 Hezballah's spiritual advisor, Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah 
issued a fatwa (Islamic degree) authorizing martyrdom operations 
"only on special occasions" due to a fear of over "exaggerated 
use [by] over-zealous youth." See Rafael Israeli, "A Manual of 
Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism," Terrorism and Political 
Violence 14, no. 4 (24 January 2002): 30.
38 Perhaps, most importantly, Palestinians successfully 
transferred the explicitly Shi'a version of martyrdom and the 
shahid to the Sunni world. Chapter Seven reviews the significance 
of this in depth.
One should not downplay the impact Hezballah has had 
on many militant organizations around the globe. However, 
its widespread usage of suicide-homicide attacks slowed in 
the late 1980s, due to leaderships' concerns over its long­
term social effects.37 38Regarding the evolution of suicide­
homicide attacks, Hezballah passed the baton to the 
Palestinians. As a result, Palestinian organizations hold 
more of the responsibility than any others for the fine- 
tuning of the shahid, as simultaneously a religious symbol 
q aand ruthless-killing machine.
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Death by Ten Thousand Bee Stings
In late 1992, as a response to the seemingly endless 
first intifada, Israel's Rabin government made the 
disastrous mistake of deporting the uprising's leaders and 
other "Islamic Palestinian activists," including both Hamas 
and PIJ members, to Southern Lebanon.39 Under the auspices 
of Hezballah and the Pasdaran, these Hamas and PIJ members 
learned the functional elements of suicide-homicide 
attacks, and established enduring connections with their 
hosts.40 Compounding its mistakes, the Rabin government 
allowed many of the 418 deportees to return to the disputed 
territories by the end of 1993.41 It is by no coincidence 
then that Hamas and PIJ attacked Israel with suicide­
homicide bombers a combined eight times during 1993.
39 At this time, Israel deported between 415 and 418 Palestinians 
to Lebanon; see Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 148; and Scott Atran, 
"Genesis of Suicide Terrorism," Science 299, issue 5612 (7 March 
2003) .
40 Hoffman notes, "PIJ...benefited doubly, forging tighter 
relations with Iran while significantly enhancing its military 
capabilities under Hezbollah's tutelage." Hoffman, Inside 
Terrorism, 148.
41 Although Hamas is 100 percent Sunni, they were more than 
willing to cooperate with the Shi'a in Lebanon, as they view 
Israel as a common enemy. Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of 
God: Why Religious Militants Kill (New York: Harper Collins, 
2003), 47.
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The mid-1990s, accordingly, saw "the heyday of 
[Palestinian] suicide-bombers."42 The "heyday" that is, 
until the situation worsened exponentially, when al-Aqsa 
intifada brought daily suicide-homicide attacks on Israeli 
civilians. At the height of this campaign, Israeli 
Historian Benny Morris explained, "[t]he Palestinians say 
they have found a strategic weapon, and suicide bombing is 
it...The streets are empty. They have effectively terrorized 
Israeli society. My wife won't use a bus anymore, only a 
taxi."43 The constant attacks on soft, i.e. civilian and 
non-combative military, targets by Palestinian suicide­
homicide bombers paralyzed Israeli society and its once 
burgeoning economy. As suicide-terror attacks began to 
represent "one of Israel's gravest strategic threats"44 and 
take their toll on the Israeli civilian population, the 
Israeli government, headed by a newly elected Prime 
Minister Ariel Sharon, acknowledged that it had to deny 
entry of terrorists from the disputed territories into 
Israel proper at all costs. Scholar Ami Pedahzur notes, 
"[a]bout halfway through the year 2002, Israel defined 
42 Morris, Righteous Victims, 62 6.
43 Hoffman, "The Logic of Suicide Bombers."
44 Assaf Moghadam, "Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second 
Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects," Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 26, no. 2 (March 2003): 65.
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suicide terrorism as a first-degree strategic threat and 
began to take great pains in dealing with it."45 For months 
Israel responded with extensive military and counter­
terrorism operations. But, after a two and half-year 
barrage of continuous suicide-terrorist attacks, the Sharon 
government, in order to decisively put a stop to the daily 
infiltration of suicide-homicide bombers, began 
construction of a security/separation barrier roughly along 
the "greenline," which demarcates Israel proper from the 
disputed territories.46
45 Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 64.
46 Specifically, the "greenline" refers to Israel's pre-1967 Six- 
Day War borders; however, today many use the term as including 
some settlement blocs as well.
47 In the areas where the security barrier has already been 
constructed, it has successfully cut off potential suicide­
homicide bombers' access into Israel proper from the disputed 
territories. This has resulted in a reduction of suicide-homicide 
attacks by 90 percent in Israel; and, it has reduced terrorist 
attacks in general by 80 percent. Israel Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs <www.mfa.gov.il> (May 2006).
Although Israel's (partially built) security barrier 
has resulted in short-term tactical success,47 the lack of a 
larger territorial buffer zone could very well turn out 
only to expose a strategic blunder in the long-term. With 
the barrier's construction, Israel has significantly 
altered its security situation in its favor regarding the 
prevention of suicide-terrorist attacks. However, the 
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security barrier has different implications for Israel's 
national military strategy, as the barrier acts as a 
tourniquet, which has stopped the bleeding caused by the 
second intifada's suicide-terror spree, but in doing so 
forces the amputation of a vital portion of Israel's 
geographical body. Ultimately, Israel's security barrier 
project offers tactical pros at the expense of paying 
strategic cons. Israel acted to barricade itself largely, 
if not solely, in response to the suicide-homicide bomber 
campaign unleashed by Hamas, PIJ, and al-Aqsa Martyrs' 
Brigade (AMB). While many view the security barrier as a 
counter-terrorism necessity to prevent infiltration by 
suicide-homicide bombers, terror organizations that 
surround Israel in the disputed territories as well as 
Hezballah in Southern Lebanon, have already exploited the 
Jewish state's increased territorial vulnerability; these 
organizations have adapted to the barrier and capitalized 
on the strategic advancements provided by suicide-homicide 
attacks, as evidenced by the rocket attacks of the last few 
years and the 2006 war with Hezballah that many argue 
represented a response to Israel's display of weakness via 
its retreat and separation policies.48
48 This debate over the effects of caving to suicide-homicide
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Nearly 40 years have elapsed of the one-sided war of 
attrition, and as an efficient and cost-effective weapon, 
the importance for the Palestinians of the suicide 
mission/suicide-homicide attack has only grown over the 
years.49 In the Palestinian movement's continuation of a 
strategy to wear Israel down, the suicide-homicide bomber 
found a central role in the conflict during al-Aqsa 
intifada, in which "strategic bombardment" took on a new 
meaning, as vigilant citizens had to view every person on 
Israeli streets as a potential bomber. The separation 
barrier, while an effective safeguard against potential 
bombers goes back to Israel's pullout from Lebanon in 2000. In 
August 2002, IDF Lieutenant General Ya'alon articulated that "the 
Israeli army is strong, Israel has technological superiority... 
but its citizens are unwilling any longer to sacrifice lives in 
order to defend their national interests and national goals. 
Therefore, [as Hezballah's Nasrallah suggests,] Israel is a 
spider-web society: it looks strong from the outside, but touch 
it and it will fall apart," Originally published in Ha'Aretz and 
quoted in Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 156-157. Furthermore, 
Hoffman notes that the "IDF high command...does not dispute 
Hezbollah's explanation for why the IDF withdrew from Lebanon, or 
the influence of the 'spider-web' theory on Palestinian 
thinking." Ultimately, high-ranking IDF officials and Hoffman, 
the leading RAND Corporation terrorism researcher, view 
Palestinian terror organizations' suicide-homicide bomber 
campaign during al-Aqsa intifada as a result of Israel's retreat 
from Lebanon. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 157.
49 First with the suicide mission of the feda'i and then with the 
suicide-homicide attacks of the shahid, Palestinians have 
consistently utilized such attacks as symbolical weapons, as well 
as tactical ones.
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suicide terrorists' infiltration, represents a Palestinian
advancement toward its strategic ends.
As Palestinian organizations' level of violence has 
increased most notably since the signing of the Declaration 
of Principles, the goals of erecting a Palestinian state 
and driving Israel off sacred Islamic land have come closer 
to fulfillment. The increasing level of pressure exerted on 
Israel has forced the Jewish state to concede territory 
that it might not ever have otherwise. Pedahzur notes:
[Suicide terrorism] succeeded where a vision of 
peace had failed. These attacks had brought about 
a substantial increase in Israeli public support 
for withdrawal from the territories--but this was 
out of a sense of resignation and not from a 
feeling that it was possible for Israelis and 
Palestinians to coexist peaceably, at least not 
in the near future. Therefore, it can be inferred 
that both Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, 
groups that from the very beginning objected to ■ 
the Oslo Accords, had realized their goals. The 
Israeli public was fed up with the Accords and, 
at the same time, was willing to accept the idea 
of secession from the territories without a 
Palestinian commitment to peace or even an end to 
terror.50
50 Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 66.
Additionally, the Sharon government's unilateral withdrawal
from Gaza came without a national referendum or clear
support from the majority of the Israeli populace for such 
a move. Nevertheless, the government saw it fit as a first 
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step to getting at the "root causes" of Palestinian 
terrorism--i.e. "occupation"; Sharon's use of the word in 
2003, marked the first time a Likud Prime Minister accepted 
the Palestinian/Arab/Islamic stance on the disputed 
territories—eventually leading to the fragmentation of the 
long-standing right wing Israeli party a year later. 
Contextualizing Success
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While the successes appear similar on the surface, a 
number of differences distinguish Hezballah's usage of 
suicide-homicide bombers as a tool of asymmetrical warfare 
from Palestinian organizations' employment of the modus 
operandi as a weapon of terror. Hezballah, in classic 
guerrilla fashion, sought to expel a foreign enemy, which 
had no vital national interest connected to Lebanon's 
territory, but operated with other interests. Palestinian 
organizations, on the other hand, have utilized suicide­
homicide bombers in an effort to bring about the state of 
Israel's ultimate destruction. Hezballah did not claim its 
attacks on U.S. and French forces, nor did the Iranian 
proxy seek dialogue. Hezballah and its Iranian backers 
simply pursued their goal of getting Western players out of 
the Lebanon game as quickly as possible. To the contrary, 
Palestinian society has used the shahid as dialogue—as a
message from one society to another—as an articulation of 
a resolute identity and collection of fervent ideologies.51
51 This is evidenced by Palestinian organizations competing with 
one another over which was best suited to relay this message.
52 These groups specifically influenced other groups to use 
suicide-homicide operations. The LTTE is not included because 
there is little evidence to suggest it has influenced groups 
outside its own conflict to incorporate suicide-homicide 
operations, with perhaps the PKK as an exception.
Although many organizations with a wide variety of 
political ideologies have incorporated suicide-homicide 
attacks, responsibility for the spread and pre-9/11 
advancement of the modus operandi rests primarily with 
Hezballah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.52 Before 
Hezballah's use of suicide-homicide bombers, similar 
operations had either been used alongside conventional 
forces as a supporting tactic or had simply been "high- 
risk" missions lacking a blatantly "suicidal" element— 
limiting their operational capability. Thus Hezballah's 
method established the cornerstone of the contemporary- 
suicide-homicide attack when it forced the U.S. out of 
Lebanon fives years before the Mujahedin expelled the 
Soviets from Afghanistan.
Palestinians used suicide terror to rob Israeli 
society of its Western normalcy and break the status quo, 
and in doing so ensnared the Sharon government and 
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compelled it to isolate the Jewish state, which has 
resulted in, and promises to continue in the future to 
have, consequences of strategic proportions. The 
Palestinians forced territorial concessions, which were 
more fruitful than the entire Oslo peace process, and 
backed Israel into a corner, where it became vulnerable to 
Hamas and Hezballah rocket attacks and audacious 
kidnappings. Effectively, Israel now finds itself on a 
constant defensive on its own territory--a position the 
Jewish state has not faced since prior to the 1967 Six-Day 
War. Palestinian terrorist organizations long ago learned 
how to use the media to maximize the effects of a self­
sacrificing or suicide-homicide attack, as initially 
demonstrated by choice of venue, such as the 1972 Olympics, 
but in the last two decades by the simple mass targeting of 
average civilians, which in manner and disregard was 
unprecedented in any terror campaign. While reprehensible, 
Palestinian-terrorist organizations learned to use suicide­
homicide attacks in a way that provided the modus operand! 
with the political power its symbolism had always 
warranted—adding again to its strategic potential.
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Balance of Terror?53
53 Initially coined by Albert Wohlstetter to refer nuclear 
deterrence, Palestinians began using it once it seemed that 
suicide terrorism proved its own deterrence value.
54 During the 2006 war, Hezballah berated the Jewish state with 
Kaytusha rockets to create a similar, yet far worse, situation on 
Israel's more densely populated Northern cities. The attacks were 
reminiscent of PLO Kaytusha attacks launched from Southern 
Lebanon in the early 1980s, which prompted Israel's 1982 
invasion.
55 Others have called it a "balance of horror."
By mid-2005, al-Aqsa intifada had all but officially 
ended, as willing bombers had lost easy access into Israel. 
Hamas quickly shifted tactics, by launching homemade 
"Qassam" rockets into Southern Israel from Gaza.54 PIJ, AMB 
and the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) followed suit. 
The suicide-homicide bomber's effects, however, remain in 
place, as Qassam attacks reflect the new reality in the 
armed dialogue between Israel and Palestinian terror 
organizations--one reminiscent of military parity, despite 
Israel's vast military superiority.
During al-Aqsa intifada, Palestinian leaders began 
claiming they had struck a "balance of terror"55 by 
deploying suicide-homicide bombers. Hamas political bureau 
member Azet al-Rushuq argues:
This weapon is our winning card, which turned our 
weakness and feebleness into strength, and 
created parity never before witnessed in the 
history of struggle with the Zionist enemy. It 
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also gave our people the ability to respond, 
deter, and inflict harm on the enemy.56
56 Azat al-Rushuq quoted in Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs, 26.
57 Today, the term "security barrier" is fairly a misnomer since 
it does not provide security against Qassam rocket attacks.
The balance of terror notion, whether genuinely believed by 
Palestinian terror organizations or simply part of the 
ever-existent diplomatic MacGuffin, functions the same vis- 
a-vis Israeli policy. The Palestinians effectively 
convinced successive Israeli governments from those led by 
Prime Ministers Rabin, to Sharon and Olmert, with the 
exception of the Netanyahu and Barak governments, that 
military parity was and continues to be a reality— 
resulting in Israel forfeiting policies vital to its 
national interests.
Today, it does not matter that the security barrier 
has decreased suicide-homicide bombers ability to 
infiltrate Israel proper and allowed Israeli society to 
revert to some form of normality. The balance of terror 
notion remains in effect, due to the combination of the 
Qassam rocket threat and the reality that without a 
separation barrier,57 which blocks the capability of 
suicide-homicide bombers but does not dilute potential 
shahids' motivation, the suicide terror threat would
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instantaneously reemerge. Thus, the suicide-homicide 
bomber, while rendered nearly combat ineffective by the 
barrier, has still brought Palestinian terror 
organizations, virtual deterrence, in addition to important 
territorial gains and political victories.
When Organizational Means
Are Individuals' Ends
By juxtaposing organizational method with person 
goals, the shahid/suicide-homicide bomber obfuscates a 
clear delineation of means and ends, and tactic and 
strategy. As a result, the modus operand! enjoys a 
predisposition to success as its operational ambiguity 
provides the foundation for a powerful mythology. Terrorism 
‘succeeds from the fear it instills in a targeted 
population, and terrorists that are impossible to 
understand only add to, and accelerate, the myth-induced 
fear factor. Even when a Palestinian suicide-homicide 
bomber fails in the tactical component of an operation, the 
act of "martyrdom" itself functions as success on the 
personal level. Similarly, and more importantly for 
Palestinian society and its representative organizations, 
an act of suicide terrorism, even when an operational 
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failure, succeeds strategically; the mere deployment of 
terrorists willing to kill themselves to murder their 
enemies sends a powerful message. One academic explanation 
contends: "[t]he rational use of terrorism can be thought 
of as a signaling game in which high profile attacks are 
carried out to communicate a player's ability and 
determination to use' violence to achieve its political 
objectives."58 An act of suicide terrorism, perhaps only 
second to an attack using nuclear weapons or weapons of 
mass destruction, marks the ultimate "high profile attack." 
Furthermore, the deployment of a suicide-homicide bomber to 
match a specific event (e.g. an election) delivers a 
message that expects a particular response--effectively, 
stripping a targeted population's confidence in its 
government's ability to secure the nation.59 To send a 
message against the peace process, scholar Luca Ricolfi 
notes, "one does not need to carry out devastating attacks, 
58 Bruce Hoffman and Gordon H. McCormick, "Terrorism, Signaling, 
and Suicide Attack," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27, no. 4 
(July 2004): 244.
59 Some scholars place the Hamas/PIJ's 1996 suicide terrorism 
campaign in this category. In an attempt to derail the peace 
process, Hamas and PIJ launched a series of suicide-terror 
attacks so as to hurt the dovish Prime Minister Shimon Peres' 
chances of being elected to his own term. See Pedahzur, Suicide 
Terrorism, 60-61; also Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, 
"Sabotaging the Peace:. The Politics of Extremist Violence," 
International Organization 56, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 263-296.
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since small-scale but 'heroic' actions carried out by­
suicide attackers may convey the message even more 
effectively than large scale ones."60 Such political 
signaling games are only made possible by the shahids who 
are willing to carry out attacks that predetermine their 
deaths. Moreover, the Palestinian shahid represents the 
fearless killer who loves death and craves murder. This 
image, more than the actual attacks, forced Israel to 
rethink its policies on the disputed territories.
60 Luca Ricolfi, "Palestinians, 1981-2003," in Making Sense of 
Suicide Missions, expanded and updated ed., ed. Diego Gambetta 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 89-90.
61 Mujahid means Muslim holy warrior, or literally "one who wages 
jihad. "
The evolution of martyrdom in the modern Islamic world 
hit a peak with the second-intifada Palestinian shahid, who 
embodies the intrepidity of the mujahid61 yet also carries 
on the vitality of Arabist romanticism and the existential 
dedication of the revolutionary, all of which help to 
captivate angry-Muslim youth as well as cosmopolitan 
reporters. Palestinian terrorist organizations have refined 
the suicide-homicide bomber to near optimization; they have 
evolved the modus operandi from a guerrilla tactic to a 
terror strategy. In doing so, they have encouraged the 
strategy's spread and escalation. With a culture of
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martyrdom that has eclipsed most Palestinian institutions 
that shape thought,62 Palestinian society has nearly 
unanimously accepted suicide terrorism as a perfectly 
legitimate political tool permitted by Islam.63 For 
Palestinians, the shahid embodies the highest religious 
role model. By superimposing 'the shahid onto the■suicide­
homicide bomber, suicide terrorism became an end unto 
itself--serving individuals with an insured ticket to 
"paradise." For terror organizations, the shahid/suicide­
homicide bomber provided a tactic that granted a number of 
strategic victories and has put them on the path to 
obtaining their overall defined political objectives.
62 Itamar Marcus, "The Indoctrination of Palestinian Children to 
Kill the Jews and Seek Death," in The Jerusalem Alternative, ed. 
Dmitry Radyshevsky. (Greenforest, Ark.: Balfour Books, 2005), 
217-219.
63 David Brooks, "The Culture of Martyrdom: How Suicide Bombing 
Became not just a Means but an End," The Atlantic Monthly 289, 
no. 6 (June 2002): 18-20.
64 Increasingly woman, children and the elderly have become 
shahids in the jihad against Israel. See Barbara Victor, Army of
With vast support for suicide-terror attacks, in words 
and deeds, the Palestinian movement sent a message to 
Israel that the Palestinian people will stop at nothing to 
force political and territorial concessions, even if it 
means sending their children to blow themselves up.64 It is 
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with this show of socio-cultural tenacity, coupled with 
suicide terrorism's effectiveness in stifling Israeli 
society, that brought the Jewish state to drop the official 
peace process altogether and adopt a policy of complete 
separation between itself and the Palestinians. Israel's 
security barrier, however, is a mirage. It only reflects 
the inability of Israeli security forces to prevent 
numerous low-intensity terror attacks plotted in the 
disputed territories. On the surface, the barrier project 
seems like realpolitik pragmatism at its best. Yet, in 
pursuit of eliminating short-term threats, which are not 
existential in nature, Israel has risked its long-term 
ability to survive in a dangerous and unforgiving 
neighborhood. Ultimately, Palestinians displayed they have 
beaten Israel back and forced it to retreat into 
isolation—not with a powerful coalition of skilled armies, 
but rather with a confederation of terror organizations 
equipped simply with bomb belts and individuals willing to 
wear and detonate them.
Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers 
(Emmaus, Penn.: Rodale, 2003).
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CHAPTER SIX
ALLAH, "PALESTINE," AND TRIBE: MOTIVATING
INDIVIDUAL PALESTINIANS TO COMMIT MARTYRDOM
Offering a precise summary of the Palestinian suicide­
homicide bomber phenomenon, political analyst David Brooks 
states:
Suicide bombing is the crack cocaine of warfare. 
It doesn't just inflict death and terror on its 
victims; it intoxicates the people who sponsor 
it. It unleashes the deepest and most addictive 
human passions—the thirst for vengeance, the 
desire for religious purity, the longing for 
earthly glory and eternal salvation.1
1 David Brooks, "The Culture of Martyrdom: How Suicide Bombing 
Became not just a Means but an End," The Atlantic Monthly 289, 
no. 6 (June 2002): 18.
2 Ariel Merari, "The Profile of the Modern Terrorist," in Post- 
Modern Terrorism: Trends, Scenarios, and Future Threats, ed. Boaz 
Ganor (Herzliya, Israel: Publishing House, 2005), 109-111.
In so many words, the succinct description captures the 
motivations behind Palestinian suicide terrorism. Themes of 
passion, vengeance and self-interest motivate "ordinary" 
and "normal"2 Palestinians to assume bomb-laden vests, find 
a target of value, position themselves, push a detonator 
button and kill themselves and as many of the defined enemy 
as possible. While subtle, this type of simultaneous 
murder-suicide means something different for the individual 
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than it does for the organization that sponsors the 
operation, or for the society that sanctions the attack and 
the political message it sends. But as always, the devil is 
in the details.
That a people with collective goals provides 
representative organizations with ends to pursue often 
leads terrorism researchers to overlook, with the exception 
of leaders or pioneering tacticians, the important roles 
individual terrorists play in their vicious game of 
political extortion. Average individuals are central to 
terror campaigns' success. They compose the people seeking 
political/social change or restoration, as well as form the 
body of organizations. This is especially the case in 
today's era of "new terrorism,"3 wherein organizations are 
less ideologically elitist and more focused on religion 
and/or ascriptive components of identity.
3 See Walter Laqueur, New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of 
Mass Destruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
4 Coined in Avery Weisman and Robert Kastenbaum, "The 
Psychological Autopsy," Community Mental Health Monograph no. 4 
(New York: Behavioral Publications, 1968).
In contrast to research on general terrorism, suicide 
terrorism has spawned a plethora of studies that seek to 
perform a "psychological autopsy"4 on individual suicide­
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homicide operatives.5 These studies commonly divorce the 
individual terrorist from his or her organization and 
collective identity. As a result, the findings paint 
suicide-homicide bombers as desperate, humiliated, deprived 
or possessing other characteristics that point the blame of 
suicide terrorism to those who are targeted.6 Despite 
popular research that compartmentalizes motives into 
varying levels,7 terror campaigns, and particularly those 
that employ the suicide-homicide modus operandi, require 
not only organizational design and environmental 
conditioning, but imperatively the mobilization of willing 
individuals, who after all function as the link between the 
three.
5 Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide 
Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005), 171.
6 For example, see El Sarraj "Wounds and Madness: Why We've 
Become Suicide Bombers," Peacework (May 2002).
7 Equally void of a comprehensive analysis include those studies 
that solely look at the strategies of organizations in search of 
the driving forces behind suicide terrorism.
Organization, environment and the individual thus work 
as one in sustaining the terror component of a political 
campaign. Furthermore, suicide-homicide bombers commit two 
separate, albeit simultaneous, acts while fulfilling their 
terror operations: murder and suicide. One could surely 
assert then that each behavior represents a distinct set of 
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motivations--some of which might overlap but not 
necessarily in every case. Accordingly, a variety of 
values, beliefs and attitudes, pulled from identity and 
environment, provide Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers 
with individual sets of motivations for carrying out their 
attacks.
Absent a Profile
The shahid video, which documents the last will and 
testament of almost every Palestinian suicide-homicide 
bomber, sheds light on individuals' religious motivations, 
as well as their political views and usually include a 
declaration calling for continued resistance. These digital 
testaments generally begin in the same manner, "Praise be 
to Allah... I am the living martyr...," but then take on a more 
personal tone, often addressing individual family members, 
specific political and religious grievances, or issuing 
particular threats against Israel or Jews or warning 
against supposed Zionist conspiracies.8 Once past the 
Islamic salutations there is no uniformity.
8 See sample in Mohammed M. Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs: The 
Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers (Washington D.C.: United 
States [U.S.] Institute for Peace Press, 200’6), 87-92; also a 
Hamas website: <www.palestine-info.info/arabic>; a Fatah website: 
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Many leading researchers have concluded a profile for 
Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers does not exist, other 
than the fact that all of them have been Muslims, most 
male, and many under the age of 25.9 Reflecting the society 
from which they emanate, Palestinian suicide-homicide 
bombers have spanned the spectrum of political affiliation; 
they have represented organizations from the ultra-right 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad to the extreme-leftist Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Education levels 
have varied from no formal education to those with graduate 
or law degrees.10 Similarly disparate, Palestinian suicide­
homicide bombers have come from every level of social 
class, including two millionaires' sons.11 Most never 
married but some had full families. Many knew people or 
<www.fateh.tv>; and a Palestinian Islamic Jihad website: <www. 
qudsway.com>; See also Inside the Mind of a Suicide Bomber, prod. 
Janis Klein, 50 min., The History Channel, 2002, DVD.
9 See Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Suicide 
Bombing Terrorism during the Current Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict: September 2000-December 2005 (1 January 2006): 7-8; 
accessed at <www.terrorism-info.org.il/>.
10 One should note, however, that in Palestinian society, the 
higher the education level one has increases the likelihood he or 
she holds fanatical viewpoints. See Luca Ricolfi, "Palestinians, 
1981-2003," in Making Sense of Suicide Missions, expanded and 
updated ed., ed. Diego Gambetta (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), 108.
11 Nasra Hassan, "Letter from Gaza: An Arsenal of Believers," The 
New Yorker, 19 November 2001.
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personally were affected negatively by Israeli police or 
military action.12 Yet most had never met an Israeli or Jew.
12 Assaf Moghadam, "Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second 
Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects," Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 26, no. 2 (March 2003): 72.
13 For Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers, Islam offers the 
spiritual impetus for taking one's life that is evident in most 
contexts where suicide-homicide attackers are employed, including 
those where a non-Islamic organization uses the modus operandi. 
In the Palestinian context, submission to Allah's will and 
sacrifice for the future of the um'ma, as well as the 
individual's pursuit of his or her own sanctity instills the 
individual with a variety of spiritual allures to kill oneself. A 
similar phenomenon exists in other Islamic contexts such as with 
Hezballah and al-Qaeda suicide terrorists. Additionally, for the 
LTTE and the PKK, two .secular-nationalist organizations, leader 
worship and cultic sacrifice for the group provide a similar 
impetus. However, suicide terrorists from these organizations 
demonstrate characteristics of "fatalistic suicide," or suicide 
induced from coercive conditioning, i.e. "brainwashing." Jon 
Elster, "Motivations and Beliefs in Suicide Missions," in Making 
Sense of Suicide Missions, expanded and updated edition, ed. 
Diego Gambetta (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 238- 
241. Elster notes that the PKK and LTTE "run on dictatorial 
lines," which leads to forms of leader worship; see page 246.
Therefore one must acknowledge Islam as the foundation 
of suicide terrorism in the Palestinian context.13 
Palestinians not only receive justification for suicide 
terrorism from interpretations of Islamic texts and 
sermons, but Islamic tradition also provides tempting 
religious perks; these notably include: for the shahid the 
procurement of 72 houriyyat al-ayn (virgin maidens) or 
"black-eyed" virgins, and for the shahida (female martyr) a 
marriage to a "perfect husband" and the promise that she
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will be the most beautiful of his wives; both shahid and 
shahida earn exemption from painful time spent in the. grave 
after death,■gain the ability to see the face of Allah, 
receive eternal glorification, a guaranteed place in heaven 
for 70 loved-ones, the permission to drink alcohol and 
enjoy the pleasures of an unimaginable paradise or jannat 
al-firdaous (heavenly gardens), wear a crown that has a 
jewel worth more than all that is in the entire world, as 
well as other incentives declared by various Islamic 
authorities.* 614 Such reasons to pursue shahada (incidental 
martyrdom) or commit istishhad (deliberate martyrdom), 
however, often represent secondary motivations when viewed 
in the smaller, more personal, context of life in 
Palestinian society. Additionally, the conflict with 
Israel, because it is a Jewish, Western and non-Islamic 
14 Some female suicide-homicide bombers are told they will be the 
most beautiful of the 72 virgins for a male shahid. See Suicide 
Killers: Paradise Is Hell. prod, and dir. Pierre Rehov, 1 hr. 20 
min., City Lights Pictures, 2006, DVD; also Anat Berko and Edna 
Erez, "'Ordinary People' and 'Death Work': Palestinian Suicide 
Bombers as Victimizers and Victims," Violence and Victims 20, no.
6 (December 2005): 611; additionally Kevin Toolis, "Suicide
Bomber Caught in the Act; Why These Girls Want to Be Martyrs,"
Herald Sun (16 September 2006). Shahids' post-temporal unions are
also referred to as "weddings with eternity." See Barbara Victor, 
Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide
Bombers (Emmaus, Penn.: Rodale, 2003); and Mohammed M. Hafez,
"Dying to Be Martyrs: The Symbolic Dimension of Suicide
Terrorism," in Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The
Globalization of Martyrdom, ed. Ami Pedahzur (New York:
Routledge, 2005), 65; Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 156.
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state, provides Palestinian society, organizations and 
individuals with Islamic justifications for suicide 
terrorism. But, beyond justifying the Palestinian point of 
view in the Conflict, individuals rely on specific passions 
and desires for vengeance, as well as personal interests, 
in order to convince themselves that "martyrdom" offers the 
best future. In these details lays the variable that often 
tips the scale to the side of action in the individual's 
cost/benefit analysis. Thus, research must consider Islam, 
yet look past its explicit influence to reach a 
comprehensive explanation of individual motives.
The Semantics of "Suicide" and "Martyrdom" 
Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers never consider 
their actions of self-induced death and killing of 
innocents as committing suicide or murder. Rather, they see 
it, as Palestinian society does, as attaining istishhad, or 
"martyrdom" through an act of self-sacrifice for Allah's 
sake. Moreover, Palestinian society places the shahid atop 
a hierarchy of honored Islamic fighters and warriors. 5 
Accordingly, the culture of martyrdom plays a central role 15
15 The shahid/istishhadi enjoys even more social praise than the 
feda'i and mujahid.
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in buttressing these notions in the mainstream discourse on 
suicide-homicide bombers within Palestinian society. For 
example, when a suicide-homicide bomber detonates his or 
her explosives and completes an operation, the bomber's 
family does not mourn but rather celebrates the "marriage" 
of its son to the 72 black-eyed virgins16 or its daughter to 
a perfect husband,17 i.e. a shahid, assigned to her in 
paradise. Indeed, families oftentimes do not post 
obituaries in the local papers—opting instead to list 
wedding announcements.18 Thus it goes without surprise that 
the social acceptance of suicide-homicide bombers as 
"martyrs" rather than suicide-murderers, surpasses polled 
support for "suicide terrorism."19
16 In the mythology propagated, the "black-eyed virgins" are not 
only perpetual virgins but also non-human; they are some type of 
cosmic being, if not angelic. This is synthesized from 
discussions with numerous Palestinians and Israeli-Arabs. See 
also Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 144.
17 Some failed Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers have 
articulated that they expect a "perfect husband" in paradise. See 
Berko and Erez, 611.
18 Moghadam, "Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second 
Intifada," 73.
19 Often polls are cited in arguments to whether Palestinians 
support suicide terrorism or not. Despite the polling on this 
question, which has fluctuated between 15 and 75 percent since 
suicide-homicide bombers first struck Israel in 1993, when a 
suicide-homicide bombers does attack Palestinian society accepts 
him or her as a martyr. See Gal Luft, "The Palestinian H-Bomb: 
Terror's Winning Strategy," Foreign Affairs 81, no. 4 
(July/August 2002). Thus, polls reflect support for the strategy 
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As a matter of fanciful semantics, Palestinian society 
rebukes the idea that a shahid commits suicide.20 Since a 
suicide-homicide bomber intentionally commits an 'amalyya 
istishhadiyya (act of self-sacrifice), or "martyrdom 
operation," in compliance with "Allah's will," various 
authorities in Palestinian society utilize Qur'anic suras 
and Hadith sayings to argue that the shahid does not commit 
intihar (suicide), nor truly dies, but lives on as a spirit 
in paradise.21 Indeed, the Qur'an explicitly suggests it is 
sinful to even state' a shahid is dead.22 Furthermore, the 
difference between one's incidental shahada, or "death for 
Allah's sake," and an 'amalyya istishhadiyya by al-shahid 
al-hai (the living martyr)23 is subtle but important,24 as 
the latter's invocation leaves a powerful insinuation for 
at a given time--not support for the act itself, which already 
enjoys deep cultural dispositions toward acceptance of the act.
20 This is a pervasive belief in other Islamic societies that 
deploy suicide terrorist as well. See The Cult of the Suicide 
Bomber, prod, and dir. David Betty and Kevin Toolis, 1 hr. 35 
min., Many Rivers Films, 2006, DVD.
21 Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs, 37-38.
22 Qur'an 2:154 states: "And call not those who are slain in the 
way of Allah 'dead.' Nay, they are living, only ye perceive not." 
Refer to Hafez, "Dying to Be Martyrs," 64.
23 Palestinian society refers to an individual who an organization 
has offered a specific suicide-homicide attack to as al-shahid 
al-hai, or "the living martyr." While a chosen individual's 
identity is usually kept secret for the sake of operational 
integrity, the individual still takes great joy in knowing he or 
she will most likely attain martyrdom.
24 Raphael Israeli, Islamikaze: Manifestations of Islamic 
Martyrology (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 109.
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future potential■shahids to feed on by providing an example' 
of unmatched 'heroism' and 'bravery.' The image of the 
shahid intentionally sacrificing his or her life for an 
Islamic/Arab/Palestinian struggle functions as an endlessly 
powerful symbol. Fusing the shahid with the suicide­
homicide bomber works to reinforce the act of suicide 
terrorism within society by framing it as an imperative to 
maintain cultural honor, individual respect and fulfill 
religious sanctity. Hence the importance of the suicide­
bomber's farewell videotape, the family's celebration of 
his or her marriage with "eternity," and the grandiose 
istishhad posters on wall after wall, street by street--all 
of which symbolically eternalize the shahid. Additionally, 
al-shahid al-hai often enjoys greater temporal benefits by 
predetermining to die in an 'amalyya istishhadiyya (versus 
the mujahid who wages jihad and obtains incidental 
shahada). Al-shahid al-hai accelerates.the Faustian logic, 
foregoing lasting-temporal benefits in exchange for 
promises of paradise, which lie simply beyond the pushing 
of a detonator button.
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In effect, Palestinian society absolves suicide­
homicide bombers of their suicide and murderous intent.25 
Moreover, the culture of martyrdom venerates the shahid 
with the highest religious and national honors. The stigmas 
of suicide and murder therefore never enter the 
individual's calculus; society replaces them with 'self­
sacrifice for Allah's will' and 'defense of Palestine.' 
Like Westerners who gauge success by their 'contributions 
to society,' or at least their 'social status,' a 
Palestinian suicide-homicide bomber's willingness to commit 
istishhad reflects the desire to contribute to the 
betterment of the 'greater good'--i.e. the collective, as 
defined as the um'ma (global Islamic community), 
"Palestine" or both; furthermore, the heroic status placed 
on shahids in Palestinian society adds to the general 
motivation of individuals seeking to 'make something' of 
their lives.26
25 Prestigious Islamic authorities that are not Palestinians such 
as Sheik Yousef Qaradawi also play an important role in 
legitimizing Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers. See Chapter 
Seven for an explanation of his fatwa (Islamic decree) 
sanctioning Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers.
26 Or simply "to do something" with their lives, which just as 
often demonstrates a rebuke of Arab society, as it does the 
conflict with Israel. See Berko and Erez, 611.
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Between Altruism and Egoism
Invoking the ideas of sociologist Emile Durkheim,27 
some researchers of suicide terrorism have explored the 
suicide terrorism phenomenon from the side of "altruistic 
suicide."28 29However, scholars have more or less overlooked 
Durkheim's "egoistic" side of suicide, if not purposely
27 Durkheim's typologies of suicide include: "egoistic," 
"altruistic," and "anomic." See Emile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study 
in Sociology, trans. John A. Spaulding and George Simpson (New 
York: Free Press, 1966).
28 See Pape 172-198; Ami Pedahzur, Arie Perliger and Leonard 
Weinberg. "Altruism and Fatalism: The Characteristics of 
Palestinian Suicide Terrorists." Deviant Behavior: An 
Interdisciplinary Journal 24 (June 2006): 405-423; Ivan Strenski, 
"Sacrifice, Gift and the Social Logic of Muslim 'Human Bombers,'" 
Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 3 (Autumn 2003).
29 Durkheim's notion of "anomic" suicide is also regularly 
overlooked. To his credit, scholar Assaf Moghadam recognizes, 
"there is no reason to assume that the shaheed's decision to 
embark on a martyrdom operation is entirely selfless." Moghadam, 
"Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada," 71.
2 9 shunned it as an overly suicidal expression of suicide. 
But, as depicted in Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers' 
own words and deeds, both altruism and self-interest play 
important roles in stimulating their motivation. 
Accordingly, the promoted allures of suicide terrorism, 
either by accident or design, play off a concoction of 
altruism and egoism.
156
The Institutionalization of "Victimhood"
Vengeance stands out as an oft-cited motive in the 
literature on Palestinian suicide terrorism. Whether or not 
one believes that Palestinians have a right to avenge 
Israeli policy or actions of Israeli citizens is 
irrelevant. For the "victim," only perception matters. 
Again the culture of martyrdom's functions play a crucial 
role, as they have facilitated the establishment and 
maintenance of "victimhood" in Palestinian society. After 
all, vengeance based on falsehoods can still effectively 
produce an "avenger," who while satisfying his or her 
bloodlust also implements policy. Social, Islamic and 
political organizations, the Palestinian Authority (PA), 
and other contributors to the culture of martyrdom have 
successfully ingrained victimhood into the Palestinian 
collective identity, allowing for individuals to give and 
take from a widespread feeling of injustice. Frequently 
articulated components of Palestinian victimhood include: 
Israel's refusal30 to allow the return of the descendants of 
750,000 Arabs31 who left the nascent Jewish state amid the 
30 One should note that this would effectively end Israeli's 
existence as a Jewish state.
31 The leading historian in this field puts the number around 
700,000, but within the debate figures have ranged from 250,000 
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1947-1948 Jewish-Arab civil war or subsequent 1948-1949 
Israeli War of Independence, checkpoints strategically 
placed across the West Bank, Israel's separation barrier, 
and Israeli control of simultaneous Jewish/Muslim holy 
sites in Jerusalem and Hebron, as well as a lengthy catalog 
of other complaints passed down generation after 
generation.
As determined in many criminological studies, the 
"victim" often grows up to victimize. Researchers who have 
interviewed numerous failed Palestinian suicide-homicide 
bombers in'Israeli prisons report: "[t]he participants' 
social identity as Palestinians, who are dispossessed, 
oppressed and humiliated, was a recurrent theme in 
discussing their lives."32 In most cases such perceptions of 
victimization and injustice demonstrate a clear nexus to 
behavior patterns culminating in one's participation in 
to 800,000; see Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian 
Refugee Problem Revisited. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2004. Today, the "refugee" population numbers around 4.4 million 
people, most of whom are scattered across the Levant; see Evelyn 
Gordon, "Civil Fights: The Palestinians Don't Want a State," 
Jerusalem Post, 24 October 2007; Samih K. Farsoun and Naseer H. 
Aruri, Palestine and the Palestinians: A Social and Political 
History, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2006), 105.
32 Berko and Erez, 609; see also Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name 
of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (New York: Harper Collins, 
2003), 32-62.
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suicide terrorism.33 Islamist-Palestinian terror 
organizations and the Fatah-led PA have perpetuated the 
institutionalization of victimhood, in order to help 
condition Palestinian society to support "martyrdom 
operations" and to instigate individuals to seek 
participation.34 Playing the "martyr" first requires 
accepting the role of the "victim." In Palestinian society, 
"justice," victimhood and martyrdom often work as the 
logical social impetus for political mobilization. If 
victims deserve justice, and martyrdom operations provide 
victims with a method to serve justice, then the conclusion 
is simple. New York University Psychiatrist John 
Rosenberger recognizes,
33 See Anat Berko, The Path to Paradise: The Inner World of 
Suicide Bombers and Their Dispatchers, trans. Elizabeth Yuval 
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2007).
34 One should note that today Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers 
are not "recruited" per se, but rather are members of a social 
network loosely affiliated with a terrorist organization; 
Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers usually seek out, when they 
want to participate in a "martyrdom operation," terrorist 
dispatchers who are also connected to the social network at hand. 
See Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, "The Changing Nature of 
Suicide Attacks: A Social Network Perspective," Social Forces 84, 
no. 4 (June 2006) .
One is visited by vengeance in response to one's 
being a victim... Vengeance is a strangely sweet 
feeling, accompanied by a clear and unambiguous 
sense that one is entitled to retaliate. 
Possessed of vengeance one feels exhilarated, 
159
empowered, almost invincible. It is a consuming 
passion. 35
35 John Rosenberger, "Discerning the Behavior of the Suicide 
Bomber: The Role of Vengeance," Journal of Religion and Health 
42, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 15-16.
36 Hamas and PIJ operational planners claim they reject 
individuals who seek to a participate in a "martyrdom operation" 
if their motive is purely based on vengeance; shahid candidates 
must demonstrate first and foremost Islamic reasoning to be sent 
on a suicide-homicide operation. See Hassan.
37 Rosenberger, 14-15.
Perceptions of injustice ultimately provide a sense of 
righteousness to the avenger. Accordingly, collective 
affirmation of victimization, coupled with religious 
justifications for retribution,36 engender individuals to 
believe without a doubt that their acts of terror exemplify 
justice and righteousness, if not holiness. So, if 
vengeance explains the motive for mass murder, what 
explains the individual's suicide?
Arab Prison, Islamic Escape: Killing to Die
"Death is...the ultimate narcissistic injury...While we 
hope, and may have faith, that death is a beginning, we 
know for sure that it is an ending."37 Rosenberger's 
assertion provides a useful basis for deciphering those 
motives of Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers left 
unarticulated. The general understanding that death brings 
an end demonstrates the suicide-homicide bomber's 
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sacrificial/altruistic motives, but the "hope" and "faith" 
suggest a more egoistical line of reasoning also exists. 
Self-interest stands as the most overlooked element in 
scholarly collections on Palestinian suicide-homicide 
bombers' motivations. Perhaps this is the case because 
researchers have not delved deep enough into the 
contradictory world of a society that hopelessly attempts 
to hold on to the past, while an ever-globalizing Western 
culture demands to influence or clash with the societies 
that it meets.
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza live in a 
traditional society based on the principles of 'urf (Arab 
customary law).38 In such a society, the hamula (clan) 
system determines and organizes the individual's life and 
place in society. Far from their bedui (nomadic) past, 
contemporary Palestinians generally receive a high level of 
education, and Palestinian society boasts an established 
middle class and elite/technocrat class. Nevertheless, 
38 Farsoun and Aruri; Eyad El Sarraj interview by Linda Butler, 
"Suicide Bombers: Dignity, Despair, and the Need for Hope," 
Journal of Palestine Studies 31, no. 4 (Summer 2002): 75-76; 
Ibrahim Wade Ata, The West Bank Palestinian Family (New York: 
KPI, 1986); Joel S. Migdal ed., Palestinian Society and Politics 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980); Mark Levine, 
"Chaos, Globalization, and the Public Sphere: Political Struggle 
in Iraq and Palestine," The Middle East Journal 60, no. 3 (Summer 
2006): 473.
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tribal norms still dominate daily life among average 
Palestinians. The individual lacks a substantial personal 
identity in the Western sense of individuality.39 As with 
any traditional or conservative society, social norms and 
codified law heavily guard against interaction between the 
sexes. Men and women have distinct non-negotiable roles, 
and the protection of females' chastity, or al-'ard (female 
sexual honor), is of the utmost importance to the family 
and its hamula. Guarding a woman's purity supercedes all 
other functions of daily life. A hamula views an assault 
on, or dishonoring of, one of its females as the highest 
insult, which requires a violent response,. usually against 
the perpetrating male and involved female without regard to 
her culpability or lack thereof. Additionally, without an 
established income, Palestinian men cannot marry, as 
families commonly demand high dowries and require that the 
male prove his ability to support a woman before they 
marry.40
39 Khalil Shikaki, "The Views of Palestinian Society on Suicide 
Terrorism," in Countering Suicide Terrorism, updated ed., ed. 
Boaz Ganor (Herzliya, Israel: International Institute for 
Counter-Terrorism [ICT], 2007), 100.
40 The Cult of the Suicide Bomber, prod, and dir. David Betty and 
Kevin Toolis, 1 hr. 35 min., Many Rivers Films, 2006, DVD.
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As one example of scores of constraints that Arab
cultural traditions and social norms put on Palestinians,
it is not surprising that many failed suicide-homicide 
bombers have acknowledged frustration with this way of life 
as a motivation for committing murder-suicide. Anat Berko 
and Edna Erez, two scholars who interviewed various failed
Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers, report:
Quite often the interviewees restated the fact 
that they live in Arab society or are part of a 
culture that dictates various restrictions, and 
monitors gender-appropriate behavior. They 
mentioned that they cannot date or socialize 
unless the contact is for marriage purposes, is 
approved by the family and under its supervision... 
[Moreover] the social background of the 
interviewees and the cultural gender scripts that 
Arab society provides for men and women were 
reflected in the paths the participants took in 
becoming suicide bombers.41
41 Berko and Erez, 610.
42 Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America's 
National Identity (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 30.
Environment and culture surely dictate "what is right and
wrong, appropriate and inappropriate,"42 and as a result
sometimes motivate individuals to seek a way out. One
failed Palestinian suicide-homicide bomber admitted:
All that is forbidden in this world is permitted 
in the Garden of Eden... [which] has everything-- 
God, Freedom, the Prophet Mohammed and my 
friends, the '•shahids '...There are 72 virgins. 
There are lots of things I can't even 
describe...!'11 find everything in the Garden of
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Eden, a river of honey, a river of beer and 
alcohol...43
43 Quoted in Berko and Erez, 613.
44 Suicide Killers.
The fact that Palestinians live side by side with Israel, 
which promotes an open society often characterized by its 
empowered military women and Mediterranean beaches filled 
with scantily clad young men and women drinking alcohol and 
freely interacting with one another, perhaps exacerbates 
young Palestinians' sentiments of hostility44 and 
frustration, as the contrast adds a component of 
incorrigible jealousy to the Conflict. Average Palestinians 
oftentimes find themselves, not only caught up in the 
ongoing religious/ethnic conflict that surrounds them, but 
also between the stubborn traditions of Palestinian society 
and the modernizing components of personal and collective 
identity.
For Palestinians discontent with, or held hostage by, 
their Arab identity, they elevate their Islamic identity to 
a higher standing. In Arab-Islamic societies, suicide 
represents the greatest moral transgression, which is 
unforgivable by Allah, just as family and society abhor any 
suicide attempts. Indeed, Arab-Islamic societies boast one 
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of the lowest suicide rates across the globe.45 But 
Palestinian society, and the individuals that collectively 
comprise it, view intihar (suicide) as extremely different, 
if not the polar opposite of istishhad (deliberate 
martyrdom). For Palestinians, intihar represents the worst 
action an individual Arab could take under any 
circumstance, but paradoxically in time of a holy struggle, 
or jihad, istishhad represents the greatest achievement any 
Muslim could attain. Thus, fulfilling ideological calls 
from their Islamic identity allows individuals an escape 
from their Arab identity, yet without explicitly or 
symbolically betraying it—as might be perceived by 
emigration or simple rebellion against social norms, and as 
"suicide" or an attempt at suicide definitely would 
demonstrate. Furthermore, martyrdom, as it provides 
glorification and fame, grants the individual an eternal 
Islamic escape from the daily tyranny of Arab traditions. 
The idealized Islamic paradise lures individuals from the 
harsh reality that marriage, and therefore heterosexual 
relations, might never occur; this exponentially increases 
the appeal of such martyrdom incentives as the marriage of 
Pape, 181-182.
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a shahid to 72 perpetual-virgins, or a shahida to her one 
perfect husband.
"We Love Death--It Brings Us Our 15 Minutes"
Outside the frustrations related to restrictions on 
male-female interaction, Arab cultural traditions and 
social norms also present individuals with significant 
deterrents against any burgeoning individuality. In an 
increasingly small world populated by individuals, the 
contradictions of a traditional society, based on the 
collective that promotes shahids as individual heroes, 
sparks another attraction to a Palestinian who views his or 
her life as monotonous, contained, predetermined or 
individualistically stifled in any number of manners. 
Attaining martyrdom provides the individual with one of 
only a few ways to distinguish him or herself in a society 
that strives on collective thought, conformity and the 
ostracizing of those who dissent or rebel.46 Scholar Martha 
Crenshaw notes, "[f]or someone whose life otherwise has
46 One researcher notes that for Palestinians "achieving any 
degree of economic or personal 'success' may seem impossible. 
Becoming a martyr, on the other hand, may well present a remedy 
to this predicament by providing an opportunity to stand out of 
the crowd and become, literally, a celebrity. The shaheed is 
endowed with a sense of individuality that he is unlikely to 
achieve in any other way." Moghadam, "Palestinian Suicide 
Terrorism in the Second Intifada," 76.
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little significance, transcendent fame can be a powerful 
motive...The individual, whose identity might otherwise 
fade into obscurity, has now established a legend for all
In pursuit of fame, while an egotistical end, 
individuals commonly take a path paved in altruism. 
Palestinian terrorists, like other Islamic militants, 
regularly state that they love death, while their enemy 
only loves life—usually implying that this is how Allah 
intends to provide victory.47 8 Importantly, Palestinian, as 
well as other influential Arab, Islamic authorities have 
declared jihad a fard ayn (individual obligation), as 
opposed to fard kifaya (collective obligation).49 Islamic 
martyrdom expert Mohammed M. Hafez notes,
47 Martha Crenshaw, "'Suicide' Terrorism in Comparative 
Perspective," in Countering Suicide Terrorism, updated ed., ed. 
Boaz Ganor (Herzliya, Israel: ICT, 2007), 22.
48 Indeed, during al-Aqsa intifada, even the highest Palestinian- 
Islamic authority, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Ikrama Sabri 
stated: "The Muslim embraces death...Look at the society of the 
Israelis. It is a selfish society that loves life. These are not 
people who are eager to die for their country and their God. The 
Jews will leave this land rather than die, but the Muslim is 
happy to die." Originally published in The New Yorker and quoted 
in Moghadam, "Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second 
Intifada," 71.
49 Scholar Rafael Israeli notes: "The duty to fight jihad is 
universal and perpetual until the entire world comes under Muslim 
dominion. However, because Muslim countries have desisted in 
practice, under various theological and practical considerations, 
from this idea, which otherwise would have permanently pitted 
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Islamic scholars construe individual obligation 
to mean that- it is the duty of every Muslim to 
.wage jihad in the path of [Allah] in defense of 
Islam, its lands, religious institutions, people, 
property. Individual obligation usually arises 
when Muslim lands are besieged by powerful foes 
that cannot be easily repelled with a small 
force. Under these circumstances, jihad is the 
religious obligation of every Muslim capable of 
fighting, just as all Muslims are obligated to 
pray, fast, and pay alms.50
them against the rest of the world, Muslim fundamentalists have 
come to take this duty as a personal one (fard ’ayn), and so have 
consecrated any struggle of theirs against Unbelievers as a 
pursuit of that holy duty." See Israeli, Islamikaze, 39-40.
50 Mohammed M. Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of 
Palestinian Suicide Bombers (Washington D.C.: U.S. Institute for 
Peace Press, 2006), 36.
Accordingly, organizations present and society accepts an 
individual's martyrdom firstly as a dutiful sacrifice for 
the collective, and secondarily as the individual's 
ascension to a higher religious status. Thus, the 
individual can easily rationalize the pursuit of personal 
fame and glory in the name of Allah, "Palestine," and 
loved-ones. But who is to say which plays the greater role 
in motivating an individual—the altruistic or the 
egotistical component--especially considering the social 
lines between these interests are frequently blurred.
The rituals involved in preparing and memorializing a 
suicide-homicide bomber exemplify a melding of altruism and 
egoism, and display how a society founded on pre-modern 
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traditions exudes tinges of postmodern marketing and 
consumerism. In Palestinian shops and marketplaces, one can 
easily find videos, t-shirts, key-chains and other mass- 
produced shahid memorabilia. The walls of Palestinian towns 
are dedicated to posters of shahids.51 Imams, politicians 
and TV-personalities alike promise suicide-homicide bombers 
eternal glorification in paradise, and without a doubt 
bombers already receive in-full everlasting fame in 
Palestinian society, where the shahid's image rests as an 
ubiquitous symbol. Ultimately, suicide-homicide bombers act 
out of both egoism and altruism—"martyrdom operations" 
offer an escape from traditionalism and an exchange of 
namelessness for celebrity, yet they also represent a 
prideful act of social solidarity.
51 For example., see Appendix B.
52 Paraphrased in Victor Davis Hanson, "Battles Change, Wars 
Don't: From ancient Greece to modern Iraq, history shows us that 
fear, honor and self-interest drive hostilities between the 
states," Los Angeles Times, 23 October 2005; and Victor Davis 
Hanson, "Old Is 'New' Warfare: Iraq conflict shares uncanny 
Motivations in Sum
Thucydides recognized that "honor, fear and self­
interest" motivate people to fight and die for their 
beliefs.52 One could argue, today this insight holds up.
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Palestinians demonstrate a similar trend in their 
expression of a most brutal form of warfare. First, the 
culture of martyrdom perpetuates the idea that Palestinians 
embody the truest of victims. Marking one of its greatest 
impacts, the culture of martyrdom has ingrained 
"victimhood" in the Palestinian collective identity—to the 
extent that it has convinced the latest generation of 
children to love death and hate life.53 Ultimately, a 
martyrdom operation offers restoration of the victim's 
wounded honor. Second, a fear of forsaking "Palestine" and 
a fear of failing to answer the call of Islam, lays the 
ideological foundation for the conflict with Israel—the 
Jewish, Western and "infidel" state. Third, and perhaps 
most importantly for the individual, martyrdom contains a 
variety of personal allures; it eternalizes the individual 
as a hero or heroine in the very society that previously 
inhibited him or her'from developing as an individual free 
to choose one's own destiny, and mature a unique identity 
owned all to his or herself. On top of pardoning suicide 
likenesses with the Peloponnesian War," National Post, 5 November 
2005.
53 For examples of the damage the culture of martyrdom has done to 
the latest generation of Palestinian children review Palestinian 
Media Watch's collection on PA textbooks, PA TV programming, etc. 
that help indoctrinate children with the concepts of jihad, 
shahada, and istishhad; access at <www.pmw.org.il>.
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and sanctioning murder, martyrdom gives the shahid the key 
to unlock the prison cell of traditional society, as well 
as the key to all the joys of paradise. Left unsatisfied by 
"the gap between expectations and reality experienced"54 the 
shahid therefore determines that a better future lies in 
the rewards for an act of murder-suicide.
54 This Durkheimian notion is accredited to one scholar's 
assessment of the social status of Palestinian shahids; see 
Elster, 245.
The Palestinian suicide-homicide bomber, absolved by 
culture of the stigmas of suicide and murder, socialized to 
view all of Israel as illegitimate, facilitated by 
political organizations and encouraged by his or her own 
psyche to right the wrongs of victimhood, is equipped with 
the necessary tools to "retaliate." In some instances, it 
is likely that the perks offered by Islamic authorities are 
an afterthought--or just enough to give that extra nudge 
the individual needs to leap from the balcony of innate 
morality. For others, the simple lack of opportunity in 
Arab society to engage in heterosexual relations outside of 
marriage, accentuates the sexual allures promised to 
suicide-homicide bombers—both male and female. The 
Palestinian collective identity's sammud, the culture of 
martyrdom within Palestinian society, the strategies of 
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terror organizations, and the simple calculus of 
individuals' cost-benefit analyses, systematically work 
together to make the process of producing suicide-homicide 
bombers virtually effortless. So seamless is the operation 
that the societal, organizational and individual culprits 
often succeed in deflecting culpability onto their targets. 
Furthermore, this assembly line of suicide terror turns 
average Palestinians into sadomasochistic suicide-homicide 
bombers, who seek to punish the victimizers for 




THE PALESTINIAN CULTURE OF MARTYRDOM AND SHAHID:
PROVIDING THE MODEL FOR 21st
CENTURY ISLAMIC TERRORISM
In recent years, the suicide-terror phenomenon has 
spread across the globe at astounding rates. With attacks 
occurring everywhere from Moscow to Bali and from New York 
City to Mumbai, suicide terrorism has made its mark as a 
global epidemic. Most evident in its post-9/11 application 
of suicide terrorism, particularly in the battle for Iraq, 
al-Qaeda has incorporated istishhad (martyrdom) into its 
grand strategy.1 Suicide-terror attacks have dominated the 
conflict in Iraq since major military operations ended 
there in late 2003.2 Indeed, in Iraq alone suicide-terror 
attacks have reached levels surpassing almost all other 
similar campaigns combined.3 However, as one terrorism 
expert recognizes, "clearly suicide bombing in Iraq is
1 Yoram Schweitzer and Sari Goldstein Ferber, "Al-Qaeda and the 
Internationalization of Suicide Terrorism," Memorandum No. 78 
(Tel Aviv: Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, 2005), 8.
2 See Nir Rosen, In the Belly of the Green Bird: The Triumph of 
the Martyrs in Iraq (New York: Free Press, 2006).
3 Mohammed M. Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and 
Ideology of Martyrdom (Washington D.C.: United States Institute 
for Peace Press, 2007), 3.
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largely an imported phenomenon."4 Furthermore, the foreign 
fighters who predominately use this import did not develop 
it firsthand. Consistently coming from Saudi Arabia more 
than' anywhere else, suicide-homicide bombers in Iraq have 
adapted the modus operandi and made it an important 
component of al-Qaeda's strategy against coalition forces 
and Iraq's democratic government.5 With its operational 
roots in Shi'a Iran,6 the sectarian and ideological nemesis 
of Saudi Arabia, the suicide-homicide attack went through a 
lengthy evolution process before finding widespread 
legitimacy in the Sunni-Muslim world. The now infamous 
import thus required significant preparation before its 
exportation to Iraq.
4 See Martha Crenshaw's "Foreword," in Suicide Bombers in Iraq, 
ix.
5 Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, Al-Qa'ida's Foreign Fighters 
in Iraq: A First Look at the -Sinjar Records (West Point, New 
York: Combating Terrorism Center, 2007), 19; Richard A. Oppel 
Jr., "Foreign Fighters in Iraq Are Tied to Allies of U.S.," The 
New York Times, 22 November 2007; Mia Bloom, "Grim Saudi Export," 
Los Angeles Times, 17 July 2005; Susan B. Glasser, "'Martyrs' in 
Iraq Mostly Saudi," Washington Post, 15 May 2005.
6 The first occurrence of an assailant strapping explosives to 
his chest and killing himself to kill others happened in 1980 
during the Iran-Iraq War, when a 13-year old Iranian named 
Hussein Fahmideh strapped explosives to himself and detonated 
them while charging an Iraqi tank. Ayatollah Khomeini went on to 
use "martyrs" to clear Iraqi minefields and the Iranian Pasdaran 
subsequently exported the shahid concept to Lebanon in 1982.
The United States (U.S.)-led War on Terror has 
decreased al-Qaeda's capability to launch spectacular
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attacks' and forced the international network to focus more 
acutely on its next structural metamorphosis in order to 
continue advancing towards its long-term goals.7 Al-Qaeda 
started as a battlefront collection of "Afghan Arabs," who 
in a few years transformed themselves into a global- 
spanning organization that in less than a decade mutated 
into an international network with countless tentacles. 
But, Usama bin Laden and Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri have not 
finished transforming al-Qaeda; they have not kept 
discretion about al-Qaeda's next metamorphous, either—that 
being, into a "popular trend,"8 wherein al-Qaeda would 
largely rely on the world's Sunni-Muslim population to rise 
up and carry out operations without direct hierarchal 
command and control. So, where has al-Qaeda found a model 
to present bin Laden's grandiose jihadi design to the 
um'ma'? Whom does al-Qaeda's prototype member or adherent 
resemble? What qualities does he or she seek to possess? 
What personal goals does he or she hope to fulfill by 
7 Al-Qaeda's long-term goals include: reinvigorating Islam to the 
extent of its "golden era." For this to happen, however, al-Qaeda 
argues the Islamic world must come out of its new j ahiliyya 
(godless dark-age) and the caliphate has to be reinstated.
8 Ely Karmon, "Who Bombed Northern Israel? Al-Qaida and 
Palestine," International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT): 
Articles (1 January 2006): accessed at <www.instituteforcounter 
terrorism.org> on 28 January 2007.
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participating in al-Qaeda's "World Islamic Front for Jihad 
against Jews and Crusaders?"
In short, the Palestinian shahid, whose glorification 
in the disputed territories exceeds that of a pop or movie 
star's in America, offers the ultimate guide. The shahid 
carries out the most’ terrifying of all terrorists' modus 
operandi: the suicide-homicide attack. As both a physical 
and symbolic act, the suicide-homicide attack marks an 
effective tool of warfare, optimal method of propaganda, 
and additionally fulfills a culturally defined religious 
duty. This makes the shahid the perfect weapon for al- 
Qaeda, which seeks to maximize the willingness of 
unaffiliated individuals to pursue the ideological 
prescripts of bin Laden and al-Zawahiri. Accordingly, al- 
Qaeda understands that using the shahid minimally provides 
twofold utility--tactical and strategic9--both of which, as 
in the Palestinian case, effectively prod the internal and 
external audiences. Already, as foci of inspiration, the 
Palestinian culture of martyrdom and shahid have 
contributed significantly to suicide-homicide bombers 
enjoying a fashionable status globally among Islamic
9 Schweitzer and Goldstein Ferber, 26.
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fanatics.10 Thus, by paving the way for massive Sunni 
suicide terrorists, the Palestinian culture of martyrdom 
and shahid have instrumentally aided al-Qaeda in advancing 
its long-term goals.
10 The intended use of the term "fanatic" here is, as philosopher 
Lee Harris defines, "someone willing to make a sacrifice of his 
own self-interest for something outside himself." See Lee Harris, 
The Suicide of Reason: Radical Islam's Threat to the West (New 
York: Basic Books, 2007), xx.
11 Walter Laqueur quoted in Assaf Moghadam, "The Roots of Suicide 
Terrorism: A Multi-Causal Approach," in Root Causes of Suicide 
Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom, ed. Ami Pedahzur (New 
York: Routledge, 2005), 95.
Exporting the Palestinian Shahid
The exuberant amount of international media coverage
on the Arab-Israeli conflict allots Palestinian terror 
organizations a paramount forum for their operations. Media 
attention plays a central role in any guerrilla or terror 
campaign, or as scholar Walter Laqueur once suggested: 
"[the media is] the- terrorist's best friend."11 With terror 
attacks, the media often functions as a tool for 
organizations to disseminate external and internal 
propaganda. Thus, when coupled with the added media 
coverage suicide-homicide attacks generally receive in any 
context, the sustained employment of suicide-homicide 
bombers within the forum of the Israeli-Palestinian 
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conflict, especially- during al-Aqsa intifada, brought 
Palestinian organizations perhaps more media attention than 
any other previous terror campaign, including al-Qaeda's 
pre-9/11 attacks. The media coverage of al-Aqsa intifada 
increased the various Palestinian organizations' prestige, 
notoriety and, most importantly, power vis-a-vis one 
another, Israel, and within the international audience.
In combination with prime exposure, the strategic 
successes provided by suicide terrorism, as demonstrated in 
the political realm, gave Palestinian terror organizations 
an even higher level of prestige among international terror 
organizations and networks. Palestinian terror 
organizations have always maintained a high, if not the 
highest, level of respect in the international terror 
community.12 The efforts of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic 
12 Regarding the Palestinian terror legacy, scholar Bruce Hoffman 
contends: "Between 1968 and 1980, Palestinian terrorist groups 
were indisputably the world's most active, accounting for more 
international terrorist incidents than any other movement. The 
success achieved by the PLO in publicizing the Palestinians' 
plight through the 'internationalization' of its struggle with 
Israel has since served as a model for similarly aggrieved 
[identity groups]." Simply put, the Palestinians revolutionized 
revolutionary violence. Hoffman goes on to credit the PLO not 
only with "internationalizing" terrorism, but also providing 
ethno-nationalist terrorist organizations with a "model," as well 
as establishing the Palestinians as revolutionary terror 
"mentors." Hoffman concludes, "the attention that the PLO has 
received, the financial and political influence and power that it 
has amassed, and the stature that it has been accorded in the 
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Jihad (PIJ) to derail the Oslo peace process, the daily 
suicide-homicide bombers of al-Aqsa intifada and Israel's 
subsequent retreat from Gaza, brought renewed praise and 
admiration from those with shared values and beliefs. 
Accordingly, this prestige has transitioned into imitation • 
of the Palestinian shahid (usually in the form of a 
suicide-homicide bomber) and its supplementary culture of 
martyrdom. Initially gaining widespread notoriety through 
its use by the Shi'a Hezbollah in Lebanon, it was never a 
given that suicide-homicide attacks would find acceptance 
in the Sunni world. Indeed, over 11 years passed from the 
time al-Da'awa 17, an Iraqi-Shi'a group, launched its first 
suicide-homicide attack and Hamas's first successful 
suicide-homicide bomber.13 Ultimately, Palestinian terror 
organizations evolved the modus operandi of suicide­
homicide bombers in two concurrent yet specific ways, 
setting important precedents, that precipitated al-Qaeda's 
strategy of relentless suicide terrorism in Iraq.
international community continues to send a powerful message to 
aggrieved peoples throughout the world." Bruce Hoffman, Inside 
Terrorism, revised and expanded ed. (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2006), 64 and 71-79.
13 Hezballah launched its first suicide-homicide attack 11 months 
after Da'awa 17--a group that attacked Iraqi government targets, 
and most likely did so with the aid of the Pasdaran, similarly to 
Hezballah in its campaigns against Western forces.
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First, Palestinians legitimized suicide-homicide 
attacks, as "martyrdom operations," in the Sunni-Muslim 
world. The Palestinian cause has always functioned as a 
galvanizing Islamic issue particularly for Sunni-Arab 
countries. As a result, the Palestinian use of suicide 
terrorism before and during al-Aqsa intifada had a direct 
effect on the general population of the Sunni-Arab world, 
concerning how it viewed the "martyrdom operation." As 
support for martyrdom operations in Palestinian society 
increased, they accordingly found wide support across the 
Sunni-Arab world (as well as in the Islamic world in 
general). As of 2002, one analyst noted: "Martyrdom has 
replaced Palestinian independence as the main focus of the 
Arab media."14 Palestinian terror organizations effectively 
utilized the media to spread acceptance of a modus operandi 
that had previously been used in the Islamic world 
exclusively by Shi'a organizations,15 and which deployed 
14 David Brooks, "The Culture of Martyrdom: How Suicide Bombing 
Became not just a Means but an End," The Atlantic Monthly 289, 
no. 6 (June 2002) : 19.
15 Moreover, martyrdom has traditionally played a much larger role 
in Shi'a Islam than Sunni Islam. For example, Shi'a Muslims 
celebrate Ashura, which commemorates the "martyrdom" of Hussein 
at the Battle of Karbala in 860.
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suicide-homicide attackers minimally and cautiously.16 The 
Sunni world's acceptance of the Palestinian twist of 
semantics that presents suicide-homicide attacks as 
"martyrdom operations" directly opened the door for all 
other militant-Sunni organizations' imitation.
16 In the late 1980s, Hezballah began to downplay its promotion of 
martyrdom within the population in Southern Lebanon. Hezballah's 
spiritual advisor, Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah even issued a fatwa 
(Islamic degree) authorizing martyrdom operations "only on 
special occasions" due to a fear of over "exaggerated use [by] 
over-zealous youth." See Rafael Israeli, "A Manual of Islamic 
Fundamentalist Terrorism," Terrorism and Political Violence 14, 
no. 4 (24 January 2002): 30.
17 Recognized by Robert Baer in The Cult of the Suicide Bomber, 
prod, and dir. David Betty and Kevin Toolis, 1 hr. 35 min., Many 
Rivers Films, 2006.
18 Prior to Palestinian use of suicide terrorism, Hezballah and 
Amal in Lebanon and the LTTE in Sri Lanka used suicide-homicide 
attacks emphasizing military targets, with exceptions made for 
politicians.
Second, by turning suicide-homicide operations into a 
weapon of terror,17 Palestinian organizations demonstrated 
the strategic pros of attacking soft targets, as well as 
garnered Islamic legitimacy for doing so. Suicide-terror 
attacks on Israeli civilians took the modus operandi to a 
new level. Outdoing, on the "audacity" scale, the previous 
campaigns that used suicide-homicide operations, which 
specifically attacked military targets,18 Palestinian 
organizations made it overt policy to target Israeli 
civilians en masse. Due to the religious undertones of its 
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conflict with Israel, Palestinians received approval by 
Islamic authorities not only for launching "martyrdom 
operations," but also for targeting civilians.
Support for suicide terrorism from important Islamic 
authorities across the Sunni-Arab world served to solidify 
the legitimacy of such acts in the eyes of hundreds of 
millions of people. Notably, the fatwa (Islamic decree) 
issued by Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradawi, a leading Sunni 
cleric,19 supporting the use of suicide-homicide attacks on 
civilians, worked not only to buttress the Palestinians 
employment of suicide-homicide bombers against Israeli 
civilians,20 but also to somewhat close the debate within 
the greater Sunni world.21 Recently at a conference honoring 
19 Al-Qaradawi is the Head of the European Council for Fatwa and 
Research, as well as the President of the International 
Association of Muslim Scholars.
20 Referring to the importance of al-Qaradawi' s role in 
legitimizing suicide terrorism, Hamas's current leader Khaled 
Mash'al states: "[Qaradawi's] unequivocal fatwa, the sheikh, may 
Allah reward him, considered martyrdom operations to be the most 
noble level of jihad. That was unparalleled support for the 
people of Palestine, because, brothers and sisters, you cannot 
imagine how difficult it is psychologically for a young 
Palestinian man or woman to sacrifice themselves or what is most 
dear to them, only to encounter a conflict in their minds and 
hearts as to whether they are on the path of righteousness, or 
whether they are committing a religious violation." See Khaled 
Mash'al, Al-Jazeera TV on 16 July 2007, trans, in Middle East 
Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Special Dispatch Series No. 
1672 (2 August 2007): accessed at <www.memri.org>.
21 Hafez notes: "Yussuf al-Qaradawi [has] declared jihad in 
Palestine as the individual obligation of every Muslim on many
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him, al-Qaradawi recalled his role in providing Islamic
legitimacy for suicide terrorism:
I support the Palestinian cause. I support the 
resistance and the jihad. I support Hamas, the 
Islamic Jihad, and Hizbullah... I support 
martyrdom operations, and this was the straw that 
broke the camel's back... Our brothers in 
Palestine were forced to resort to martyrdom 
operations. The .divine destiny is just, and so it 
gave these brothers something the enemy lacks... 
Their enemy is bombing them from above and 
below...and all they want is [to sacrifice] their 
own lives. The Palestinian man or woman booby- 
trap themselves--they turn themselves into human 
bombs--and sacrifice themselves for the sake of 
Allah, in order to strike fear in the hearts of 
their enemies.22
occasions during his weekly program on al-Jazeera entitled al- 
Sharia wal-Haya (Islamic Law and Life). His religious rulings 
regarding "martyrdom operations" aired on December 23, 2001 in a 
show entitled al-Amaliyat al-Istishhadiyya fi Falastin (Martyrdom 
Operations in Palestine) and on May 31, 2004 in a show entitled 
al-Muslimun wal-Unf al-Siyasi (Muslims and Political Violence). 
Yussuf al-Qaradawi's blessing for suicide bombings can be found 
in interviews with the Kuwaiti-based weekly, Majallat al- 
Mujtama'a, no. 1201 [1996] and the London-based monthly, Falastin 
al-Muslima, March 2002. In the latter, he rules that it is 
permissible for women to engage in suicide bombings. His 
religious rulings and publications can be found on his web site 
www.qaradawi.net." See Mohammed M. Hafez, "Dying to Be Martyrs: 
The Symbolic Dimension of Suicide Terrorism," in Root Causes of 
Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom, ed. Ami 
Pedahzur (New York: Routledge, 2005), 77.
22 Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradhawi, Al-Jazeera TV on 16 July 2007, 
trans, in MEMRI, Special Dispatch Series No. 1672 (2 August 
2007): accessed at <www.memri.org>.
23 Hafez notes: "[in the book al-Amaliyat al-Istishhadiyya fi 
Mizan al-Fiqhi (Martyrdom Operations in Islamic Jurisprudence),
Additionally, the endorsement of suicide-homicide attacks
by countless other prestigious Islamic authorities,23 and 
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moreover the subsequent widespread acceptance of suicide­
homicide bombers as shahids, effectively precluded other 
(Sunni) . Islamic figures from offering any serious 
rebuttals. As a result, those that propel global-Islamist 
ideologies, particularly al-Qaeda, have taken note of the 
Palestinians' successes in employing suicide terrorism­
regarding both strategic and political victories, as well 
as their greater propagandistic value among Muslims. 
Consequently, al-Qaeda has sought to adapt both the 
suicide-terror tactic and istishhad strategy for its own 
goals.
Direct Links and al-Qaeda's Palestinian Aura
Contrary to popular belief, al-Qaeda's connection to 
the Palestinian cause and people is nothing new.24 After 
all, al-Qaeda's founder, Sheik Abdallah Azzam (al- 
Filastini) came from a village outside Jenin in the 
disputed territories. Al-Qaeda's pre-9/11 chief of 
Nawaf Hayel al-Takrouri] cites at least thirty-two religious 
ruling (fatwas) by Islamic scholars around the Muslim world 
supporting 'martyrdom operations' in Palestine." Hafez goes on to 
explain: "This is one of the most important books to be published 
on this subject... [because the author] cites historical and 
contemporary Islamic scholars that affirm that martyrdom is 
dependent on religious faith and [jihad] in the path of [Allah]. 
See Hafez, "Dying to Be Martyrs," 76.
24 Many terrorism analysts frequently comment on al-Qaeda's 
supposed disconnect from the Palestinian issue.
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operations, Abu Zubayda', who sits in U.S. custody at 
Guantanamo Bay for his role in the 9/11 attacks, is 
Palestinian. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi pulled most of Tawhid 
wal-Jihad's25 original lieutenants from Palestinian groups 
operating in the Levant.26 Even al-Zargawi, a Jordanian-born 
Bedouin, claimed his hamula (clan) originated from the 
Jerusalem area.27 Predating al-Qaeda's founding, the first 
known PIJ suicide-homicide bomber plot in 1986 called for 
using a bomb built by an "Afghan-Alum" mujahid.28 29On April 
30, 2003, al-Qaeda and Hamas launched a co-sponsored 
suicide-terror attack against a popular Israeli pub in Tel 
Aviv, killing three and wounding over 50. These are just a 
few examples of Palestinians involved with al-Qaeda or vice 
versa. However, the connection goes beneath the surface, 
and past the superficiality of individual members and 
network-affiliated groups. A Palestinian aura has embedded 
itself deep within the al-Qaeda ideology, organization, 
network and most importantly its burgeoning movement.
25 Meaning "Monotheism and Holy War," Tawhid wal-Jihad eventually 
transitioned into al-Qaeda in the Land of Two Rivers--also 
commonly called al-Qaeda in Iraq.
26 Alexis Debat, "Osama bin Laden's .Heir," National Interest 80 
(Summer 2005): 155-157.
27 Karmon, "Who Bombed Northern Israel? Al-Qaida and Palestine."
28 Notes from ICT seminar on "The Global Jihad," given by Reuven 
Paz, in Herzliya, Israel (21 June 2005) .
29 See Appendix A.
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Al-Qaeda intends to mimic the Palestinian experience 
with jihad, istishhad and ultimately strategic success, yet 
on a macro-global level. Al-Qaeda recognizes that making 
jihad and istishhad the crux of its strategy can set the 
foundation for realizing a durable global movement. Before 
9/11, al-Qaeda saw its main purpose as training and 
financing like-minded Islamists to wage jihad.30 Since 9/11, 
bin Laden and al-Zawahiri have simply sought to motivate as 
many as possible within the general um'ma (global Islamic 
community) to participate in terrorism, if not a "martyrdom 
operation." Al-Qaeda expert Rohan Gunaratna summarizes: 
"Bin Laden directed the attack on America's most 
outstanding landmarks to inspire and incite the wider 
Muslim community and to show the way to the other Islamist 
movements."31
30 Rohan K. Gunaratna, "The New al-Qaida: Developments in the 
Post-9/11 Evolution of al-Qaida," in Post-Modern Terrorism:
Trends, Scenarios and Future Threats, ed. Boaz Ganor (Herzliya, 
Israel: Publishing House, 200-5), 47.
31 Gunaratna, "The New al-Qaida," 43.
With its ability to strike on a spectacular scale 
greatly reduced, al-Qaeda's post-9/11■attacks have 
increasingly resembled more the modus operandi of the 
Palestinian suicide-homicide bomber than the Hezballah- 
inspired simultaneous and large-scale attack, which 
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characterized al-Qaeda's own style from August 1998 to 
early 2003.32 The July 2005 attacks in London bore 
resemblance to components of both methods, as they included 
four simultaneous suicide-homicide bomber attacks, yet 
targeted common transportation systems. In Iraq, al-Qaeda's 
campaign has almost entirely looked Palestinian in mode— 
numerous individual bombers attacking average civilians on 
a seemingly daily basis. Sometimes the influence is 
explicit. For example, on the eve of the U.S. invasion of 
Iraq, a leader of al-Qaeda's female suicide-homicide bomber 
squads stated:
32 One should not downplay the influence Hezballah has had on al- 
Qaeda' s style in simultaneously attacking multiple symbolic 
targets. The primary contention here is that Palestinian shahids 
paved the way for Sunni groups to target civilians using suicide­
homicide attackers. Al-Qaeda's current reduced capability, 
however, has led it to look closer at the Palestinian model on a 
tactical/operational level.
33 "Um Osama" quoted in "Bin Laden Has Set Up Female Suicide 
Squads: Report," Arab News (Dubai), 13 March 2003, cited in Mia 
Bloom, "Female Suicide Bombers: A Global Trend," Deedalus (Winter 
2007): 99.
We are preparing for the new strike announced by 
our leaders, and I declare that it will make 
America forget...the September 11 attacks. The 
idea came from the success of martyr operations 
carried out by young Palestinian women in the 
occupied territories.33
The shift in method, however, goes to the top. Bin 
Laden has sought to strategically redirect tactical
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approach and return to al-Qaeda's rhetorical roots. In May ■
2008, bin Laden released a tape stating:
To Western nations... this speech is to understand 
the core reason of the war between our 
civilization and your civilians. I mean the 
Palestinian cause...[which] is the major issue 
for my (Islamic) nation. It was an important 
element in fueling me from the beginning and the 
19 [9/11 hijackers] with a great motive to fight 
for those subjected to injustice and the 
oppressed [emphasis added].34
34 "Usama bin Laden: Al Qaeda Will Continue Holy War Until 
Liberation of Palestine," Associated Press, 16 May 2008.
35 Quoted in Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002), 147, cited in 
Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 3.
3S Lee Keath, "Bin Laden Wants 'Caravan' of Martyrs," Associated 
Press, 11 September 2007.
Bin Laden's statement demonstrates a refocusing of al-
Qaeda's attention; moreover, it echoes the distant words of
Abdallah Azzam, who once stated:
Our presence in Afghanistan today, which is the 
accomplishment of the imperative of jihad and our 
devotion to the struggle, does not mean that we 
have forgotten Palestine. Palestine is our 
beating heart, it comes even before Afghanistan 
in our minds, our hearts, our feelings and our 
faith.35
Marking the sixth.anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, bin
Laden called on righteous Muslims to participate in the
"caravan" of martyrs.36 Playing off Azzam's pamphlet, Join
the Caravan, which called on Muslims to join the .
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Mujahedin's jihad in Afghanistan, bin Laden's call 
demonstrates al-Qaeda's commitment to a new istishhad-based 
strategy, replacing Azzam's Jihad-based strategy. In 
effect, al-Qaeda has shifted focus from the mujahid to the 
shahid. Reminiscent of the Palestinian movement's own shift 
away from the feda'i to the shahid, al-Qaeda intends to 
duplicate a major play from the Palestinian playbook. It 
seeks to empower the individual.37
37 The mujahid and the feda'i both represent Islamic fighters who 
do not actively seek to die during jihad; the shahid does. 
Additionally, the mujahid and feda'i represent more of a 
participation in a group, whereas the shahid stands for any 
individual willing to answer Islam's call to jihad.
38 Schweitzer and Goldstein Ferber, 11 and 40.
The "Occupation" of Dar al-Islam, 
Defensive Jihad and Fard Ayn
Today, al-Qaeda's ideology and strategy revolve around 
the individual.38 Since its founding, al-Qaeda has presented 
jihad through the ideological tenet of fard ayn (individual 
obligation). Lacking a real-world method that truly lived 
up to its abstract ideation, deliberate "martyrdom," as 
expressed through a suicide-homicide attack, offers such an 
outlet to express the undeniable fulfillment of one's 
individual obligation to an Islamic calling to jihad. As 
researchers Yoram Schweitzer and Sari Goldstein Ferber 
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note, "[t]he concept of sacrificing one's life in the name' 
of Allah (istishhad)' became a. supreme organizational ideal 
within al-Qaeda and then spread to its operatives and 
affiliates in what might be described as a self­
reproducing, self-disseminating virus."39 Remote and mostly 
disconnected from the wide variety of affiliated 
organizations within its global "network of networks,"40 al- 
Qaeda maintains a small core leadership hierarchy. 
Furthermore, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, most likely camped 
out in the tribally administered areas of North West 
Pakistan, do not intend on overseeing their war with the 
West and the secular leaders of the Islamic world to its 
finish. Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri understand that they lead 
a war of patience, resolve and ultimately one that pits the 
will of the individual Muslim against that of various 
nation-states and the world's remaining superpower.
39 Schweitzer and Goldstein Ferber,, 9.
40 CIA's Counter-Terrorism Center coined this term in the late 
1990s. Gunaratna, "The New al-Qaida," 48.
In order for individuals to receive social support for 
waging jihad, it requires establishing the necessary 
interpretation of Islam. Al-Qaeda has thus promoted the 
stance that its war with the West represents a defensive 
jihad, which makes participation in it, whether physically 
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or financially, a fard ayn of each and every Muslim. Going 
back to the teachings of al-Qaeda's founder, Abdallah 
Azzam, fard ayn has played a central role in al-Qaeda's 
temperament concerning "occupied" Islamic lands; Azzam 
argued,
...jihad will remain an individual obligation 
until all other lands which formerly were Muslim 
come back to us and Islam reigns within them once 
again. Before us lie Palestine, Bukhara, Lebanon, 
Chad, Eritrea, Somalia, the Philippines, Burma, 
South Yemen, Tashkent, Andalusia.
Localized social reinforcement of these interpretations has 
therefore become paramount to al-Qaeda effectively 
executing its global strategy.
Like al-Qaeda, the Islamist-Palestinian organizations 
view jihad as fard aynA1 While Azzam and before him Muslim 
Brotherhood-ideologue Sayyid Qutb articulated the notion of 
fard ayn, Hamas and PIJ more than others put the doctrine 
into practice beginning in 1993 and reaching its 
quintessence during al-Aqsa intifada. Serving as an example 
of an individual's obligation to free the land of dar al- 
Islam—further even, to one's ultimate sacrifice for the
41 Mohammed M. Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of 
Palestinian Suicide Bombers (Washington D.C.: United States 
Institute for Peace Press, 2006), 36.
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cause—Palestinian shahids/suicide-homicide bombers opened 
the floor to al-Qaeda's own shahids.
Indeed, al-Qaeda did not begin employing suicide­
homicide operations until its August 1998 attacks on the 
U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Al-Qaeda's first 
operations inside the U.S., the assassination of popular 
Rabbi and former-Israeli Knesset member Meir Kahane in 
November 1990 and the first attempt to destroy the World 
Trade Center in February 1993, did not involve suicide 
terrorists. During the 1990s, al-Qaeda's modes of operation 
remained in their formative state.
The Palestinian introduction of the shahid as a 
suicide-homicide bomber to the Sunni world during the mid- 
1990s surely had an impact on al-Qaeda' s decision to start 
using them in 1998. After all, at this time, most of al- 
Qaeda' s top leadership had been in the jihad business 
either before or since the Afghan-Soviet war, yet suicide­
homicide attacks did not occur during that conflict, or 
directly after it when al-Qaeda first began operating as an 
international-terror organization. Al-Qaeda designed its 
attacks in the late 1990s and early 2000s to shock, yet 
they did not occur relentlessly.
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Uniting organizational strategy with the motivations
of individuals requires coordinating social forces and ■ 
securing cultural accommodation. To launch suicide-terror 
attacks on a large scale, massive interaction with the 
related constituency has to exist. Scholar Ami Pedahzur 
contends:
In cultural terms, suicide terrorism can thus be 
described as a result of a spiraling feedback 
process between an organization and its 
constituency. In order to sustain a suicide 
campaign, every terrorist organization needs the 
support of the community. Raising such support 
depends upon the organization's success in 
instilling ideas among members of the society 
about the importance of martyrdom and glorifying 
these notions by religious, nationalistic or4 2 other means.
Palestinian suicide-terror campaigns against Israel
received international Sunni support for targeting Israeli 
civilians. Thus al-Qaeda in its macro-scale suicide-terror 
war had to gain the same type of support for targeting a 
broader defined enemy.
Al-Qaeda's Adaptation of the
Culture of Martyrdom
A related culture of martyrdom rests as the sole
variable that distinguishes organizations, which employ
42 Ami Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism (Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 
2005), 163.
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suicide-homicide attacks from those that do not.43 
Furthermore, the social sustenance a suicide-terror 
campaign receives from an affiliated culture of martyrdom 
stands as a general testament to the support a constituency 
gives to its representative body. The symbiosis between 
organizations and individuals ultimately is communicated 
through cultural symbols and by the social accommodation in 
motivating and sanctioning behavior. Palestinian Media 
Watch director Itamar Marcus identifies three components 
imperative to motivating suicide terrorism: create an 
enemy,-legitimate killing the enemy, and motivate a 
willingness to die while killing the enemy.44 Concurringly, 
researcher Assaf Moghadam recognizes, "two sets of motives 
[must] converge...a willingness to kill...[and] a 
willingness to die."45 The Palestinian culture of martyrdom 
perpetuates and ensures the function of these three 
components. First, the culture of martyrdom alters the 
defined 'other' to represent an explicit 'enemy.' Second, 
43 Assaf Moghadam, "The Roots of Suicide Terrorism-: A Multi-Causal 
Approach," in Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization 
of Martyrdom, ed. Ami Pedahzur (New York: Routledge, 2005), 98.
44 Notes from ICT seminar on "Modern and Post-Modern Terrorism 
Strategies," given by Boaz Ganor and Itamar Marcus, in Herzliya, 
Israel (9 June 2005).
45 Assaf Moghadam, "Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second 
Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects," Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 26, no. 2 (March 2003): 68-69.
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the culture of martyrdom legitimizes the killing of this 
enemy by framing its intentions as specifically threatening 
to the Palestinian collective identity and generally 
sinister in its dealings with the world. Third, the culture 
of martyrdom motivates and sanctions the willingness of 
individuals to die in the process of killing the sinister 
enemy.
Installed in various mosques and Islamic centers in 
urban areas of European cities, within underground 
political organizations in Middle Eastern capitals, and 
infested in South Asian madrassas alike, Islamic fanatics 
have decentralized the culture of martyrdom, just as al- 
Qaeda has done to its organizational structure. In contrast 
to the original Palestinian version, al-Qaeda's 
international jihadi-Salafi culture of martyrdom is less 
overt. Rather it operates in the shadows of Western and 
Islamic societies, and flourishes more as a satellite 
culture of martyrdom and virtual culture of martyrdom, 
wherein adherents can turn on an Arabic-language news 
outlet or enter an online Islamist chat-room to get a dose 
of an Islamist'worldview. Indeed, global communications and 
media have redrawn the boundaries of cultural enclaves. No 
longer are cultures society-specific, but instead
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oftentimes function as transnational forces in their own
right.
Framing Conflict
As noted above, motivating a willingness to die while
killing first entails defining the enemy and explaining why 
those who comprise it need to die. Thus, while political 
value provided by suicide-homicide attacks ultimately works 
as the greatest catalyst to organizations' continued use of 
the modus operandi, motivating individuals to carry out 
such operations requires continuous framing of "social 
ills." Commenting on the required preparation for launching 
effective campaigns, Hafez notes:
Mobilizing collective action consists of more 
than calling on people to rise up or take to the 
streets; it involves framing social ills as 
threats and opportunities for action, networking 
among activists and their constituencies, 
building formal and informal organizations, 
forging collective identities and alliances, 
making claims against opponents and states, and 
motivating individuals to assume personal costs 
when the benefits of success are not readily
4 6apparent.
In this regard, connecting the individual to the collective
identity marks step one. Step two entails converging the
individual obligation to fixing the social ills.
45 Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq, 16.
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Most Islamist denominations commonly frame the world 
as though it teeters on the brink of an apocalyptic
I
struggle 'between the forces of Islam and a sinister
I
I"Zionist-Crusader" alliance. Al-Qaeda's rhetoric has shaped 
up no differently, often warning that Muslims must defend 
their religion against Zionist-Crusader aggression. In 
1998, the World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and 
Crusaders, an umbrella network headed by al-Qaeda, stated:
1 The ruling to kill the Americans and their
; allies—civilians and military—is an obligation 
incumbent upon every Muslim who can do it and in 
any country--this until the Aqsa Mosque [in
, Jerusalem] and Holy Mosque [in Mecca] are
: liberated from their grip, and until their armies
1 withdraw from all the lands of Islam, defeated,
i shattered, and unable to threaten any Muslim.
This is in accordance with the Word of the Most
1 High—"fight the pagans all together as they 
fight you all together" [Qur'an 9:36]
1 and..."Fight them until there is no more tumult
1 or oppression, and [all] religion belongs to
1 Allah [Qur'an 8: 39].47
47 The World Islamic Front's Declaration to Wage Jihad against the 
Jews and Crusaders in Raymond Ibrahim, ed. and trans., The Al- 
Qaeda Reader (New York: Broadway Books, 2007), 13.
Such statements from al-Qaeda's leadership, commonplace 
since 9/11, clearly articulate who their enemy is, why theyI
are an enemy, when victory against this enemy will be
Iapparent, and a divine obligation for all Muslims to
i
participate in bringing about victory. Simply, al-Qaeda 
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seeks to energize as many individual Muslims as possible to 
fight the Christian, Jewish and other non-Muslim peoples 
that "threaten" Islam. Regarding the "occupation" of dar 
al-Islam, Israel, the U.S., Spain, Russia, India, Christian 
Lebanon, the Philippines and other non-Muslim nation-states 
controlling "Muslim land" become the obvious targets. At 
the forefront, however, sit the U.S. and Israel. Al-Qaeda 
suggests that the U.'S. designs its foreign policy to "serve 
the Jews' petty state, [and divert] attention from its 
occupation of Jerusalem and the murder of Muslims there."48 
Islamists have elevated the supposed Jewish threat to a 
more severe status. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
coupled with various Qur'an suras and Hadith sayings that 
promote anti-Jewish beliefs,49 has allowed Islamists to 
frame all of the Islamic world's problems within the 
In Ibrahim, 12.
49 For example, one Hadith saying quotes Mohammed: "The last hour 
would not come unless the Muslims will fight against the Jews and 
the Muslims would kill them and until the Jews would hide 
themselves behind a stone or a tree and a stone or tree would 
say: Muslim, [oh] the servant of Allah, there is a Jew behind me; 
come and kill him." In Ram Swarup, Understanding the Hadith: The 
Sacred Traditions of Islam (New York: Prometheus Books, 2002), 
215. See also Qur'an 5:64 on page 202.
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context of a Jewish "conspiracy," in which the U.S.
maintains a key supportive position.50
50 In December 1998, bin Laden argued: "The Jews have succeeded in 
obligating American and British Christians to strike Iraq...all 
the biggest [U.S] officials are Jews--have led the Christians to 
clip the wings of the Islamic world." See in Ibrahim, 276. On 
October 18, 2003, bin Laden released a tape to al-Jazeera that 
stated: "[Bush] is carrying out the demands of the Zionist lobby 
that helped him into the White House--that is, annihilate the 
military might of Iraq because it is too close to the Jews in 
occupied Palestine... he is [also] concealing his own ambitions 
and the ambitions of the Zionist lobby in their desire for oil." 
In Ibrahim, 211.
Islamist entities like al-Qaeda understand the
important part the "other" plays in solidifying a 
collective identity--in this case, an Islamic identity as 
represented by the urn'ma. Judaism, one of Islam's earliest 
foes, additionally fills this role today for Islamists. In
March 2003, bin Laden warned to his fellow Muslims:
One of the most important objectives of the new 
Crusader attack is to pave the way and prepare 
the region, after its fragmentation, for the 
establishment of...the Greater State of Israel, 
whose border will include extensive areas of Iraq 
and Egypt, through Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, all of 
Palestine, and large parts of the Land of the Two 
Holy Places... What is happening to our people in 
Palestine is merely a model that the Zionist- 
American alliance wishes to impose upon the rest 
of the region: the killing of men, women and 
children... People [there] live in perpetual fear 
and paralyzing terror, awaiting death at any 
moment from a missile or shell that will destroy 
their homed, kill their sisters, and bury their 
babies alive...The founding of "Greater Israel" 
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means the surrender of the countries of the 
region to the Jews...51 52
In Ibrahim, 276-277.
52 Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradhawi, Qatar TV on 25 February 2006, 
trans, in MEMRI, Special Dispatch Series No. 1102 (28 February 
2006): accessed at <www.memri.org>.
53 Reuven Paz, "The Islamic Legitimacy of Palestinian Suicide 
Terrorism," in Countering Suicide Terrorism, updated ed., ed. 
Boaz Ganor (Herzliya, Israel: ICT, 2007), 61-62.
Again, Sheikh Qaradawi has lent his authority to confirming
the Islamist viewpoint; on the conflict with Judaism, he 
argues:
We do not disassociate Islam with war...We are 
fighting in the name of Islam... They fight us 
with Judaism, so we should fight them with Islam. 
They fight us with the Torah, so we should fight 
them with the Koran. If they say "the Temple," we 
should say "[the] Aqsa Mosque." If they say: "We 
glorify the Sabbath," we should say: "We glorify 
the Friday." This is how it should be. Religion 
must lead the war. This is the only way we can
Referring to Islamic suicide terrorism, expert on Islamist
movements Reuven Paz contends that
The perception of the struggle between Islam and 
Judaism is actually the main justification for 
the general use of terrorism, and particularly 
for suicide bombing... The core perception of the 
Islamist Arab groups is that they face a global 
conspiracy against the Islamic world... [A]fter 
the establishment of Israel and the renaissance 
of the Islamist groups since the [1960s] and 
[1970s] this conspiracy came to be viewed as a 
constant and perhaps eternal struggle between 
Judaism and Islam.53
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Giving credence to his conspiratorial rants among his
Muslim audience, bin Laden employs Qur'an suras to buttress
his evidence against Judaism. For example, he states:
The Jews have lied about the Creator, and even 
more so about His creations. The Jews are 
murderers of the prophets, the violators of 
agreements... These are the Jews: usurers and 
whoremongers...Allah said of them: "Have they a 
share in [Allah's] dominion? If they have, they 
will not give up so much [of it] as would equal a 
spot on the stone of a date" [Qur'an 4:53].54
54 Usama bin Laden, "Sermon for the Feast of the Sacrifice," Al­
jazeera TV on 16 February 2003, trans, in MEMRI, Special Dispatch 
Series No. 476 (6 March 2003): accessed at <www.memri.org>. I 
would like to thank Dr. Richard Saccone for identifying this sura 
as Qur'an 4:53.
By designating an incorrigible enemy, whom even Allah
condemns, and consistently articulating this enemy's 
sinister goals, al-Qaeda intends to create a sense of dire 
urgency among Muslims to defend Islam, so that they 
seriously contemplate the prospects of participating in 
jihad, if not pursuing istishhad.
Like its role in the operational advancement and
legitimization of suicide terrorism, Palestinian
organizations and society have helped to construct the 
commonly accepted anti-Jewish narrative that currently 
exists in the Islamic world. For example, Hamas touts the 
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traditional anti-Semitic line in its 1988 Charter, stating 
that
[The Jews] stood behind the French Revolution, 
the Communist Revolution, and most the 
revolutions we have heard and hear about, here 
and there... [I]t has become common knowledge 
that [they caused] World War I...[and] World War 
II... [They also] inspired the formation of the 
United Nations and the Security Council instead 
of the League of Nations, in order to rule the 
world through them. No war broke out anywhere 
without [Jews'] fingerprints on it.55
55 Hamas charter in Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian 
Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2000), 189-190.
56 Hamas charter in Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, 190.
57 Hamas charter in Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, 188.
Predating al-Qaeda's similar practice by a decade, Hamas 
goes on to quote the Qur'an, citing sura 5:64: "So often as 
they shall kindle a fire for war, Allah shall extinguish 
it; and they shall set their minds to act corruptly in the 
earth, but Allah loveth not the corrupt doers."56 To connect 
the Quranic passages to present-day, Hamas makes statements 
such as: "The Nazism of the Jews includes [even] women and 
children; it terrorizes everyone. These Jews ruin people's 
livelihoods, steal their money, and their honor."57 Hamas, 
like al-Qaeda seeks to arouse a sense of duty among average 
Muslims. Hamas declares: "jihad [in Palestine is] an 
individual obligation for every Muslim. In the 
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confrontation with the usurpation of Palestine by the Jews, 
we must raise the banner of Jihad."58 With the massive media 
exposure that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict receives 
across the Islamic world, Hamas and Fatah's beliefs and 
rhetoric commonly get dispersed along with breaking news. 
Their views of Israel, Jews and Zionism accordingly reach 
countless households across the Arab and Islamic worlds.
58 Hamas charter in Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, 184- 
185.
Establishing a nexus between the potential jihadi and 
the 'larger than life' struggle of the um'ma provides an 
opportune way to increase the amount of new jihadis— 
particularly within communities already disaffected by one 
of the defined enemies of Islam. Furthermore, contrasting 
Western society with, an idealized Islamic one, gives those 
Muslims, who might find the West disillusioning, immoral or 
corrupt, an additional impetus for participating in 
something that aims at "correcting" these ills. However, 
Israel's "occupation" of al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, the 
third holiest site in Islam, and the U.S. "occupation" of 
the Holy Mosque in Mecca, the holiest site in Islam, stand 
as the two most prominent Islamist grievances that arouse 
interest and motivation among nascent jihadis. Without 
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surprise, an overwhelming majority of al-Qaeda's attacks 
have targeted either U.S. or Jewish/Israeli interests.59 
Ultimately, al-Qaeda has learned, from Islamist 
Palestinians, how to shape its arguments to best direct the 
individual to the decision that one must personally defend 
Islam at all costs—even if it means paying the price with 
his or her own life.
59 While many acknowledge the U.S. as a primary target of al-Qaeda 
attacks, many analysts fail to recognize that al-Qaeda has 
consistently targeted Jewish targets around the world (its 
attacks in e.g. Tunisia, Turkey, Morocco, Kenya, etc.).
Social Networks
In both the Palestinian and jihadi-Salafi cases,
social networks have played increasingly prominent roles in 
facilitating suicide terrorism, largely because they 
provide a social space for immersing individuals in the 
concepts of jihad and istishhad. For Palestinians, the 
culture of martyrdom has influenced general society to the 
point that organizations, since the late 1990s, no longer 
seek potential shahids but instead select them from a long 
line of willing and eager candidates. Pedahzur notes: 
"[today,] suicide bombers are not recruited, nor do they 
undergo a training process. They are peripheral figures in 
the network who join the ranks ad hoc from the environment 
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close to the network, for the purpose of carrying out a 
suicide attack."60 Similarly, al-Qaeda shahids are usually 
not recruited per se. Rather, a future shahid joins a 
social network,61 which provides space that immerses the 
individual in the jihadi lifestyle—where one learns its 
beliefs, values, attitudes, goals, rhetoric, argumentation 
and puts him or her in contact with a dispatcher. Initially 
lured in by identity-based religious, political and social 
issues, the individual over time62 accepts the ideological 
framing, solutions and prescriptions of those around him or 
her. Eventually, if needed, the individual volunteers for a 
martyrdom operation. The culture of martyrdom, often within 
the confines of a social network/ succeeds in awakening the 
individual's duty to take matters into his or her own 
hands.
60 See Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, "The Changing Nature of 
Suicide Attacks: A Social Network Perspective," Social Forces 84, 
no. 4 (June 2006): 2000.
61 Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 121-124.
62 One should note, in the Palestinian case social networks are 
usually based around the hamula (clan).
The Palestinian Legacy Today: Suicide 
Terrorism as a Global Phenomenon
Following the onslaught of al-Aqsa intifada in
September 2000 and the 9/11 attacks a year later, suicide
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attacks have dramatically increased. Palestinians launched 
more suicide-terror attacks than any other movement63 until 
al-Qaeda in Iraq surpassed them in late 2005. Today, 
organizations affiliated with al-Qaeda's global jihad. 
continue to comprise the majority of those launching such 
attacks. While many credit al-Qaeda's 9/11 attacks with 
inspiring these affiliated organizations to continue bin 
Laden's war after the U.S. began its campaign against the. 
core Afghan/Pakistan-based al-Qaeda organization,64 many 
fail to recognize the role Palestinians played in 
highlighting the shahid/suicide-homicide bomber's various 
utilities.
63 See Appendix A; and Intelligence and Terrorism Information 
Center, Anti-Israeli Terrorism, 2006: Data, Analysis and Trends 
(March 2007): 51-55; accessed at <www.terrorism-info.org.il>; see 
also Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 327, note 33; Hafez, Suicide 
Bombers in Iraq, 3.
54 Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 116.
Without the precedents set by Palestinians, al-Qaeda's 
global istishhad-based. jihad would have required much more 
preparation. Palestinian organizations perfected the 
process of deploying suicide-homicide bombers, as they went 
from recruiting to selecting shahid candidates within a 
decade. Palestinian organizations convinced not only 
Palestinian society, but also large portions of the greater 
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Sunni world, that suicide-homicide attackers truly embody 
"martyrs" and thus suicide-homicide attacks are really 
"martyrdom operations." Similarly, Palestinians garnered 
international support from prestigious Islamic 
authorities—ultimately, leading to the Sunni 
legitimization of suicide-homicide attacks against 
civilians, i.e. suicide terrorism. Furthermore, by 
demonizing Israelis and Jews, Palestinian society helped 
foster conspiracy theories, and other forms of conflict 
framing, that encouraged Muslims' violent response.
In formulating a unique modus operandi, al-Qaeda 
synthesized Hezballah's symbolic and simultaneous targeting 
with the Palestinians'. mass targeting of civilians. 
However, one finds it highly unlikely that Hezballah has 
functioned as the primary organizational inspiration for 
Sunni suicide terrorists, considering the great disdain 
such individuals regularly have for Shi'a Islam-- 
particularly the followers of al-Qaeda's movement in Iraq. 
Characterized by suicide-homicide bombers attacking 
Israeli-civilian buses, cafes, malls and other pedestrian 
targets, the Palestinian shahid became a premier icon in 
the Sunni world. The Palestinian shahid, ingrained in the 
mind of anyone who viewed Arabic-language satellite 
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television, particularly during al-Aqsa intifada (2000- 
2005), surely offered an important inspiration on its own. 
Additionally, the 9/11 attacks, which did not involve 
suicide-homicide bombers, but rather suicidal hijackers and 
suicide-terror pilots,65 exemplify the grandiose-jihadi 
terror attack. But, for the smaller, localized groups that 
carried out most of al-Qaeda's post-9/11 operations, the 
Palestinian shahid offered a more tenable model.
55 One could argue that only the pilots committed suicide during 
the 9/11 attacks.
Ultimately, the Palestinian suicide-homicide bomber, 
as the icon of al-Aqsa intifada, symbolized the Palestinian 
cause and people, and in doing so produced a micro-scale 
prototype for terrorist organizations such as those within 
al-Qaeda's international network. Thus, the triumph of 
Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers has had anything but 
an isolated effect. Terrorism, and particularly suicide­
homicide attacks, stand as continuous learning processes 
for the global-terror community. Accordingly, since the 
early Palestinian suicide-terror campaigns in the mid- 
1990s, popular Islamic concepts of martyrdom and jihadi 
suicide terrorism have maintained a continuous escalation 
toward a marriage of the synonymous. Already, al-Qaeda has 
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adopted the socio-cultural and religious lessons put into 
practice by Palestinians (e.g. fard ayn, conflict framing, 
etc.) and merged them with bin Laden's universal message, 
which has rapidly disseminated across the um'ma via 
satellite television, the internet and other means of 
contemporary mass communication. Al-Qaeda's shift in focus 
from jihad to istishhad represents a Palestinianization of 
the international jihadi-Salafi movement. Moreover, it 
signals that the advancements in suicide terrorism made by 
the Palestinian shahid/suicide-homicide bomber and its 
complementary culture of martyrdom will likely continue to 
inspire and foment imitation and therefore remain having 
reverberating effects for years to come.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION: SUICIDE TERRORISM AS
A FIXTURE OF THE 21st CENTURY?
Through its reemergence as a significant force in the 
Islamic world, political Islam returned various concepts to 
the forefront of social discourse and practice, including 
violent ones like jihad, fard ayn and istishhad. These 
notions have notably produced violent phenomena such as 
suicide-homicide bombings, suicidal hijackings and 
beheadings. While Shi'a-Muslims initially developed the 
suicide-homicide modus operandi, and some nominally secular 
organizations have employed such attacks,1 2nearly forty 
Sunni-Muslim organizations have used suicide-homicide
1 The Shi'a Muslim employers of suicide-homicide attacks include 
Iranian soldiers, the Iraqi Da'awa 17 and Hezballah and Amal in 
Lebanon. The "secular" employers of suicide-homicide attacks 
include the Syrian Socialist-National Party, Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam, Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), Fatah, Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine; one should note, however, all of these 
organizations have employed some kind of religious or cultic 
symbolism in attracting individuals to carry out attacks. Fatah 
and PFLP even set up new Islamist "brigades," to launch suicide­
homicide attacks on their behalves.
2 For a comprehensive list of suicide-homicide attacks worldwide 
from December 1981 to June 2005, see Ami Pedahzur, Suicide 
Terrorism (Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 2005), 241-253.
2 attacks since the Palestinians started doing so in 1993. 
Moreover, following the precedents set by Palestinian 
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organizations, Sunni- militants and terrorists today carry 
out the overwhelming majority of suicide-homicide attacks 
in an increasing number of locations and with a decreasing 
level of targeting discrimination. That suicide-homicide 
attacks originated with Shi'a Muslims and currently the 
Shi'a in Iraq have not resorted to suicide terrorism 
further demonstrates that the modus operand! has nearly 
become an exclusively Sunni phenomenon.
Indeed, without' Sunni organizations, suicide terrorism 
would probably arouse minimal international concern. The 
Palestinians' al-Aqsa intifada would not have had the 
impact that it did; the wall separating Israel from the 
disputed territories surely would not stand, and Hamas 
would not enjoy the popular support that it currently does 
among Palestinians and other Arabs and Muslims. Al-Qaeda's 
embassy, USS Cole and 9/11 attacks would not have happened 
in the manner that they did, if at all. Iraq's 
reconstruction would not face the severe challenges that it 
does, as Sunni suicide-terror attacks (e.g. Golden-Dome 
Mosque attack and Ashura festival attack) have led to major 
sectarian clashes. The United Kingdom (UK) would not have 
faced the horror of British citizens killing themselves in 
order to murder fellows Britons. Seemingly endless, one 
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could go on with scores of examples, as Sunni organizations 
have launched numerous attacks in Indonesia, Russia, Egypt, 
Jordan, Turkey, Morocco, Spain,. Tunisia, India, Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Philippines, Singapore, Croatia 
and elsewhere. Disregarding the work of Sunni organizations 
over the last 15 years, suicide-homicide attacks have 
struck only in Lebanon, Kuwait, Sri Lanka, India, Argentina 
and on the battlefields of the Iran-Iraq War.3 With an 
international-Sunni culture of martyrdom shadowing the 
dispersal of suicide terrorism across the globe, a high 
likelihood exists that the modus operandi will continue to 
play a part in Islamist behavior in the foreseeable future. 
The Palestinian shahid's suicide terror 'MO' has made its 
mark, and al-Qaeda intends to duplicate it across the 
globe. Countering suicide terrorism therefore will require 
well thought-out strategies that employ a collection of 
responses that correspond to the varying facilitators and 
perpetrators of the modus operandi.
3 One can add Turkey to the list if one counts the PKK as 
secular, despite its solely Sunni membership.
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The Three Pillars of Suicide Terrorism: 
Individuals'Ends as Organizations' 
Means to Collective Goals
Recently on February 4, 2008, two Palestinian suicide­
homicide bombers launched an attack on a small shopping 
center in Dimona, Israel, killing a woman and wounding 40. 
A day later, al-Hayat al-Jadida (The New Life), the 
official newspaper of Palestinian Authority (PA) praised 
the terrorists, stating: "The perpetrators of the operation 
died as shahids." The two other newspapers under PA control 
similarly hailed the suicide terrorists as shahids, 
publicly bestowing upon them Islam's highest honor.4 
Considering that proponents of "peace" regularly deem PA 
President Mahmoud Abbas and his Fatah party the "moderates" 
within the Palestinian political arena, one should not 
expect popular Palestinan support for suicide terrorism to 
decrease anytime in the near future. Accordingly, Israel, 
like the United States (U.S.) in its fight against global 
jihadis, ought not patiently wait on "moderates" to correct 
the ills of "extremists," particularly when the two are 
oftentimes indistinguishable.
4 Yadid Berman, "PA Glorifies Dimona Terrorists," Jerusalem Post, 
6 February 2008.
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Nations-states targeted by suicide terrorism must work 
proactively to disable the utility of such attacks. Israel 
has sought to geographically disconnect itself from 
potential threats, yet it has done so at the cost of 
territory and principle,’ which in the long-run could have 
unimaginable consequences. Rather, Israel's "pre-separation 
Wall" counter-terrorism strategy represents a more 
strategically geared response to suicide terrorism: 
targeted assassinations of organizational leaders, 
dispatchers and bombmakers, demolition of the homes of 
suicide-terror perpetrators, and measures aimed at 
hindering collective support for terrorism in general and 
shahids/suicide-homicide bombers in particular.
Regarding the suicide-terror phenomenon, organizations 
function as the serial killer, individuals act as the 
killing instrument, and the sanctioning society/collective 
as the little voice that sounds off in both of their 
heads—encouraging them to go through with their murderous 
intentions. The shahid stands as a product of Palestinian 
collective identity/society, organizations/social networks, 
and individuals all which seek at various levels to pursue 
the goals of Palestinian sammud--namely, the destruction of 
the state of Israel via the return of "refugees" and the
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"liberation" of the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa Mosque. 
Similarly, international jihadis work under leadership and 
with the support of a transnational community. Not unlike 
Palestinian fanatics, international jihadis desire a 
complete retreat of infidel-states that "occupy" dar al- 
Islam. They too refuse to moderate their goals even 
slightly, instead choosing to "resist." Palestinian 
shahids, in a sense, do their "death work" as performance 
artists in the presentation of sammud. Al-Qaeda-affiliated 
shahids do theirs in a macro-version of the same signaling 
game--pursuing political extortion via a war of attrition.
Employing suicide terrorism entails three imperative 
components: organizational strategic necessity, motivated 
individuals and a complementary culture of martyrdom. These 
multiple forces behind suicide,terrorism accordingly 
necessitate distinct responses. Disabling the three pillars 
of suicide terror, both at the localized an international 
levels, thus requires deterring the collective, preempting 





When dealing with terrorist organizations, negotiation 
never represents a forward-looking counterstrategy. Caving 
to terrorists' demands only "invites more attacks."5 
Furthermore, negotiating with organizations that once 
employed, but no longer use or advocate, terror tactics 
similarly sends a message that terrorism can one day 
provide profitable gains for those who use it. Negotiation 
therefore cannot exist with organizations that either 
currently, previously or prospectively might use terror 
tactics to advance their strategy. Rather, nation-states 
afflicted by terror tactics need a proactive preemption 
policy that promises to either capture or kill terror 
leaders prior to or directly after a terror attack. Hafez 
notes:
5 Mohammed M. Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of 
Palestinian Suicide Bombers (Washington D.C.: United States 
Institute for Peace Press, 2006), 70.
Given that suicide bombings are a strategic 
choice by militant organizations aiming to coerce 
opponents into making concessions, it would be a 
mistake to grant major political concessions 
during a campaign of suicide attacks. Such 
compromise confirms the viability of this 
strategy.... Only after Israel refused to make 
major concessions and escalated its 
counterinsurgency against the militants did
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Palestinian factions begin talking about a cease­
fire.6
6 Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs, 70.
But, even if a nation-state seeks a "cease-fire," any truce 
should not mark recognition or the initiation of 
normalization. Nation-states that recognize organizations 
that have once employed terrorism will do so only to their 
detriment, as well as to the disservice of other states in 
similar positions.
Countering Pillar Two: 
Deterring Collective- Support for Suicide Terrorism
As demonstrated by the Palestinians, terror 
organizations often work as the voice of a people. 
Accordingly, terror organizations rely on the support of 
the population in order to function. Thus, if the costs put 
on the sanctioning society/collective reach a high enough 
point to remove support for organizations that use suicide­
terror attacks, then it will force organizations to 
recalculate the value of launching such operations. Because 
organizations rely on domestic support, counter-terrorism 
strategists need to direct deterrence policy against the 
accommodating population rather than the specific terror 
organization, whose members should be marked for 
termination or capture anyhow. In Maoian terms, the goal
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here is to make the "sea" an unwelcome environment for the 
"fish," while counter-terrorists simultaneously fish for 
the fish.
A collective punishment policy does not have to 
suffocate a population, but it surely needs to send a 
message, as well as work toward a functional goal. In the 
disputed territories for example, Israel usually increases 
security at times of heightened alert or during an ongoing 
suicide-homicide bombing campaign; this commonly results in 
added roadblocks and checkpoints that slow the daily 
functions of Palestinian society. A more severe punishment, 
and pointed message, might include measures like the 
cutting off of power or wide scale searches—both of which 
a nation-state can pointedly execute in problematic areas— 
implementing a targeted collective punishment. A disclaimer 
of exactly why the society has to pay the costs of an 
organization's actions, however, must accompany any 
collective punishment, so as to prevent the loss of its 
message.
Nevertheless, many nation-states' security 
circumstances do not mirror those of Israel, which has 
brought suicide terrorism to near cessation by physically 
separating itself from the population deploying suicide­
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homicide bombers. Indeed, as demonstrated by the UK's 7/7 
and 7721 bombers, sometimes a nation-state's suicidal enemy 
comes from its own citizenry. Various attacks in Jordan, 
Spain, Turkey, North' Africa and elsewhere demonstrate 
similar instances. In such cases, nation-states should make 
a concerted effort with local communities to expose exactly 
who and what social-networking institutions may or may not 
have accommodated specific individuals in not only 
launching terror attacks but also supporting them. For 
example, accommodating behavior includes the glorification 
of suicide terrorists as "shahids" or heroes, and nation­
states should afford individuals and institutions that 
participate in such behavior zero tolerance. Nation-states 
should make the monitoring, of social networks likely 
associated with Islamic fanaticism of utmost concern to 
domestic security agencies.
Countering Pillar Three: Un-Motivating
Individuals to Commit Suicide Terrorism
Verifying one's existential worth requires the ability 
to make an impact. Individuals accordingly look for any 
number of ways to affect the world before them. Given the 
right circumstances, terror campaigns provide individuals 
with an outlet to channel their desires 'to make a 
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difference.' Suicide terrorists participate in terrorism 
for reasons, identical to other terrorists: political ones; 
but, they commit suicide for a variety of reasons, often 
unrelated and customized, if not completely personal. 
Palestinian shahids usually seek to kill Israelis out of 
vengeance and a sense of religious and cultural duty, yet 
they kill themselves for a number of reasons, both 
externally and domestically provoked. For many, 
participation in a greater cause assuages the individual's 
desire to "contribute" and thus "confirms" the importance 
of one's existence. But, beyond pursuing glory, fame or 
mere recognition, adherence to Islamic duties can also 
obscure the betrayal of Arab social norms. Sometimes 
suicide terrorists just want to die, yet need a 
"legitimate" way to do so. Murdering others in the name of 
the cause, while killing oneself provides this socio­
religious legitimacy. Whether for Allah, "Palestine," the 
um'ma or all three, individuals can rationalize and 
legitimize their escape from society via vengeance.
Thus, counter-terrorism strategies need to look at the 
bigger picture and attach themselves to larger foreign and 
domestic policies. Quelling not only the individual's 
motivation to kill, but also the motivation to kill oneself 
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over social discontentment suggests that vast social 
reforms need to occur in the locales that produce suicide 
terrorists. That most suicide terrorists come from 
societies under the rule of authoritarian leaders or live 
as second or third generation Muslim-immigrants in Western 
Europe indicates that both environments require vast 
reform. Uh-motivating individuals to commit suicide-terror 
attacks means thorough democratic reform in the greater 
Arab and Islamic worlds, and concerted integration and 
acculturation of Muslim immigrants into Western societies. 
In recent years giant leaps have been made in the former, 
and many have awakened to the necessity of the latter; 
however, both problems lie far from resolution, and 
awareness of the problems does not always translate to 
progress in the right direction. Nevertheless, Western 
policymakers need to remain focused on democratic 
reformation in the Islamic world and acculturation of 
Muslim immigrants living in Western societies.
Undercutting Istishhad with Individuality
An Old West/gunslinger adage suggests that when signs 
of the end of the world appear, men react in three 
different ways. The first man seeks all the worldly joy he 
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can muster--whiskey, prostitutes, etc. The second man heads 
to the mission and prays with the priest. The third man, 
however, gathers his resolve and revolvers and looks for 
the way to finish the game—that is, on some suicidal 
mission, he seeks to do his part in one last effort for a 
greater cause.7 Political Islam's promoters of martyrdom 
have converged the paths of these men into one; taking the 
holy man, the egotistical man, and the resolute man and 
synthesizing them into the perfect confronter of the 
world's end--thereby optimizing the capacity to produce 
vast numbers of apocalyptic perpetrators of violence. 
Ultimately, without access to alternative belief systems, 
and deprived of the opportunity to participate within a 
modern society based on the tenet of individuality, the 
apocalyptic istishhadi ideologies will continue attracting 
marginalized Muslim subjects and disaffected Muslim 
immigrants. However, ideologies such as those that promote 
istishhad never self-correct. Like with Nazism and Soviet 
Marxist-Leninism, freedom will have to push them out of 
existence.
7 Paraphrased from an explanation in Young Guns II, prod. Paul 
Schiff and Irby Smith, dir. by Geoff Murphy, 1 hr. 43 min., 
Morgan Creek/Warner Bros., 1990, DVD.
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Thus, acquiescing to suicide terrorism, or any form of 
terrorism, for that matter, represents the most lethal 
mistake any nation-state could make. Acquiescence extends 
legitimacy to those who employ terrorism—granting their 
causes and ideologies justifications for continued violence 
and setting precedents for others to mimic. The U.S. 
pullout from Lebanon in 1984, Israel's 2000 withdrawal from 
its buffer zone in Southern Lebanon and its 2005 unilateral 
disengagement from G.aza, all established significant 
victories for the strategies of guerrilla warfare and 
terrorism. Furthermore, these retreats verified the 
strategic utility of suicide-homicide attacks, and 
encouraged their continued utilization. More importantly, 
however, the continued recognition by international powers, 
including the U.S., of such organizations as the 
Palestinian Fatah legitimate the terror tactics and 
strategies that they have employed over the years. The U.S. 
makes serious contradictions when it condemns al-Qaeda in 
Iraq yet continues to fund and buttress Fatah's position 
within Palestinian politics, as both organizations continue 
to launch suicide-homicide attacks against civilians. 
Neither the Palestinian nor the jihadi-Salafi facilitators 
of suicide-terror attacks will decide to end their 
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campaigns in the foreseeable future, primarily because 
their goals, which define their existence, remain 
untenable. Organizations usually pursue their end-goals as 
best to their capabilities—therefore demonstrating 
rational behavior. Analysts and policymakers, however, 
should not assume this rationality would transmit to these 
actors moderating their end-goals. Why would they, 
particularly if they refuse to even "moderate" their means? 
How much reliance then can targeted nation-states put on 
their enemies' more "moderate" constituencies and 
representative bodies? When innocent lives are at stake, 
the answer-should always be "zero." It rests then on 
targeted nation-states to abrasively end their foes' 
suicide-terror campaigns and provide them with nothing less 
than a Carthaginian peace.
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APPENDIX A
PALESTINIAN SUICIDE-HOMICIDE ATTACKS IN ISRAEL

















1/8 Van bomb Sahar Tamam Nabulsi n/a
09/12/1993 Hamas/ 
PIJ
Gaza Prisons Service bus 0/2 Car bomb* Aymen Attalla n/a
09/14/1993 Hamas Gaza Police station 0/0 Belt bomb* n/a n/a





Bus/ Beit El 
headquarters






0/0 Car bomb* n/a n/a
11/02/1993 Hamas Singil/
Jerusalem-Shilo road
Bus 0/0 Car bomb n/a n/a





04/06/1994 Hamas Alula, Israel Bus 8/51 Car bomb Ra’id Abdallah 
Zakama
19
04/13/1994 Hamas Hadera, Israel Bus 5/30 Belt bomb Amar Amama n/a
10/19/1994 Hamas Tel Aviv, Israel Bus 22/48 Belt bomb Hassan Abd 
al-Rahman al-Suweh
27



















12/25/1994 Hamas Jerusalem, Israel Bus ' 0/13 Belt bomb Ayman Kamil Radi 
(Khan Yunis, Gaza) 
[PA police officer]
21
01/22/1995 PIJ Beit Lid junction 
(near Netanya, Israel)




04/09/1995 PIJ Kfar Darom, Gaza Bus 8/36 Car bomb Khaled Khatib 29
04/09/1995 Hamas Netsarim junction 
(Gaza)
n/a 0/Some Car bomb n/a n/a
06/25/1995 Hamas/ 
PIJ
Gaza IDF Outpost 0/3 Donkey 
bomb
Mu’awiyya Roka 22
07/24/1995 Hamas Ramat Gan, Israel Bus 6/32 Belt bomb Labib Anwar Azem 23
08/21/1995 Hamas Jerusalem, Israel Bus 4/106 Belt bomb Sufian Sbeih Jabarin 26
11/02/1995 PIJ Geffen checkpoint/ 
Kissufim crossing ' 
(Gush Katif, Gaza)





02/25/1996 Hamas Jerusalem, Israel Bus 26/80 Belt bomb Majdi Abu Wardeh 
[student]
19




1/35 Belt bomb Ibrahim Sarahneh 26
03/03/1996 Hamas Jerusalem, Israel Bus 19/10 Belt bomb Ra’id Shamubi n/a
03/04/1996 Hamas/ 
PIJ







03/21/1997 Hamas Tel Aviv, Israel Cafe Apropos 3/48 Belt bomb Musa Ghneimat 28
04/01/1997 PIJ Netzarim junction 
(Gaza)




04/01/1997 PIJ Kfar Darom, Gaza Bus 0/0 n/a Abdallah al-Madhoun n/a
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(Gaza) Sabbah;








07/30/1997 Hamas Jerusalem, Israel Mahane Yehuda 
(marketplace)







09/04/1997 Hamas Jerusalem, Israel Ben Yehuda/ 
Midrahov 
(pedestrian mall)
8/181-210 Belt bomb Tawfiq Yassin; 
Yousef Shouli; 
Asadi Tul






07/19/1998 Hamas Jerusalem, Israel Mall 0/1 n/a n/a n/a
10/29/1998 Hamas Gush Katif, Gaza IDF jeep 
(schoolbus escort)
1/8 Belt bomb Suhib Timraz 19















11/06/2000 Hamas Rafah, Gaza Israeli Navy vessel 0/0 Raft bomb n/a n/a
12/15/2000 Hamas Erez crossing 
(Gaza-Southern Israel)
Security outpost 0/0 Belt bomb n/a n/a
12/22/2000 Hamas/ 
Fatah
Mekhola, Jordan Valley Kiosk 0/3 Belt bomb Hisham Abdallah Najar24 
al-Faloji
01/01/2001 Hamas Netanya, Israel Bus 0/35-60 Car bomb Hamed Saleh Abu 
Hajle
24
03/01/2001 Hamas Mei-Ami junction 
(Wadi Ara)
Taxi 1/10 Bag bomb n/a












03/28/2001 Hamas Neve Yamin- 
Kfar Saba, Israel
Gas station 2/4 Belt bomb Fadi Attalah Yousef 
‘Amer
23
04/22/2001 Hamas Kfar Saba, Israel Bus stop 1/45-60 Belt bomb Omar Salem 22










05/18/2001 Hamas Netanya, Israel HaSharon 
(mall)





05/25/2001 Hamas Netzarim junction Bus 0/0 Truck bomb Ala Hilal Abd al-Safer 19;
Osama Nimer Darwish 21
05/25/2001 PIJ Hadera, Israel Central bus station 0/66 Car bomb Yousef Suyyat; n/a;
Nidal Jibali
(both from Jenin) 
[both PA police 
officers]
n/a
05/29/2001 Hamas Tapuach checkpoint 
(Khan Yunis, Gaza)
IDF outpost 0/2 Belt bomb n/a n/a
06/01/2001 Hamas/
PIJ
Tel Aviv, Israel Dolphinarium
(nightclub)
22/83-120 Belt bomb Sayyed al-Hotari 21
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06/17/2001 PIJ Badahaniyye, Gaza IDF outpost 0/0 Donkey-cart 
bomb
n/a n/a
06/22/2001 Hamas Alei Sinai, 
Gush Katif, Gaza
IDF patrol 2/1 Car bomb Ismail al-M’asoubi 27
07/09/2001 Hamas Kissufim crossing 
(Gush Katif, Gaza)










07/16/2001 PIJ Binyamina, Israel Bus stop/ 
train station
2/11 Belt bomb Nidal Mustafa Ibrahim 20 
(Jenin)
07/22/2001 PIJ Haifa, Israel (military) 0/0 Belt bomb* n/a n/a
08/02/2001 Hamas/ 
PIJ
Beit Shean, Israel Bus 0/0 Belt bomb* n/a n/a
08/04/2001 Hamas n/a n/a 0/0 n/a n/a n/a




0/1 Car bomb n/a n/a
08/09/2001 Hamas/ 
PIJ




Izz al-Din al-Masri 23
08/12/2001 PIJ Kiryat Mozkin,
Haifa, Israel





09/04/2001 Hamas Jerusalem, Israel Pedestrians on 
Nevi’im Street
0/13-20 Bag bomb Ra’id Nabil 
al-Barghouti
26
09/09/2001 PIJ Beit Lid junction 
(nearNetanya, Israel)




09/09/2001 Hamas Nahariya, Israel Train station 3/46-95 Bag bomb Mohammed al-Nabashi 48 
(Israeli-Arab citizen)
10/07/2001 PIJ Kibbutz Shluhot, 
Beit Shean Valley, 
Israel
Kibbutz entrance 1/5 Belt/car 
bomb








IDF jeep 0/2 Bag bomb n/a n/a
11/08/2001 Hamas Baka al-Sharkiye Border police 0/2 Bag bomb n/a n/a
11/26/2001 Hamas Erez crossing 
(Gaza-Southern Israel)
Border police 0/2 Belt bomb Tayser Ahmad Ajrami 26
11/29/2001 Fatah/ 
PIJ
Hadera, Israel Bus 3/9 Belt bombs Abd al-Karim Abu
Nafa
(Jericho)




12/01/2001 Hamas Jerusalem, Israel Ben Yehuda 
(pedestrian mall)









12/02/2001 Hamas Haifa, Israel Bus 15/40-61 Belt bomb Maher Habashi 21




Daoud Ali Ahmed 
(Artas)
43
12/09/2001 PIJ Haifa, Israel Bus stop/ 
hitchhiking post
0/30 Belt bomb Nimer Yousef 20




0/4 Bag bombs/ 
road bomb






Tulkaram, Samaria (military) 0/0 Belt bomb n/a n/a
01/17/2002 Fatah Hadera, Israel Public hall 6/some n/a n/a n/a
01/25/2002 PIJ Tel Aviv, Israel Cafe 0/23-33 Belt bomb Safwat Abd al-Rahman 18 
Khalil



















MURDERED/ BOMB BOMBER/S 
(HOMETOWN) 
[Occupation] 















3/22-30 Belt bomb Sadal Ahad Abd al- 
Haq
20




02/18/2002 Fatah Ma’ale Adumim, Judea Police 1/2 Car bomb Mohammed Hamuda n/a
02/19/2002 Fatah Mekhola junction Bus 0/0 Belt bomb n/a n/a
02/22/2002 Fatah Efrat, Gush Etzion, 
Judea
Supermarket 0/3 Beit bomb n/a n/a
02/27/2002 Fatah Maccabim junction 
(Jerusalem-Modi’in 
highway)
Police 0/5 Belt bomb Darine Abu AishaA 
[English literature 
student at al-Najah 
University]
03/02/2002 Fatah Jerusalem, Israel Yeshiva/ 
Synagogue
11/46-55 Belt bomb Mohammed Daraghme 20 
(Bethlehem)
03/05/2002 PIJ Afula, Israel Bus/bus station 1/20 Belt bomb Karim Takhaina n/a
03/07/2002 PFLP Ariel, Samaria Eshel HaShomron 
(hotel)
0/15 Belt bomb Shadi Nasser 15
03/07/2002 Hamas/ 
Fatah

















03/09/2002 Hamas Jerusalem, Israel Moment (cafe) 11/58 Belt bomb Fouda Ismail al- 
Hourani
22
03/17/2002 PIJ Jerusalem, Israel Bus/French Hill 
intersection
0/25 Belt bomb Akram Nabatiti n/a
03/20/2002 PIJ Wadi Ara
(near Afula, Israel)
Bus 7/28-42 Belt bomb Ra’afat Tahsin Slim 
Dyab
20
03/21/2002 Fatah Jerusalem, Israel Cafe/ 
pedestrians
3/86 Belt bomb Mohammed Hashaika n/a
03/22/2002 Fatah Salem/Zebub checkpoint, 
Jenin, Samaria












03/27/2002 Hamas Netanya, Israel Park Hotel 
(Passover party)
29/144 Belt bomb Abed al-Basat Ode 
(Tulkarem)
25
03/29/2002 Fatah Jerusalem, Israel Supermarket 2/22-30 Belt bomb Ayat al-AkhrasA 18
03/30/2002 Fatah Tel Aviv, Israel My Coffe Shop 
Cafe
1/29 Belt bomb Muhanad Salahat 23
03/30/2002 Fatah Baka al-Garbiayye/ 
Nazlat Issa, Samaria
Border police 1/1 Belt bomb n/a n/a
03/31/2002 Hamas Haifa, Israel Matzah 
(restaurant)/ 
gas station
15/45 Belt bomb Shadi al-Tubas 23
03/31/2002 Fatah Efrat, Judea Medical center 0/6 Belt bomb Jamil Khalaf Hamid 17
04/01/2002 Fatah Jerusalem, Israel Police roadblock 1/2 Belt bomb 
(detonated 
while in car)
Rami Mohammed Issa 19




(east of Haifa, Israel)
Bus 8/22 Belt bomb Ayman Abu Haijah 23
04/10/2002 Hamas Haifa, Israel Bus 7/several Belt bomb n/a n/a
04/11/2002 n/a Samaria n/a 0/several Belt bomb* n/a n/a
04/12/2002 Fatah Jerusalem, Israel Mahane Yehuda 
(marketplace)




04/19/2002 PIJ Gush Katif, Gaza IDF outpost 0/2 Car bomb* n/a n/a
04/20/2002 Hamas 108 Qalqilye checkpoint (military) 0/0 Belt bomb n/a n/a
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DATE ORG LOCATION TARGET MURDERED/ BOMB BOMBER/S AGE
WOUNDED TYPE (HOMETOWN) 
[Occupation]
05/07/2002 Hamas Rishon Letsion, Israel Spiel 
(Billard club)






05/08/2002 PIJ Megiddo junction Bus stop 0/3 Belt bomb n/a n/a
05/19/2002 Hamas/ 
PFLP
Netanya, Israel Open air market 3/60 Backpack 
bomb
Usama Boshkar 19




0/0 Belt bomb n/a n/a
05/22/2002 Fatah Rishon Letsion, Israel Chess Cafe at 
Rothschild Street 
(pedestrian mall)
2/36-41 Bag bomb Issa Bdeir 16
05/24/2002 Fatah Tel Aviv, Israel Studio 49 Disco 
(nightclub)
0/7 Car bomb Amar Skukani 19
05/27/2002 Fatah Petach Tikva, Israel Bravissimo 
(ice cream parlor)
2/37 Bag bomb Jihad Titi 
(Balata, Nablus)
18




17/42 Car bomb Hamza Aref Hassan 
Samudi
18
06/11/2002 Fatah Herzliya, Israel Restaurant 1/15 Pipe bomb Omar Ziada 30





0/0 Belt bomb n/a n/a









7/39-50 Bag bomb Sayyed Awadi 17
07/17/2002 Fatah Tel Aviv, Israel Theatre at 
Neve Sha’anan 
(pedestrian mall)





07/30/2002 Fatah Jerusalem, Israel Felafel stand 0/5 Belt bomb Mahsin Atta 
(Beit Jala)
17
08/04/2002 Hamas Mt. Meron junction 
(Tsafet, Israel)
Bus 9/48 Belt bomb Jihad Walid Hamada 24
08/05/2002 Fatah Umm al-Fahm junction 
(Northern Israel)
Civilian car 0/1 Belt bomb n/a n/a




1/3 Belt bomb n/a n/a
09/19/2002 Hamas Tel Aviv, Israel Bus 6/58-66 Bag bomb n/a n/a
10/09/2002 Hamas Ramat Gan, Israel Bus stop 1/30-35 Belt bomb Raifk Hamad 31
10/10/2002 n/a Kibbutz Netzer, 
Samaria




10/11/2002 Hamas Tel Aviv, Israel Tayelet 
(coffee house)
0/0 Belt bomb* n/a n/a
10/21/2002 PIJ Karkur junction 
(Pardes Hannah, Israel)












Kfar Saba, Israel Arim 
(mall)
2/37-69 Belt bomb Nabil Sawalhe 20
11/11/2002 PIJ Erez crossing 
(Gaza-Southern Israel)
Military 0/0 n/a n/a n/a
11/21/2002 Hamas Jerusalem, Israel Bus 11/51 Belt bomb Nael Abu Hilail 23




11/28/2002 PFLP Erez crossing 
(Gaza-Southern Israel)
DCO office 0/0 Car bomb n/a n/a
12/28/2002 Hamas Jerusalem, Israel Russian 0/0 Car bomb n/a n/a
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Khattab


















01/17/2003 Hamas Offshore 4 km from
Dugit, Gaza
Israeli naval vessel 0/0 Explosives- 
laden raft
n/a n/a
02/09/2003 PIJ Gush Katif, Gaza Orhan outpost 3/4 Belt bomb n/a n/a
02/19/2003 Hamas n/a n/a 0/0 n/a Karim Batron 21
03/05/2003 Hamas Haifa, Israel Bus 17/42-60 Belt bomb Mahmoud al-Qawasme 20 
(Hebron)-
03/30/2003 PIJ Netanya, Israel London Cafe 0/58 Belt bomb Rami al-Jemeel Ranam 19
04/24/2003 Fatah/ 
PFLP
Kfar Saba, Israel Train station 1/15 Belt bomb Ahmed Khaled Khatib 18
04/30/2003 Hamas/ 
al-Qaeda
Tel Aviv, Israel Mike’s Place 
(pub)
3/62 Belt bomb 
Belt bomb*
Asif Mohammed Hanif 21;
(London, England) 27
[Islamic Law Student]; 
Omar Khan Sharif 
(Darby, England)
05/08/2003 Fatah Gaza IDF tank 0/0 Car bomb n/a n/a
05/18/2003 Hamas Hebron, Judea Gross Square 2/0 Belt bomb Faud al-Qawasme 
(Hebron)
22
05/18/2003 Hamas Jerusalem, Israel Bus/ 
French Hill 
Intersection
9/20 Belt bomb Bassam Taruri 19
05/18/2003 Hamas Jerusalem, Israel Ram intersection 0/0 Bag bomb Abd’al-Fatah Ja’abari 19
05/19/2003 Hamas al-Aram checkpoint 
(near Kfar Darom, Gaza)









06/11/2003 Hamas Jerusalem, Israel Bus 17/104 Belt bomb Abd’al-Muti Shabana 18
06/19/2003 PIJ Moshav Sde Trumot, 
Israel
Grocery store 1/0 Belt bomb Ahmed Abahre 20
07/07/2003 PIJ Moshav Kfar Ya’avitz, 
Israel
Civilian home 1/6 Belt bomb Ahmed Yehiye 22
08/12/2003 Fatah Rosh HaAyin Store at Mall 1/9-10 Belt bomb Islam Yousef Qteishat 17
08/12/2003 Hamas Ariel, Samaria Bus stop 2/2-4 Belt bomb Khamis Ghazi Gerwan 17
08/19/2003 Hamas/ 
PIJ
Jerusalem, Israel Bus 24/ 
104-128
Belt bomb Ra’id Abd’al-Hamid
Masq
29
09/09/2003 Hamas Tsrifin Army Base Bus stop/ 
Hitchhiking post








10/04/2003 PIJ Haifa, Israel Maxim 
(restaurant)
21/60 Belt bomb Hanadi JaradatA 27
10/09/2003 Fatah/ 
PIJ
Tulkaram, Samaria DOC office 0/3 Belt bomb n/a n/a
11/03/2003 Fatah Azun village, Samaria IDF patrol 0/1 Belt bomb Sabih Abu Saud 16
11/09/2003 Fatah Tulkaram, Samaria (military) 0/3 n/a n/a n/a
12/25/2003 PFLP Petah Tikva, Israel Bus stop/Bne-Barak 
intersection
4/20 Belt bomb Sa’ad Hanani 18
01/11/2004 n/a n/a n/a 0/0 n/a Iyad al-Masri 16
01/14/2004 Hamas Erez crossing 
(Gaza-Southern Israel)
Workers’ terminal 4/12 Belt bomb Rim Salah al-RiyashiA 
[mother of two]
22




02/22/2004 Fatah Jerusalem, Israel Bus 8/68-72 n/a Mohammed Za’ul 
(Bethlehem)
23
02/27/2004 PIJ n/a n/a 0/0 n/a Abed al-Hameed 21
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(Gaza City)
DATE ORG LOCATION TARGET MURDERED/ BOMB BOMBER/S AGE



















Ashdod, Israel Port 11/18 Belt bomb; 
Bag bomb







Border police 1/3 Belt bomb Fadi al-Amoudi 22
04/28/2004 Hamas Kfar Darom, Gaza (military) 0/4 n/a n/a n/a
05/21/2004 PFLP Bekaot checkpoint 
(Northern Jordan Valley)
n/a 0/5 n/a n/a n/a
07/11/2004 PIJ Tel Aviv, Israel Bus stop 1/40 Belt bomb Iyad al-Masri 17
08/31/2004 Hamas Be’er-Sheva, Israel Two buses 16/100 Belt bombs Ahmed al-Qawasme; 








0/0 Car bomb n/a n/a
09/14/2004 Fatah Qalqilye, Samaria IDF jeep 0/3 n/a Yousef Ighbariye 22
09/22/2004 Fatah Jerusalem, Israel French Hill junction 
(hitchhiking post)
2/17 n/a Zainab Abu SalemA 19
11/01/2004 PFLP Tel Aviv, Israel Cannel Market 3/32 n/a Ali Amar Alfar 
(Askar, Nablus)
18
01/06/2005 Hamas Ganei Tai, 
Gush Katif, Gaza










01/18/2005 Hamas Gush Katif, Gaza ISA/IDF 
investigators
2/7 Belt bomb Omar Tabash 21
02/25/2005 PIJ Tel Aviv, Israel Stage Club 
(nightclub)
5/53 Belt bomb Abdallah Badran 21
07/12/2005 PIJ Netanya, Israel HaSharon Mall 5/90 Belt bomb Ahmad Abu Khaalil 
(Atil village)
18
08/28/2005 Hamas Be’er-Sheva, Israel Central bus station 0/52 Belt bomb n/a n/a
10/26/2005 PIJ Hadera, Israel Felafel stand at 
marketplace
6/55 Belt bomb Hassan Abu Zeid 
(Qabatiye)
20
12/05/2005 PIJ Netanya, Israel HaSharon Mall 5/50 Bag bomb Lutfi Amin 
(Kfar Rai)
20s




01/12/2006 PIJ Jenin, Samaria Security forces 0/0 Belt bomb Muataz Khalil n/a
01/19/2006 PIJ Tel Aviv, Israel Rosh Ha’ir 
(restaurant)
0/31 Belt bomb* Sami Abd al-Hafez 
Antar





Kedumim, Samaria Civilian vehicle 4/0 Belt bomb Ahamd Masharka 
(Hebron)
24
04/17/2006 PIJ Tel Aviv, Israel Rosh Ha’ir 
(restaurant)




10/06/2006 PIJ Beit Hanoun area, Gaza IDF soldiers 0/1 Belt bomb Mirfat Amin MasoudA 
(Jabaliyye)
n/a









DATE ORG LOCATION TARGET MURDERED/ BOMB BOMBER/S AGE












04/19/2008 Hamas Kerem Shalom crossing 
(Gaza-Southern Israel)














Sources: MFA, ICT, Jerusalem Post, Ha’aretz, Deutsche Presse-Agentur
Cross-Referenced with: Mohammed M. Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers 
(Washington D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Process, 2006); Ami Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism. (Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 
2005); Shaul Shay, The Shahids: Islam and Suicide Attacks (London: Transaction Publishers, 2004); Human Rights Watch, Erased in 
a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks against Israeli Civilians (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2002).
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former leader Yasser Arafat
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